IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION RASSAN TARABEIN, ) #16872-003 ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-00328-JB-B v. ) ) KATHRYN SCOTT, et al., ) ) Defendants. )
ORDER This ac)on is before the Court on Plain)ff, Rassan Tarabein’s (“Tarabein”) Mo)on to Recuse Judge Jeffrey Beaverstock Due to Conflict of Interest (Doc. 4) and Mo)on to Object to Judge Bivins’ Order, Request for Reconsidera)on, and Mo)on to Compel Judge Beaverstock to Recuse. (Doc. 12). AQer careful considera)on of the issues raised and for the reasons set forth below, Tarabein’s mo)ons are DENIED. I. Background On September 9, 2024, Tarabein a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, filed the instant ac)on seeking relief pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narco1915(b)(2). (Id.). Once Tarabein paid the ini)al filing fee, this Court entered an Order for Payment of Remainder of Prisoner Filing Fee. (Doc. 11). The Order set forth that the remainder of the filing fee was to be
paid in monthly increment payments in the amount of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to Plain)ff’s prisoner account in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(2). (Id.). Thus, the Court Ordered that each )me the amount in Plain)ff’s escrow account exceeds $10.00, the Warden at FPC Montgomery should remit payments to the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama un)l the remaining $289.97 of the filing fee was paid in full. (Id.).
On October 30, 2024, Tarabein filed the instant mo)on seeking reconsidera)on of Judge Bivins’ Order of October 22, 2024 (Doc. 11) and a Mo)on to Compel Judge Beaverstock to Recuse.1 (Doc. 12). II. Analysis A. ObjecVon and MoVon to Reconsider
Tarabein seeks reconsidera)on of the Order entered by Magistrate Judge Bivins ordering him to pay the filing fee for his civil ac)on, as the funds become available in his account. First Tarabein contends the subject order, by imposing a financial strain, “infringes upon his rights under the First Amendment, which guarantees the right to pe))on the government for redress of grievances, and the FiQh Amendment, which protects against depriva)on of property without
1 With respect to recusal, Tarabein’s combined mo7on (Doc. 11) incorporates those arguments previously raised in his earlier filed separate mo7on for recusal (Doc. 4). The undersigned has considered the substance of both mo7ons for recusal, but will primarily refer to the first filed mo7on as it sets forth Tarabein’s posi7on with more specificity. Nevertheless, because both mo7ons present the same arguments, they are both denied. due process.” (Doc. 12). As a result of the alleged financial hardship, Tarabein addi)onally argues that the Court should “cap” the total deduc)on from his account at 20%, regardless of the number of cases he files. This argument rest on Tarabein’s acknowledgment that he currently has four
pending case that would cumula)vely require 80% of his account to be paid to the Court for his pending cases, leaving only 20% of his funds for basic necessi)es. Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), payment of the filing fee is mandatory. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). Accordingly, prisoners are responsible for paying their filing fees the moment the civil action or appeal is filed. Nevertheless, an exception exists for prisoners who have “no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.” 28 U.S.C. §
1915(b)(4). “However, ‘the prisoner is still obligated to pay the full filing fee when the money does become available.’ ” Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 722 n.4 (11th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 524 U.S. 978 (1998) (citation omitted). As such § 1915(b) permits the Court to assess the funds available to the prisoner, collect a partial payment, and thereafter collect monthly payments of the prisoner’s preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account until the total filing
fee has been paid. “[P]roceeding IFP in a civil case is a privilege, not a right -- fundamental or otherwise.” Rivera, 144 F.3d at *724. Tarabein’s mo)on seeking reconsidera)on of Magistrate Judge Bivins’ Order or alterna)vely seeking a “cap” on the funds deducted from his account is due to be denied. First, Judge Bivins’ Order dictates funds are to be withdrawn from Tarabein’s account in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). Tarabein makes no argument that deduction of funds is inconsistent
with the PLRA. Moreover, Tarabein’s’ arguments that the withdrawal of funds pursuant to § 1915 creates a financial hardship that results in a Constitutional violation is without merit. Despite his beliefs, the restriction imposed on Tarabein (payment of the fee in accordance with § 1915) did not block his access to the Court. In fact, it is apparent that Tarabein has been able to file, not one, but four pending lawsuits. Along similar lines, the Eleventh Circuit has previously
determined that other portions of § 1915 do not block court access. (See e.g. Vanderberg v. Donaldson, 259 F.3d 1321, 1323 (11th Cir. 2001). (“But sec)on 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) only addresses procedures to be followed by the district court once an inmate's claim is presented before the court. In no way does the sec)on restrict the ability of a prisoner to prepare and file complaints, thereby bringing them to a court's amen)on.”) Accordingly, Tarabein’s posi)on does not compel this Court to reconsider its previous determina)on.
Tarabein addi)onally argues that the Court should “cap” the total deduc)on from his account at 20%, regardless of the number of cases he files. This argument rests on Tarabein’s acknowledgment that he currently has four pending civil cases which he believes would cumula)vely require 80% of his account to be paid to the Court for his pending cases, leaving only 20% of his funds for basic necessi)es.2 Again, the Court is not convinced. First, a review of the
Tarabein’s pending cases indicates that a payment order has only been entered in two (2) of his cases, not all four. Moreover, while Judge Bivins’ Order requires the remainder of the filing fee to be paid in monthly increments of 20% of the preceding month’s account balance, it also requires that the account must have a balance of over ten (10) dollars. As a result, regardless of the number of cases Tarabein files or has pending, the Court’s payment cannot leave Tarabein’s
2 Tarabein does not cite to anything for his belief that his account balance would be reduced by 80% and did not submit any documents suppor7ng the same. In fact, it does not appear that the Court has received any payments in any of Tarabein’s pending civil cases since October 2024, when payment orders were entered in two of his pending ac7ons.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION RASSAN TARABEIN, ) #16872-003 ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-00328-JB-B v. ) ) KATHRYN SCOTT, et al., ) ) Defendants. )
ORDER This ac)on is before the Court on Plain)ff, Rassan Tarabein’s (“Tarabein”) Mo)on to Recuse Judge Jeffrey Beaverstock Due to Conflict of Interest (Doc. 4) and Mo)on to Object to Judge Bivins’ Order, Request for Reconsidera)on, and Mo)on to Compel Judge Beaverstock to Recuse. (Doc. 12). AQer careful considera)on of the issues raised and for the reasons set forth below, Tarabein’s mo)ons are DENIED. I. Background On September 9, 2024, Tarabein a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, filed the instant ac)on seeking relief pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narco1915(b)(2). (Id.). Once Tarabein paid the ini)al filing fee, this Court entered an Order for Payment of Remainder of Prisoner Filing Fee. (Doc. 11). The Order set forth that the remainder of the filing fee was to be
paid in monthly increment payments in the amount of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to Plain)ff’s prisoner account in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(2). (Id.). Thus, the Court Ordered that each )me the amount in Plain)ff’s escrow account exceeds $10.00, the Warden at FPC Montgomery should remit payments to the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama un)l the remaining $289.97 of the filing fee was paid in full. (Id.).
On October 30, 2024, Tarabein filed the instant mo)on seeking reconsidera)on of Judge Bivins’ Order of October 22, 2024 (Doc. 11) and a Mo)on to Compel Judge Beaverstock to Recuse.1 (Doc. 12). II. Analysis A. ObjecVon and MoVon to Reconsider
Tarabein seeks reconsidera)on of the Order entered by Magistrate Judge Bivins ordering him to pay the filing fee for his civil ac)on, as the funds become available in his account. First Tarabein contends the subject order, by imposing a financial strain, “infringes upon his rights under the First Amendment, which guarantees the right to pe))on the government for redress of grievances, and the FiQh Amendment, which protects against depriva)on of property without
1 With respect to recusal, Tarabein’s combined mo7on (Doc. 11) incorporates those arguments previously raised in his earlier filed separate mo7on for recusal (Doc. 4). The undersigned has considered the substance of both mo7ons for recusal, but will primarily refer to the first filed mo7on as it sets forth Tarabein’s posi7on with more specificity. Nevertheless, because both mo7ons present the same arguments, they are both denied. due process.” (Doc. 12). As a result of the alleged financial hardship, Tarabein addi)onally argues that the Court should “cap” the total deduc)on from his account at 20%, regardless of the number of cases he files. This argument rest on Tarabein’s acknowledgment that he currently has four
pending case that would cumula)vely require 80% of his account to be paid to the Court for his pending cases, leaving only 20% of his funds for basic necessi)es. Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), payment of the filing fee is mandatory. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). Accordingly, prisoners are responsible for paying their filing fees the moment the civil action or appeal is filed. Nevertheless, an exception exists for prisoners who have “no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.” 28 U.S.C. §
1915(b)(4). “However, ‘the prisoner is still obligated to pay the full filing fee when the money does become available.’ ” Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 722 n.4 (11th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 524 U.S. 978 (1998) (citation omitted). As such § 1915(b) permits the Court to assess the funds available to the prisoner, collect a partial payment, and thereafter collect monthly payments of the prisoner’s preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account until the total filing
fee has been paid. “[P]roceeding IFP in a civil case is a privilege, not a right -- fundamental or otherwise.” Rivera, 144 F.3d at *724. Tarabein’s mo)on seeking reconsidera)on of Magistrate Judge Bivins’ Order or alterna)vely seeking a “cap” on the funds deducted from his account is due to be denied. First, Judge Bivins’ Order dictates funds are to be withdrawn from Tarabein’s account in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). Tarabein makes no argument that deduction of funds is inconsistent
with the PLRA. Moreover, Tarabein’s’ arguments that the withdrawal of funds pursuant to § 1915 creates a financial hardship that results in a Constitutional violation is without merit. Despite his beliefs, the restriction imposed on Tarabein (payment of the fee in accordance with § 1915) did not block his access to the Court. In fact, it is apparent that Tarabein has been able to file, not one, but four pending lawsuits. Along similar lines, the Eleventh Circuit has previously
determined that other portions of § 1915 do not block court access. (See e.g. Vanderberg v. Donaldson, 259 F.3d 1321, 1323 (11th Cir. 2001). (“But sec)on 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) only addresses procedures to be followed by the district court once an inmate's claim is presented before the court. In no way does the sec)on restrict the ability of a prisoner to prepare and file complaints, thereby bringing them to a court's amen)on.”) Accordingly, Tarabein’s posi)on does not compel this Court to reconsider its previous determina)on.
