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6 7 United States District Court 8 Central District of California
9 10 TANESIA TRAMELL, Case № 2:25-cv-10902-ODW (KSx) 11 Plaintiff, 12 ORDER DENYING MOTION TO v. REMAND [26] 13 SANTANDER CONSUMER USA INC. 14 et al.,
15 Defendants.
16 17 I. INTRODUCTION 18 Plaintiff Tanesia Tramell, proceeding pro se, filed this action in state court 19 against Defendants Santander Consumer USA Inc.; Patrick K. Willis Company, Inc. 20 d/b/a American Recovery Service (“ARS”); and American First Asset Recovery 21 Services Inc. (“AFARSI”). (Notice Removal (“NOR”) Ex. A (“Compl.”), Dkt. No. 1.) 22 Defendants removed the action to this Court based on federal question jurisdiction 23 under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (NOR 1, Dkt. No. 1.) Tramell now moves to remand the 24 case on the grounds that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and that 25 Defendants’ removal was procedurally defective. (Mot. Remand (“Motion” or 26 “Mot.”), Dkt. No. 26.) For the following reasons, the Court DENIES the Motion.1 27
28 1 Having carefully considered the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 1 II. BACKGROUND 2 Tramell entered into a financing contract with House of Imports to purchase a 3 2017 Mercedes-Benz GLC300. (Compl. ¶ 25.) Around 2019, House of Imports 4 assigned Tramell’s contract to Santander. (Id.) On or about April 23, 2023, Santander 5 internally charged off Tramell’s account, removing it from its active portfolio, but 6 continued to attempt collection and enforcement activities as if the account remained 7 active. (Id. ¶ 26.) On or about August 6, 2023, Santander ordered the repossession of 8 Tramell’s vehicle. (Id. ¶ 27.) Santander engaged ARS to coordinate the repossession. 9 (Id. ¶ 30.) In turn, ARS subcontracted the physical repossession to AFARSI. (Id.) 10 AFARSI agents subsequently entered Tramell’s private residential property without 11 consent or judicial authorization and seized her vehicle. (Id. ¶ 31.) 12 On October 14, 2025, Tramell filed this action in state court against Defendants, 13 asserting fourteen state law claims and one federal claim under the Fair Debt 14 Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). (See id. ¶¶ 73–190.) On November 13, 2025, 15 Defendants removed the action to this Court based on federal question jurisdiction 16 arising from Tramell’s FDCPA claim. (NOR 2.) On March 19, 2026, Tramell moved 17 to remand, arguing that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and that removal 18 was procedurally defective. (Mot 1–2.) 19 III. LEGAL STANDARD 20 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and possess only that 21 jurisdiction as authorized by the Constitution and federal statute. U.S. Const. art. III, 22 § 2, cl. 1; Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). 23 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a party may remove a civil action brought in a state court 24 to a district court only if the plaintiff could have originally filed the action in federal 25 court. Federal district courts have original jurisdiction where an action arises under 26 federal law, or where each plaintiff’s citizenship is diverse from each defendant’s 27 citizens (i.e., diversity is “complete”), and the amount in controversy exceeds 28 $75,000. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a). 1 There is a strong presumption that a court is without jurisdiction until 2 affirmatively proven otherwise. Fifty Assocs. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 446 F.2d 3 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 1970); see Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) 4 (“Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal 5 in the first instance.”). When a case is removed from state court, the removing party 6 bears the burden of demonstrating that removal is proper. Corral v. Select Portfolio 7 Servicing, Inc., 878 F.3d 770, 773 (9th Cir. 2017). Removal for lack of jurisdiction 8 under § 1332(a) is strictly construed, and any doubt as to removal is to be resolved in 9 favor of remand. Id. at 773–74. 10 IV. DISCUSSION 11 Tramell moves to remand this action on two grounds: (1) Tramell’s FDCPA 12 claim does not present a federal question, and (2) Defendants’ removal contains 13 procedural defects. (Mot. 2.) 14 A. Federal Question Jurisdiction 15 Tramell argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action. 16 (Id. at 4.) The parties agree that no basis for diversity jurisdiction exists. (Id.; 17 NOR 1–2.) However, they disagree over whether the Court has subject matter 18 jurisdiction based on a federal question. (NOR 2; Mot. 4.) 19 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, this Court has original jurisdiction over civil claims 20 “arising under” federal law. Removal based on § 1331 is governed by the 21 “well-pleaded complaint” rule. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 22 804, 808 (1986). Under this rule, “federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal 23 question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” 24 Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Given that the plaintiff 25 controls which claims to plead, the “well-pleaded complaint” rule makes the plaintiff 26 the “master of the complaint.” Id. at 398–99. 27 Here, Tramell alleges that Defendants violated the FDCPA. (Compl. ¶¶ 186– 28 90.) The FDCPA is a federal statute. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. Thus, Tramell’s 1 claim arises under the laws of the United States. See Scott v. Middleman, 2 No. 2:25-cv-03107-SVW (AGRx), 2025 WL 1605299, at *1 (C.D. Cal. May 2, 2025) 3 (construing a small claims complaint seeking FDCPA statutory damages as asserting a 4 federal claim sufficient to confer federal question jurisdiction). Accordingly, this 5 Court has subject matter jurisdiction based on a federal question. 6 Tramell argues that no federal question jurisdiction exists because her FDCPA 7 claim is incidental to her state law claims. (Mot. 4.) However, this argument does not 8 lead to a different result. A plaintiff’s characterization of FDCPA claims as “minor” 9 does not defeat federal question jurisdiction where the plaintiff expressly “elected to 10 include those federal question claims” in her complaint. Sung Yoon v. State Farm 11 Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 2:19-cv-03811-PA (JPRx), 2019 WL 2109644, at *2 12 (C.D. Cal. May 13, 2019). As the master of her complaint, Tramell “controls much 13 about her suit.” Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 35 (2025). 14 Tramell determines “which substantive claims to bring,” and in doing so, establishes 15 the basis for a federal court’s jurisdiction. Id. She may choose to plead federal law 16 claims, including potentially being required to litigate in a federal forum, or she may 17 choose to plead only state law claims and attempt to secure a state forum. Id.
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O 1
6 7 United States District Court 8 Central District of California
9 10 TANESIA TRAMELL, Case № 2:25-cv-10902-ODW (KSx) 11 Plaintiff, 12 ORDER DENYING MOTION TO v. REMAND [26] 13 SANTANDER CONSUMER USA INC. 14 et al.,
15 Defendants.
16 17 I. INTRODUCTION 18 Plaintiff Tanesia Tramell, proceeding pro se, filed this action in state court 19 against Defendants Santander Consumer USA Inc.; Patrick K. Willis Company, Inc. 20 d/b/a American Recovery Service (“ARS”); and American First Asset Recovery 21 Services Inc. (“AFARSI”). (Notice Removal (“NOR”) Ex. A (“Compl.”), Dkt. No. 1.) 22 Defendants removed the action to this Court based on federal question jurisdiction 23 under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (NOR 1, Dkt. No. 1.) Tramell now moves to remand the 24 case on the grounds that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and that 25 Defendants’ removal was procedurally defective. (Mot. Remand (“Motion” or 26 “Mot.”), Dkt. No. 26.) For the following reasons, the Court DENIES the Motion.1 27
28 1 Having carefully considered the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 1 II. BACKGROUND 2 Tramell entered into a financing contract with House of Imports to purchase a 3 2017 Mercedes-Benz GLC300. (Compl. ¶ 25.) Around 2019, House of Imports 4 assigned Tramell’s contract to Santander. (Id.) On or about April 23, 2023, Santander 5 internally charged off Tramell’s account, removing it from its active portfolio, but 6 continued to attempt collection and enforcement activities as if the account remained 7 active. (Id. ¶ 26.) On or about August 6, 2023, Santander ordered the repossession of 8 Tramell’s vehicle. (Id. ¶ 27.) Santander engaged ARS to coordinate the repossession. 9 (Id. ¶ 30.) In turn, ARS subcontracted the physical repossession to AFARSI. (Id.) 10 AFARSI agents subsequently entered Tramell’s private residential property without 11 consent or judicial authorization and seized her vehicle. (Id. ¶ 31.) 