USCA4 Appeal: 23-1502 Doc: 18 Filed: 07/02/2025 Pg: 1 of 5
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-1502
TANJANEKA JONES,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ELI LILLY AND COMPANY,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Albert David Copperthite, Magistrate Judge. (8:20-cv-03564-ADC)
Submitted: January 29, 2025 Decided: July 2, 2025
Before NIEMEYER, WYNN, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Janice Williams-Jones, LAW OFFICE OF JANICE WILLIAMS-JONES, Ellicott City, Maryland, for Appellant. Matthew A. Fitzgerald, MCGUIREWOODS LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 23-1502 Doc: 18 Filed: 07/02/2025 Pg: 2 of 5
PER CURIAM:
Tanjaneka Jones appeals the magistrate judge’s order 1 granting summary judgment
to her former employer, Eli Lilly and Company (“Lilly”), on Jones’s claims of sex- and
race-based discrimination and retaliation. 2 Jones, a Black woman, alleged that she was
disciplined more severely than a White male coworker, even though both employees had
exhibited similar performance deficiencies. She further alleged that her supervisor
retaliated against her after she complained to a human resources representative. We affirm.
“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, construing all
facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Schulman v. Axis
Surplus Ins. Co., 90 F.4th 236, 243 (4th Cir. 2024). Summary judgment is appropriate “if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Under the familiar McDonnell Douglas 3 framework, a plaintiff alleging
employment discrimination bears “the initial burden of proving . . . her prima facie case by
a preponderance of the evidence.” Abilt v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 848 F.3d 305, 315
(4th Cir. 2017). If the plaintiff makes this showing, “[t]he burden of production then shifts
1 The parties consented to jurisdiction before a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 2 Jones brought the race-based claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the sex-based claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, and Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 20-606. 3 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
2 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1502 Doc: 18 Filed: 07/02/2025 Pg: 3 of 5
to the employer to . . . provide some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action.” Sharif v. United Airlines, Inc., 841 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 2016)
(internal quotation marks omitted). If the employer satisfies this requirement, “the plaintiff
resumes the burden of persuading the factfinder that the employer’s proffered explanation
is merely a pretext for discrimination.” Id.
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on disparate discipline, “a
plaintiff must show (1) that plaintiff engaged in prohibited conduct similar to that of a
person of another race, color, sex, religion, or national origin, and (2) that disciplinary
measures enforced against the plaintiff were more severe than those enforced against the
other person.” Lightner v. City of Wilmington, 545 F.3d 260, 264-65 (4th Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation marks omitted). 4 “The similarity between comparators and the
seriousness of their respective offenses must be clearly established in order to be
meaningful.” Id. at 265.
We agree with the magistrate judge’s determination that Jones’s performance
deficiencies were not similar enough to her comparator’s. From 2014 to 2019, Jones served
as a senior sales representative, selling diabetes products to physicians. Several times
during her tenure, Jones received negative feedback about the quality of her sales calls,
such as lacking adequate technical knowledge and failing to engage in “pre-call planning”
4 Jones complains that the magistrate judge incorrectly applied a different prima facie test to her discrimination claims. We conclude that any such error is harmless because, as discussed herein, the magistrate judge properly determined that Jones’s comparator evidence was insufficient.
3 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1502 Doc: 18 Filed: 07/02/2025 Pg: 4 of 5
and meaningful sales conversations. The frequency of these criticisms increased toward
the end of her time with Lilly: for Jones’s 2018 annual review, her supervisor indicated
that she was not meeting job expectations; in the spring of 2019, a different supervisor
complained about her pre-call planning and advised that she would be placed on a
performance improvement plan; in August 2019, a third supervisor advised that Jones was
not improving; and in October 2019, Jones was placed on probation.
By contrast, Jones’s comparator was praised for his pre-call planning and customer
skills. And while he did have some blemishes with the quality of his customer interactions,
most of his deficiencies concerned either the quantity of his customer contacts or problems
unrelated to customer issues. Moreover, evidence in the record shows that Jones received
criticism for her sales call performance as early as 2015, yet she fails to identify any
evidence suggesting that her comparator’s shortcomings had likewise persisted for several
years. Thus, because Jones and her comparator did not engage in similar prohibited
conduct, we conclude that she failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination based
on disparate discipline.
Next, we turn to the retaliation claims, which are also subject to the McDonnell
Douglas framework. Evans v. Int’l Paper Co., 936 F.3d 183, 194 n.5 (4th Cir. 2019). “A
prima facie case of retaliation requires proof that: (1) the plaintiff engaged in protected
activity, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) there was a causal
connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Ray v. Int’l Paper Co.,
909 F.3d 661, 669 (4th Cir. 2018).
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Although the magistrate judge found that Jones discharged, albeit barely, her initial
burden of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation, we find that Jones’s claims actually
failed on the third prong. Regarding causation, Jones relied solely on the temporal
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USCA4 Appeal: 23-1502 Doc: 18 Filed: 07/02/2025 Pg: 1 of 5
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-1502
TANJANEKA JONES,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ELI LILLY AND COMPANY,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Albert David Copperthite, Magistrate Judge. (8:20-cv-03564-ADC)
Submitted: January 29, 2025 Decided: July 2, 2025
Before NIEMEYER, WYNN, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Janice Williams-Jones, LAW OFFICE OF JANICE WILLIAMS-JONES, Ellicott City, Maryland, for Appellant. Matthew A. Fitzgerald, MCGUIREWOODS LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 23-1502 Doc: 18 Filed: 07/02/2025 Pg: 2 of 5
PER CURIAM:
Tanjaneka Jones appeals the magistrate judge’s order 1 granting summary judgment
to her former employer, Eli Lilly and Company (“Lilly”), on Jones’s claims of sex- and
race-based discrimination and retaliation. 2 Jones, a Black woman, alleged that she was
disciplined more severely than a White male coworker, even though both employees had
exhibited similar performance deficiencies. She further alleged that her supervisor
retaliated against her after she complained to a human resources representative. We affirm.