Tarabein addi)onally argues that the Court should “cap” the total deduc)on from his account at 20%, regardless of the number of cases he files. This argument rests on Tarabein’s acknowledgment that he currently has four pending civil cases which he believes would cumula)vely require 80% of his account to be paid to the Court for his pending cases, leaving only 20% of his funds for basic necessi)es.2 Again, the Court is not convinced. First, a review of the
Tarabein’s pending cases indicates that a payment order has only been entered in two (2) of his cases, not all four. Moreover, while Judge Bivins’ Order requires the remainder of the filing fee to be paid in monthly increments of 20% of the preceding month’s account balance, it also requires that the account must have a balance of over ten (10) dollars. As a result, regardless of the number of cases Tarabein files or has pending, the Court’s payment cannot leave Tarabein’s
2 Tarabein does not cite to anything for his belief that his account balance would be reduced by 80% and did not submit any documents suppor7ng the same. In fact, it does not appear that the Court has received any payments in any of Tarabein’s pending civil cases since October 2024, when payment orders were entered in two of his pending ac7ons. Moreover, upon inquiry, it appears that 20% would be taken from Tarabein’s account and either applied to each case in order of filing (oldest first) or divided and allocated to each case. account with a zero balance. Finally, as the Eleventh Circuit has recognized “proceeding IFP in a civil case is a privilege, not a right.” See Rivera, supra. Importantly, Tarabein’s decision to file numerous lawsuits is one of free will and the Court is not persuaded that he, in contrast to any
other prisoner, should be relieved of the financial consequences of his choice. Accordingly, Tarabein’s motion is due to be denied. B. MoVon to Recuse According to Tarabein, Judge Beaverstock should be recused from this ac)on based on a conflict of interest, demonstrated bias, and prejudicial involvement in prior related proceedings. (Doc. 4). More specifically, Tarabein asserts that because Judge Beaverstock presided over the
criminal ac)on (where he was allegedly wrongfully convicted based on false evidence) which forms the basis of his current ac)on against the defendants, “Judge Beaverstock cannot be expected to fairly adjudicated the current civil mamer arising from the same facts.” (Doc. 4). In that respect, Tarabein contends Judge Beaverstock (1) “denied cri)cal defense mo)ons” allowing fabricated evidence to be presented at trial, (2) permimed the “submission of clear exculpatory
evidence” resul)ng in the imposi)on of a maximum sentence in defiance of precedent, and (3) demonstrated a clear pamern of bias, including religious discrimina)on of Tarabein who is Muslim. (Doc. 4). As a result, Tarabein argues Judge Beaverstock should recuse himself pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 455(a) and (b)(1) and Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994). Sec)on 455(a), requires recusal “in any proceeding in which his impar)ality might reasonably be ques)oned.” “The test is whether an objec)ve disinterested, lay observer fully
informed of the facts underlying the grounds on which recusal was sought would entertain a significant doubt about the judge's impar)ality.” Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1524 (11th Cir. 1988). Sec)on 455(b)(1) requires disqualifica)on when a judge “has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed eviden)ary facts concerning the proceeding”.
As an ini)al mamer, Tarabein has previously sought, without success, the recusal of Judge Beaverstock in his criminal ac)on. As a result, Tarabein is familiar with the considera)ons for recusal and has previously been informed those standards have not been met with respect to the undersigned. The mo)on for recusal in this ac)on suffers the same fate. Although Tarabein uses words such as “unfair”, “biased”, “prejudiced”, “impar)al”, and the like, he cannot point to any support for his allega)ons. Instead, Tarabein points generally to the fact that Judge Beaverstock
denied mo)ons or permimed evidence in his criminal proceedings. As the Court has previously informed Tarabein, disagreement with a Court’s decision is not evidence of impar)ality or a valid ground for recusal. See Nelson v. Saul, No. CV 18-00385-CG-N, 2020 WL 1315716, at *7 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 6, 2020), R & R adopted, No.CV 18-00385-CG-N, 2020 WL 1310477 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 19, 2020) (rejec)ng challenge to judge’s impar)ality that was premised on nothing more than a
disagreement with the decision); In re Evergreen Sec., Ltd., 570 F.3d 1257, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining that challenges to adverse rulings are not grounds for recusal). Similarly, Tarabein has failed to show any evidence of religious bias. Again, he simply states he is Muslim without any reference to allegedly prejudicial conduct based on the same. As a result, Tarabein has presented no evidence to support the recusal of the undersigned, and his mo)on is due to be denied. III. Conclusion AQer careful considera)on of the issues raised and for the reasons set forth above,
Tarabein’s mo)ons (Docs. 4 and 12) are DENIED. DONE and ORDERED this 27th day of March, 2025. /s/ JEFFREY U. BEAVERSTOCK CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE