Ricardo Garza v. Mike Morath, Texas Commissioner of Education and La Joya Independent School District

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided December 19, 2024·No. 13-23-00257-CV·Published

Opinion

NUMBER 13-23-00257-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

RICARDO GARZA, Appellant, v.

MIKE MORATH, TEXAS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION AND LA JOYA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM THE 430TH DISTRICT COURT OF HIDALGO COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Longoria, Tijerina, and Peña Memorandum Opinion by Justice Tijerina

This appeal stems from the nonrenewal of appellant Ricardo Garza’s employment contract with appellee La Joya Independent School District (the District). Garza appeals the trial court’s decision upholding appellee the Texas Commissioner of Education’s

(Commissioner) decision denying Garza’s appeal of the District’s nonrenewal. By two issues, Garza argues: (1) the District did not conduct its own investigation and instead accepted the investigation performed by its police department; and (2) substantial evidence does not support the Commissioner’s decision. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The District employed Garza as a physical education elementary school teacher under a term contract. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.201(3) (defining “term contract” as “any contract of employment for a fixed term between a school district and a teacher”). After three second-grade students accused Garza of inappropriately touching them, Garza was placed on administrative leave with pay on January 22, 2022. Garza was subsequently arrested for the allegations.

On May 11, 2022, the District sent Garza notice of its proposed nonrenewal. Garza requested a hearing before the school board pursuant to the District’s nonrenewal policies. See id. § 21.207(a) (requiring the school board to provide a hearing within fifteen days of the teacher’s request after notice of a proposed nonrenewal). A hearing was held on June 14, 2022. Witnesses testified on the District’s behalf including its superintendent, several of Garza’s colleagues, parents, and Garza’s principal. Garza was present at the hearing with his attorney, and evidence was presented. Following the hearing, the school board voted to uphold the District’s recommendation that Garza’s contract not be renewed. The District notified Garza that it would not be renewing his contract based on these specific provisions of the District’s policy: failure to fulfill duties or responsibilities,

insubordination, failure to meet professional conduct, diminished capacity of effectiveness because of publicity, breach of contract, behavior that presents a physical harm to students, assault on a student, and good cause.

Garza appealed the school board’s decision to the Commissioner on June 30, 2022. See id. § 21.301 (“Appeal to Commissioner”). On August 17, 2022, the Commissioner issued a written decision, affirming the school board’s vote. Garza then appealed to the district court. See id. § 21.307 (“Judicial Appeals”). After reviewing the merits of Garza’s appeal, the district court affirmed the Commissioner’s decision, finding that the denial of Garza’s appeal was supported by substantial evidence. This appeal followed.

II. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE By two issues, Garza argues that the District’s decision not to renew his contract is not supported by substantial evidence because the District solely relied on its police department’s investigation rather than conduct its own independent investigation. A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law An aggrieved party may appeal a school board’s decision not to renew a term contract to the Commissioner. See id. § 21.301. In reviewing the school board’s decision, the Commissioner may not substitute his or her judgment for that of the school board unless the school board’s decision is: (1) arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful; or (2) not supported by substantial evidence. Id. § 21.303(b)(1). The Commissioner may not reverse a decision of a school board based on a procedural irregularity or error by the

board unless the Commissioner determines that the irregularity or error was likely to have led to an erroneous decision. Id. § 21.303(c). The Commissioner must also issue a written decision that includes findings of fact and conclusions of law. See id. § 21.304.

A party may appeal the Commissioner’s decision to the district court. See id. § 21.307 (a)(1) (providing for judicial review of the commissioner’s decision). Under the substantial evidence rule, the district court “review[s] the evidence on the evidentiary record made at the local level and any evidence taken by the commissioner but may not take additional evidence.” Id. § 21.307(e). The district court may not “reverse the decision of the commissioner unless the decision was not supported by substantial evidence or unless the commissioner’s conclusions of law are erroneous.” Id. § 21.307(f). “Substantial evidence review is a limited standard of review, requiring ‘only more than a mere scintilla [of evidence],’ to support an agency’s determination.” Edinburg Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Esparza, 603 S.W.3d 468, 478 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2020, no pet.) (quoting Montgomery Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Davis, 34 S.W.3d 559, 562 (Tex. 2000)).

In our review, we “focus on whose decision is properly before us.” Davis, 34 S.W.3d at 562. “If, based on the evidence as a whole, reasonable minds could have reached the same conclusion as the Commissioner, then the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Id. Whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence is a question of law. Id. “[E]vidence in the record may preponderate against the agency decision and still amount to substantial evidence

supporting the decision,” and we will “uphold the Commissioner’s decision on any legal basis shown in the record.” Id. B. Discussion Garza argues that the only evidence before the District was its police department’s investigation and that the District is prohibited from using this evidence to make an administrative decision. Contrary to Garza’s assertion, this record is replete with evidence the Commissioner considered in its review of Garza’s appeal including: walkthrough evaluations performed by Garza’s principal Dulce Diaz and assistant principal Yvonne Rosales wherein they observed his interactions with female students and lack of classroom management; communication logs between Diaz, Garza, and Rosales instructing Garza to redirect his behavior and keep his distance from female students; affidavits from Garza’s colleagues witnessing his physical interactions and inappropriate physical contact with female students; conference notes between Diaz and Garza regarding student safety; affidavits from parents of the children who made outcries regarding Garza inappropriately touching the female students; numerous student interviews; forensic interviews of the alleged child victims; the District’s police department investigation report; the District’s employee handbook; the District’s local policies; evidence that Garza received sexual harassment training; warrants for Garza’s arrest; questionnaires from Garza’s colleagues; and the Title IX Investigator report, among others. Therefore, Garza’s assertion that the only evidence before the District was its police department’s investigation is inaccurate.

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Ricardo Garza v. Mike Morath, Texas Commissioner of Education and La Joya Independent School District, (Tex. Ct. App. 2024).

Ricardo Garza v. Mike Morath, Texas Commissioner of Education and La Joya Independent School District (Ricardo Garza v. Mike Morath, Texas Commissioner of Education and La Joya Independent School District) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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