MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
CLARIE, District Judge.
The plaintiffs have petitioned the Court to declare unconstitutional and invalid that part of Conn.Gen.Stat. § 9-400,1 which imposes as a condition [515]*515precedent that a prospective candidate receive the support of at least 20% of the delegate strength in a district convention on any roll call vote, in order to qualify to run in a district office primary which would select the party endorsed nominee.2 The plaintiffs represent that they have otherwise satisfied all the requirements of § 9-400.
District conventions are required for the choosing of candidates for all district offices pursuant to Conn.Gen.Stat. § 9-382. The plaintiffs claim, however, that those running for the same office as they, i. e., in the cases of Tansley and Verriker, state senator, and in the case of Rotatori, probate judge, but whose district is territorially confined to a single municipality as opposed to a multiple town district, are not subject to the same 20% qualifying requirement. These latter offices are classified as “municipal offices”3 and a convention is not required by law prior to their selection as party-endorsed candidates. The statutes precribe that the local party rules may provide for their selection in one of three ways, namely:
“(1) by the enrolled members of such party in the municipality at a caucus or (2) by delegates to a convention chosen in accordance with such rules by such enrolled members or (3) by the town committee of such party.” Conn.Gen.Stat. § 9-390.
To force a primary for a municipal office a potential nominee must obtain 5% of signatures of the electors on the last completed party registration list in the respective district and pay a statutory filing fee.4 This qualifying difference [516]*516between a district and municipal classification of nominees for the same office (senator or judge of probate), the plaintiffs assert constitutes an invidious discrimination against them and is in contravention to the equal protection clause provided under the fourteenth amendment.5
A three-judge district court was convened to hear the plaintiffs’ claims. Jurisdiction is present pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968). The Court finds that the legislature could reasonably conclude that valid practical grounds existed for distinguishing between single and multiple town state senatorial and probate districts and that the challenged statutes are constitutional.
State statutes validly enacted are presumed to be constitutional. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 148, 58 S.Ct. 778, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938); Becker Steel Co. v. Cummings, 296 U.S. 74, 80, 56 S.Ct. 15, 80 L.Ed. 54 (1935); Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 294 U.S. 532, 543, 55 S.Ct. 518, 79 L.Ed. 1044 (1935). It is the plaintiffs’ burden, if they are to prevail, to demonstrate the invidious discrimination they have alleged. Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, 211 U.S. 265, 281, 29 S.Ct. 50, 53 L.Ed. 176 (1908); Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Commission, supra. In Alaska Packers, the Supreme Court, in upholding a California statute, stated:
“Indulging the presumption of constitutionality which attaches to every state statute, we cannot say that this one, as applied, lacks a rational basis or involved any arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of state power.” 294 U.S. at 543, 55 S.Ct. at 522.
So also in this case, a rational basis for the enactment of the differing standards for the qualification to run in a primary is present.
At the local level, the structure of the two major political parties in Connecticut is by town committee. The statutes provide for the selection of party-endorsed candidates for municipal offices by caucus, convention, or by the town committee, at the discretion of said local committee in accordance with the party rules. Conn.Gen.Stat. § 9-390, quoted supra. While the legislature could have specifically required conventions at this electoral level, it chose otherwise for the obvious reason that it was dealing with [517]*517a different set of circumstances. The recognition of this circumstance at the single-town level is further evidenced by the fact that the legislature provided alternative methods, in § 9-390, for candidate selection even among identical single-town districts, i. e., by caucus, convention or tov/n committee.6 Thus, it may have felt that when dealing with a single town, the interests of the various party factions are adequately represented by party caucus or by the town committee. In this latter group the members themselves are elected and subject to being challenged through the primary system. Conn.Gen.Stat. § 9-406. The interests and objectives of party members in a single municipality are likely to be more uniform, than would be the case where multiple municipalities were involved.
The legislative history of the state primary laws, the various amendments and the legislative action on proposed amendments not adopted, indicate at least that many of the legislators were of the opinion that the caucus provided adequate representation in the smaller towns. See the Joint Standing Committee Hearings on Election, 1957, page 70 et seq. and 1963, page 40 et seq. This conclusion was based on the less complicated party structure and the similarity of interests at the local level. The same conclusion could reasonably have been reached as to the single-town municipal district offices.
When the party endorsement for a district office is at stake, a convention is required 7 for the apparent purpose of granting proportionate representation
from each of the various municipalities in the district. Where multiple municipalities are territorially involved, the interests of the various delegates to the nominating convention are likely to differ at least on local issues.
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MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
CLARIE, District Judge.
The plaintiffs have petitioned the Court to declare unconstitutional and invalid that part of Conn.Gen.Stat. § 9-400,1 which imposes as a condition [515]*515precedent that a prospective candidate receive the support of at least 20% of the delegate strength in a district convention on any roll call vote, in order to qualify to run in a district office primary which would select the party endorsed nominee.2 The plaintiffs represent that they have otherwise satisfied all the requirements of § 9-400.
District conventions are required for the choosing of candidates for all district offices pursuant to Conn.Gen.Stat. § 9-382. The plaintiffs claim, however, that those running for the same office as they, i. e., in the cases of Tansley and Verriker, state senator, and in the case of Rotatori, probate judge, but whose district is territorially confined to a single municipality as opposed to a multiple town district, are not subject to the same 20% qualifying requirement. These latter offices are classified as “municipal offices”3 and a convention is not required by law prior to their selection as party-endorsed candidates. The statutes precribe that the local party rules may provide for their selection in one of three ways, namely:
“(1) by the enrolled members of such party in the municipality at a caucus or (2) by delegates to a convention chosen in accordance with such rules by such enrolled members or (3) by the town committee of such party.” Conn.Gen.Stat. § 9-390.
To force a primary for a municipal office a potential nominee must obtain 5% of signatures of the electors on the last completed party registration list in the respective district and pay a statutory filing fee.4 This qualifying difference [516]*516between a district and municipal classification of nominees for the same office (senator or judge of probate), the plaintiffs assert constitutes an invidious discrimination against them and is in contravention to the equal protection clause provided under the fourteenth amendment.5
A three-judge district court was convened to hear the plaintiffs’ claims. Jurisdiction is present pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968). The Court finds that the legislature could reasonably conclude that valid practical grounds existed for distinguishing between single and multiple town state senatorial and probate districts and that the challenged statutes are constitutional.
State statutes validly enacted are presumed to be constitutional. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 148, 58 S.Ct. 778, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938); Becker Steel Co. v. Cummings, 296 U.S. 74, 80, 56 S.Ct. 15, 80 L.Ed. 54 (1935); Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 294 U.S. 532, 543, 55 S.Ct. 518, 79 L.Ed. 1044 (1935). It is the plaintiffs’ burden, if they are to prevail, to demonstrate the invidious discrimination they have alleged. Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, 211 U.S. 265, 281, 29 S.Ct. 50, 53 L.Ed. 176 (1908); Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Commission, supra. In Alaska Packers, the Supreme Court, in upholding a California statute, stated:
“Indulging the presumption of constitutionality which attaches to every state statute, we cannot say that this one, as applied, lacks a rational basis or involved any arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of state power.” 294 U.S. at 543, 55 S.Ct. at 522.
So also in this case, a rational basis for the enactment of the differing standards for the qualification to run in a primary is present.
At the local level, the structure of the two major political parties in Connecticut is by town committee. The statutes provide for the selection of party-endorsed candidates for municipal offices by caucus, convention, or by the town committee, at the discretion of said local committee in accordance with the party rules. Conn.Gen.Stat. § 9-390, quoted supra. While the legislature could have specifically required conventions at this electoral level, it chose otherwise for the obvious reason that it was dealing with [517]*517a different set of circumstances. The recognition of this circumstance at the single-town level is further evidenced by the fact that the legislature provided alternative methods, in § 9-390, for candidate selection even among identical single-town districts, i. e., by caucus, convention or tov/n committee.6 Thus, it may have felt that when dealing with a single town, the interests of the various party factions are adequately represented by party caucus or by the town committee. In this latter group the members themselves are elected and subject to being challenged through the primary system. Conn.Gen.Stat. § 9-406. The interests and objectives of party members in a single municipality are likely to be more uniform, than would be the case where multiple municipalities were involved.
The legislative history of the state primary laws, the various amendments and the legislative action on proposed amendments not adopted, indicate at least that many of the legislators were of the opinion that the caucus provided adequate representation in the smaller towns. See the Joint Standing Committee Hearings on Election, 1957, page 70 et seq. and 1963, page 40 et seq. This conclusion was based on the less complicated party structure and the similarity of interests at the local level. The same conclusion could reasonably have been reached as to the single-town municipal district offices.
When the party endorsement for a district office is at stake, a convention is required 7 for the apparent purpose of granting proportionate representation
from each of the various municipalities in the district. Where multiple municipalities are territorially involved, the interests of the various delegates to the nominating convention are likely to differ at least on local issues. Proportionate representation in that situation is certainly desirable in order to insure that all points of view are represented.
Given this distinction, the legislature was faced with the problem of determining who would be entitled to run in a primary where unanimity was not present at the nominating level. The state has an interest in not having wide open primaries, wherein anyone can run who so desires. Such a procedure would lead to excessive cost and confusión, without any showing that the contestant had a substantial, or even any support within his own party. Cf. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 34, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968). The state does have an interest in maintaining the integrity and stability of existing political parties, thus encouraging responsible action on their part.8 See 20 Conn. Senate Proceedings, Vol. 6, Pt. 11, at p. 542 (1955); see generally Barton, The General-Election Ballot: More Nominees or More Representative Nominees?, 22 Stan.L.Rev. 165, 167-172 (1970). In a multi-town district, where the convention system is required, the legislature determined that 20% of the vote for a specific office on any roll-call during said convention, plus a petition containing the signatures of 350 party enrolled members in said district in the case of a state senator; or 100 such signatures in the case of a probate judge, constituted an adequate showing within the party to [518]*518entitle a candidate to participate in a primary. It is enlightening to note in this respect, that in 1963 a bill to reduce this 20% figure to 10% was referred to the committee on elections and from there sent to conference where it died. H.B. No. 2565; see Joint Standing Committee Hearings on Elections (1963) at page 102 et seq. This action provides some indication that the legislature believed this 20% requirement was essential to adequately protect the state’s interest in the electoral process.
In single-town districts, where conventions are not required, the legislature was determined that the signatures of at least 5% of the electors on the party’s last completed enrolment list was necessary to safeguard the comparable interests served by the 20% convention vote. The parties may still dispute whether it is more difficult to obtain a 20% vote in the convention or a petition of 5% of the registered party electors. It is not for this Court to speculate on the comparable strength or weaknesses of each, so long as the standards adopted are reasonable and not discriminatory. It must be emphasized, however, that in no instance is a person subject to the 20% requirement compelled to run against one who is not so subject.9 The plaintiffs have not sustained their burden of showing to the contrary; and if the presumption of constitutionality of state statutes is to be meaningful, the Court must conclude that the Connecticut legislature validly exercised its discretion. This is not a situation like that presented in Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968), where the possibility of qualifying to run was virtually nonexistent.10 In that landmark case, dealing with one’s right to a place on the ballot, the Supreme Court stated:
“It is true that this Court has firmly established the principle that the Equal Protection Clause does not make every minor difference in the application of laws to different groups a violation of our Constitution. But we have also [519]*519held many times that ‘invidious’ distinctions cannot be enacted without a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” 393 U.S. at 30, 89 S.Ct. at 10.
The present case deals with that type of minor difference which Williams does not proscribe. The states have broad discretion in formulating election policies. Williams v. Rhodes, supra, at 34, 89 S.Ct. 5; United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 311, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941); Voorhes v. Dempsey, 231 F.Supp. 975, 977 (D.Conn. 1964) (three-judge court). The statutes herein challenged represent a valid exercise of that discretion. It may well be that the plaintiffs have strong feelings that this legislative distinction creates an unnecessary burden upon prospective candidates for public office, however, if their claim has any merit their proper forum is before the state legislature. The plaintiffs have shown no invidious discrimination. All three petitions are denied and dismissed.
So ordered.