“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, construing all
facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Schulman v. Axis
Surplus Ins. Co., 90 F.4th 236, 243 (4th Cir. 2024). Summary judgment is appropriate “if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Under the familiar McDonnell Douglas 3 framework, a plaintiff alleging
employment discrimination bears “the initial burden of proving . . . her prima facie case by
a preponderance of the evidence.” Abilt v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 848 F.3d 305, 315
(4th Cir. 2017). If the plaintiff makes this showing, “[t]he burden of production then shifts
1 The parties consented to jurisdiction before a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 2 Jones brought the race-based claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the sex-based claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, and Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 20-606. 3 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
2 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1502 Doc: 18 Filed: 07/02/2025 Pg: 3 of 5
to the employer to . . . provide some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action.” Sharif v. United Airlines, Inc., 841 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 2016)
(internal quotation marks omitted). If the employer satisfies this requirement, “the plaintiff
resumes the burden of persuading the factfinder that the employer’s proffered explanation
is merely a pretext for discrimination.” Id.
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on disparate discipline, “a
plaintiff must show (1) that plaintiff engaged in prohibited conduct similar to that of a
person of another race, color, sex, religion, or national origin, and (2) that disciplinary
measures enforced against the plaintiff were more severe than those enforced against the
other person.” Lightner v. City of Wilmington, 545 F.3d 260, 264-65 (4th Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation marks omitted). 4 “The similarity between comparators and the
seriousness of their respective offenses must be clearly established in order to be
meaningful.” Id. at 265.
We agree with the magistrate judge’s determination that Jones’s performance
deficiencies were not similar enough to her comparator’s. From 2014 to 2019, Jones served
as a senior sales representative, selling diabetes products to physicians. Several times
during her tenure, Jones received negative feedback about the quality of her sales calls,
such as lacking adequate technical knowledge and failing to engage in “pre-call planning”
4 Jones complains that the magistrate judge incorrectly applied a different prima facie test to her discrimination claims. We conclude that any such error is harmless because, as discussed herein, the magistrate judge properly determined that Jones’s comparator evidence was insufficient.
3 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1502 Doc: 18 Filed: 07/02/2025 Pg: 4 of 5
and meaningful sales conversations. The frequency of these criticisms increased toward
the end of her time with Lilly: for Jones’s 2018 annual review, her supervisor indicated
that she was not meeting job expectations; in the spring of 2019, a different supervisor
complained about her pre-call planning and advised that she would be placed on a
performance improvement plan; in August 2019, a third supervisor advised that Jones was
not improving; and in October 2019, Jones was placed on probation.
By contrast, Jones’s comparator was praised for his pre-call planning and customer
skills. And while he did have some blemishes with the quality of his customer interactions,
most of his deficiencies concerned either the quantity of his customer contacts or problems
unrelated to customer issues. Moreover, evidence in the record shows that Jones received
criticism for her sales call performance as early as 2015, yet she fails to identify any
evidence suggesting that her comparator’s shortcomings had likewise persisted for several
years. Thus, because Jones and her comparator did not engage in similar prohibited
conduct, we conclude that she failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination based
on disparate discipline.
Next, we turn to the retaliation claims, which are also subject to the McDonnell
Douglas framework. Evans v. Int’l Paper Co., 936 F.3d 183, 194 n.5 (4th Cir. 2019). “A
prima facie case of retaliation requires proof that: (1) the plaintiff engaged in protected
activity, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) there was a causal
connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Ray v. Int’l Paper Co.,
909 F.3d 661, 669 (4th Cir. 2018).
4 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1502 Doc: 18 Filed: 07/02/2025 Pg: 5 of 5
Although the magistrate judge found that Jones discharged, albeit barely, her initial
burden of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation, we find that Jones’s claims actually
failed on the third prong. Regarding causation, Jones relied solely on the temporal
proximity between her complaints to the human resources representative in August 2019
and her placement on probation in October 2019. In some instances, temporal proximity
between a protected activity and an adverse employment action is sufficient to establish
causation at the prima facie stage. Strothers v. City of Laurel, 895 F.3d 317, 336-37 (4th
Cir. 2018). However, “[w]here timing is the only basis for a claim of retaliation, and
gradual adverse job actions began well before the plaintiff had ever engaged in any
protected activity, an inference of retaliation does not arise.” Francis v. Booz, Allen &
Hamilton, Inc., 452 F.3d 299, 309 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
As illustrated above, Jones was repeatedly admonished for inadequate pre-call
planning, resulting in her placement on a performance improvement plan two months
before she engaged in a protected activity. Given Jones’s track record, we cannot infer,
based simply on temporal proximity, that the subsequent decision to place her on probation
was made in retaliation for her complaints to human resources.
Accordingly, we affirm the magistrate judge’s order granting summary judgment to
Lilly. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED