Goolsby, Judge:
In these consolidated actions based primarily on alleged acts of negligence, gross negligence, recklessness, willfulness, and wantonness that damaged real and personal property belonging to the respondents Charles T. and Ann M. Tant, H. B. and Lona C. Lynn, Viola S. Parrish, and Kathleen S. DuBose, Dan River, Inc., appeals from the judgments rendered in favor of the respondents following a jury trial. The issues on appeal relate to the awards of punitive damages and to the admissibility of certain evidence. We affirm the awards of actual damages and reverse the awards of punitive damages.
The respondents, who are residents of Easley, South Carolina, allege that between November 18, 1980, and either the latter part of April or the first part of May, 1981, Dan River’s Easley plant emitted a black, tarry soot that fell [143]*143upon and damaged their respective homes and items of personal property. The jury awarded the Tants $5,500.00 actual damages and $12,500.00 punitive damages, the Lynns $600.00 actual damages and $7,500.00 punitive damages, Parrish $250.00 actual damages and $7,500.00 punitive damages, and DuBose $400.00 actual damages and $7,500.00 punitive damages.
During the trial, the respondents introduced a vial containing material they said represented a sample of the substance that fell on their properties and a report relating to an analysis of the sample material. Dan River objected to the introduction of both the sample material and the report.
I.
Dan River maintains that the evidence does not support the awards of punitive damages. We agree.
Dan River operates a manufacturing plant or mill in Easley, South Carolina, powered by a coal-fired boiler system. A tall smoke stack serves the system’s boilers.
The Tants were the first to complain to Dan River about oily, black soot. They called Dan River on November 20, 1980, two days after the soot allegedly accumulated on their house and yard and stuck to their motor vehicles. There is no evidence that Dan River’s operation of its Easley mill had previously prompted any complaints to Dan River about soot discharges from its smoke stack. In fact, one month prior to the incident in question, Dan River’s operation of the mill was judged to be in compliance with all air pollution control regulations and standards of the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC).
Immediately after the Tants complained of the soot, Dan River sent representatives to visit them and to inspect their property. Dan River also employed J. E. Sirrine Company to inspect its boiler facilities. At Sirrine’s suggestion, Dan River completely rebuilt its primary boiler and installed an over-fire air fan system at its Easley mill. Dan River also retrained its boiler operators. By April 15, 1981, approximately five months after receiving the first complaint, Dan River’s emission problems were remedied.
[144]*144In South Carolina, punitive damages are recoverable when a defendant’s acts are willful and wanton or are so grossly negligent or reckless as to imply willfulness and wantonness. Sample v. Gulf Refining Co., 183 S. C. 399, 191 S. E. 209 (1937). They are also recoverable where the evidence shows a malicious invasion of the plaintiffs rights. Fennell v. Littlejohn, 240 S. C. 189, 125 S. E. (2d) 408 (1962). Punitive damages, however, may not be awarded for mere gross negligence or for inadvertence. Hicks v. McCandlish, 221 S. C. 410, 70 S. E. (2d) 629 (1952). “The test by which a tort is to be characterized as reckless, willful or wanton is whether it has been committed in such a manner or under such circumstances that a person of ordinary reason or prudence would then have been conscious of it as an invasion of the plaintiff’s rights.” Hinson v. A. T. Sistare Construction Co., 236 S. C. 125, 131-32, 113 S. E. (2d) 341, 344 (1960).
Here, no evidence supports a finding that Dan River acted either willfully, wantonly, maliciously, or with a present consciousness of wrongdoing. At most, the evidence shows mere gross negligence or inadvertence.
The respondents placed much emphasis on an internal memorandum written two months after the soot problem arose and during the time Dan River was undertaking corrective measures. The memorandum recites that the “Easley boiler installation has been a matter of increasing concern for the last few years” and that the “boilers have been on the ‘ragged edge’ for years as far as the air pollution regulations are concerned.” While the boilers operated on the “ragged edge,” they nevertheless enjoyed DHEC approval.
We recognize that Dan River’s boilers and smoke stack were old at the time the pollution occurred; however, this fact, without more, affords no basis for an award of punitive damages. See Newman v. Nelson, 350 F. (2d) 602 (10th Cir. 1985). To justify an award of punitive damages, the record should include proof that the boiler installation was persistently, recklessly, or indifferently maintained. Id. The record here contains no such proof.
Although no South Carolina precedent exists, courts elsewhere have denied punitive damages where the defendant, upon learning of a problem, takes reasonable steps to end or minimize any damage to the plaintiff and there is neither [145]*145any evidence of any wrongful intent on the defendant’s part to injure the plaintiff or his property nor any evidence of any conscious or willful disregard by the defendant of the plaintiff’s rights. See Harrison v. Indiana Auto Shredders Co., 528 F. (2d) 1107 (7th Cir. 1976); Earl v. Clark, 219 N.W. (2d) 487 (Iowa 1974); Lacy Feed Co. v. Parrish, 517 S.W. (2d) 845 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (error refused NRE); Atkinson v. Herington Cattle Co., 200 Kan. 298, 436 P. (2d) 816 (1968); Newman v. Nelson, supra; Laurel Equipment Co. v. Matthews, 218 Miss. 718, 67 So. (2d) 258 (1953). The cases brought by the Tants and the others fall within this rule.
The submission to the jury of the issue of punitive damages, then, was unwarranted.
II.
Dan River next contends that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence a vial of sample material and a DHEC report containing an analysis of the sample material.
Dan River states in its exceptions that the sample material and the report based upon the sample material were irrelevant because “it was not sufficiently proven that the sample material was representative of the effluents allegedly deposited on the ... respondent’s properties] by [Dan River]” and because the respondents failed to establish a complete chain of evidence of the sample material prior to its analysis by DHEC.
Dan River’s first ground of objection goes to the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility. Moreover, the representative character of the sample material was established since testimony showed that it consisted of a substance collected on the same day off the surface of two different vehicles, one belonging to the Tants and the other to the Duboses. Chemical analysis indicated the sample material matched a fly ash sample subsequently collected at Dan River’s plant.
At any rate, the question of whether the sample material was relevant rested largely within the discretion of the trial judge. See Ward v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 232 S. C. 582, 103 S. E. (2d) 48 (1958); Neal v. Clark, 199 S. C. 316, 19 S. E. (2d) 473 (1942).
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Goolsby, Judge:
In these consolidated actions based primarily on alleged acts of negligence, gross negligence, recklessness, willfulness, and wantonness that damaged real and personal property belonging to the respondents Charles T. and Ann M. Tant, H. B. and Lona C. Lynn, Viola S. Parrish, and Kathleen S. DuBose, Dan River, Inc., appeals from the judgments rendered in favor of the respondents following a jury trial. The issues on appeal relate to the awards of punitive damages and to the admissibility of certain evidence. We affirm the awards of actual damages and reverse the awards of punitive damages.
The respondents, who are residents of Easley, South Carolina, allege that between November 18, 1980, and either the latter part of April or the first part of May, 1981, Dan River’s Easley plant emitted a black, tarry soot that fell [143]*143upon and damaged their respective homes and items of personal property. The jury awarded the Tants $5,500.00 actual damages and $12,500.00 punitive damages, the Lynns $600.00 actual damages and $7,500.00 punitive damages, Parrish $250.00 actual damages and $7,500.00 punitive damages, and DuBose $400.00 actual damages and $7,500.00 punitive damages.
During the trial, the respondents introduced a vial containing material they said represented a sample of the substance that fell on their properties and a report relating to an analysis of the sample material. Dan River objected to the introduction of both the sample material and the report.
I.
Dan River maintains that the evidence does not support the awards of punitive damages. We agree.
Dan River operates a manufacturing plant or mill in Easley, South Carolina, powered by a coal-fired boiler system. A tall smoke stack serves the system’s boilers.
The Tants were the first to complain to Dan River about oily, black soot. They called Dan River on November 20, 1980, two days after the soot allegedly accumulated on their house and yard and stuck to their motor vehicles. There is no evidence that Dan River’s operation of its Easley mill had previously prompted any complaints to Dan River about soot discharges from its smoke stack. In fact, one month prior to the incident in question, Dan River’s operation of the mill was judged to be in compliance with all air pollution control regulations and standards of the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC).
Immediately after the Tants complained of the soot, Dan River sent representatives to visit them and to inspect their property. Dan River also employed J. E. Sirrine Company to inspect its boiler facilities. At Sirrine’s suggestion, Dan River completely rebuilt its primary boiler and installed an over-fire air fan system at its Easley mill. Dan River also retrained its boiler operators. By April 15, 1981, approximately five months after receiving the first complaint, Dan River’s emission problems were remedied.
[144]*144In South Carolina, punitive damages are recoverable when a defendant’s acts are willful and wanton or are so grossly negligent or reckless as to imply willfulness and wantonness. Sample v. Gulf Refining Co., 183 S. C. 399, 191 S. E. 209 (1937). They are also recoverable where the evidence shows a malicious invasion of the plaintiffs rights. Fennell v. Littlejohn, 240 S. C. 189, 125 S. E. (2d) 408 (1962). Punitive damages, however, may not be awarded for mere gross negligence or for inadvertence. Hicks v. McCandlish, 221 S. C. 410, 70 S. E. (2d) 629 (1952). “The test by which a tort is to be characterized as reckless, willful or wanton is whether it has been committed in such a manner or under such circumstances that a person of ordinary reason or prudence would then have been conscious of it as an invasion of the plaintiff’s rights.” Hinson v. A. T. Sistare Construction Co., 236 S. C. 125, 131-32, 113 S. E. (2d) 341, 344 (1960).
Here, no evidence supports a finding that Dan River acted either willfully, wantonly, maliciously, or with a present consciousness of wrongdoing. At most, the evidence shows mere gross negligence or inadvertence.
The respondents placed much emphasis on an internal memorandum written two months after the soot problem arose and during the time Dan River was undertaking corrective measures. The memorandum recites that the “Easley boiler installation has been a matter of increasing concern for the last few years” and that the “boilers have been on the ‘ragged edge’ for years as far as the air pollution regulations are concerned.” While the boilers operated on the “ragged edge,” they nevertheless enjoyed DHEC approval.
We recognize that Dan River’s boilers and smoke stack were old at the time the pollution occurred; however, this fact, without more, affords no basis for an award of punitive damages. See Newman v. Nelson, 350 F. (2d) 602 (10th Cir. 1985). To justify an award of punitive damages, the record should include proof that the boiler installation was persistently, recklessly, or indifferently maintained. Id. The record here contains no such proof.
Although no South Carolina precedent exists, courts elsewhere have denied punitive damages where the defendant, upon learning of a problem, takes reasonable steps to end or minimize any damage to the plaintiff and there is neither [145]*145any evidence of any wrongful intent on the defendant’s part to injure the plaintiff or his property nor any evidence of any conscious or willful disregard by the defendant of the plaintiff’s rights. See Harrison v. Indiana Auto Shredders Co., 528 F. (2d) 1107 (7th Cir. 1976); Earl v. Clark, 219 N.W. (2d) 487 (Iowa 1974); Lacy Feed Co. v. Parrish, 517 S.W. (2d) 845 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (error refused NRE); Atkinson v. Herington Cattle Co., 200 Kan. 298, 436 P. (2d) 816 (1968); Newman v. Nelson, supra; Laurel Equipment Co. v. Matthews, 218 Miss. 718, 67 So. (2d) 258 (1953). The cases brought by the Tants and the others fall within this rule.
The submission to the jury of the issue of punitive damages, then, was unwarranted.
II.
Dan River next contends that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence a vial of sample material and a DHEC report containing an analysis of the sample material.
Dan River states in its exceptions that the sample material and the report based upon the sample material were irrelevant because “it was not sufficiently proven that the sample material was representative of the effluents allegedly deposited on the ... respondent’s properties] by [Dan River]” and because the respondents failed to establish a complete chain of evidence of the sample material prior to its analysis by DHEC.
Dan River’s first ground of objection goes to the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility. Moreover, the representative character of the sample material was established since testimony showed that it consisted of a substance collected on the same day off the surface of two different vehicles, one belonging to the Tants and the other to the Duboses. Chemical analysis indicated the sample material matched a fly ash sample subsequently collected at Dan River’s plant.
At any rate, the question of whether the sample material was relevant rested largely within the discretion of the trial judge. See Ward v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 232 S. C. 582, 103 S. E. (2d) 48 (1958); Neal v. Clark, 199 S. C. 316, 19 S. E. (2d) 473 (1942). Clearly, the sample material was relevant. It legally tended “to prove, or make more [146]*146or less probable some matter in issue.” Gause v. Livingston, 251 S. C. 8, 13, 159 S. E. (2d) 604, 607 (1968). In this instance, a “matter in issue” was whether a discharge from Dan River’s plant fell on the respondents’ homes and motor vehicles.
As to the chain of evidence argument, we recognize that the party offering a specimen is required to establish, as least as far as practicable, a complete chain of evidence from the time the specimen is first acquired until it is taken to the final custodian by whom the specimen is analyzed. Benton v. Pellum, 232 S. C. 26, 100 S. E. (2d) 534 (1957). Proof, however, “need not negate all possibility of tampering” and “[w]here the substance analyzed has passed through several hands the evidence must not leave it to conjecture as to who had it and what was done with it between the taking and the analysis.” Id. at 33-34, 100 S. E. (2d) at 537.
In this instance, the testimony completely established the chain of evidence from the time the sample material was collected until it reached the DHEC laboratory. The vial containing the sample material was identified by the party who supervised the substance’s collection and by the laboratory technician at DHEC who ultimately received and analyzed it. Those who had custody of the sample material between the time it was collected and the time it was analyzed also testified. No evidence was presented to suggest the vial was tampered with.
The trial judge, therefore, did not abuse his discretion in admitting in evidence the vial containing the sample material and the report from DHEC.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Cureton, J., concurs, and Gardner, J., dissents.