12 On October 14, 2025, Tramell filed this action in state court against Defendants, 13 asserting fourteen state law claims and one federal claim under the Fair Debt 14 Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). (See id. ¶¶ 73–190.) On November 13, 2025, 15 Defendants removed the action to this Court based on federal question jurisdiction 16 arising from Tramell’s FDCPA claim. (NOR 2.) On March 19, 2026, Tramell moved 17 to remand, arguing that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and that removal 18 was procedurally defective. (Mot 1–2.) 19 III. LEGAL STANDARD 20 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and possess only that 21 jurisdiction as authorized by the Constitution and federal statute. U.S. Const. art. III, 22 § 2, cl. 1; Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). 23 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a party may remove a civil action brought in a state court 24 to a district court only if the plaintiff could have originally filed the action in federal 25 court. Federal district courts have original jurisdiction where an action arises under 26 federal law, or where each plaintiff’s citizenship is diverse from each defendant’s 27 citizens (i.e., diversity is “complete”), and the amount in controversy exceeds 28 $75,000. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a). 1 There is a strong presumption that a court is without jurisdiction until 2 affirmatively proven otherwise. Fifty Assocs. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 446 F.2d 3 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 1970); see Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) 4 (“Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal 5 in the first instance.”). When a case is removed from state court, the removing party 6 bears the burden of demonstrating that removal is proper. Corral v. Select Portfolio 7 Servicing, Inc., 878 F.3d 770, 773 (9th Cir. 2017). Removal for lack of jurisdiction 8 under § 1332(a) is strictly construed, and any doubt as to removal is to be resolved in 9 favor of remand. Id. at 773–74. 10 IV. DISCUSSION 11 Tramell moves to remand this action on two grounds: (1) Tramell’s FDCPA 12 claim does not present a federal question, and (2) Defendants’ removal contains 13 procedural defects. (Mot. 2.) 14 A. Federal Question Jurisdiction 15 Tramell argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action. 16 (Id. at 4.) The parties agree that no basis for diversity jurisdiction exists. (Id.; 17 NOR 1–2.) However, they disagree over whether the Court has subject matter 18 jurisdiction based on a federal question. (NOR 2; Mot. 4.) 19 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, this Court has original jurisdiction over civil claims 20 “arising under” federal law. Removal based on § 1331 is governed by the 21 “well-pleaded complaint” rule. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 22 804, 808 (1986). Under this rule, “federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal 23 question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” 24 Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Given that the plaintiff 25 controls which claims to plead, the “well-pleaded complaint” rule makes the plaintiff 26 the “master of the complaint.” Id. at 398–99. 27 Here, Tramell alleges that Defendants violated the FDCPA. (Compl. ¶¶ 186– 28 90.) The FDCPA is a federal statute. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. Thus, Tramell’s 1 claim arises under the laws of the United States. See Scott v. Middleman, 2 No. 2:25-cv-03107-SVW (AGRx), 2025 WL 1605299, at *1 (C.D. Cal. May 2, 2025) 3 (construing a small claims complaint seeking FDCPA statutory damages as asserting a 4 federal claim sufficient to confer federal question jurisdiction). Accordingly, this 5 Court has subject matter jurisdiction based on a federal question. 6 Tramell argues that no federal question jurisdiction exists because her FDCPA 7 claim is incidental to her state law claims. (Mot. 4.) However, this argument does not 8 lead to a different result. A plaintiff’s characterization of FDCPA claims as “minor” 9 does not defeat federal question jurisdiction where the plaintiff expressly “elected to 10 include those federal question claims” in her complaint. Sung Yoon v. State Farm 11 Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 2:19-cv-03811-PA (JPRx), 2019 WL 2109644, at *2 12 (C.D. Cal. May 13, 2019). As the master of her complaint, Tramell “controls much 13 about her suit.” Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 35 (2025). 14 Tramell determines “which substantive claims to bring,” and in doing so, establishes 15 the basis for a federal court’s jurisdiction. Id. She may choose to plead federal law 16 claims, including potentially being required to litigate in a federal forum, or she may 17 choose to plead only state law claims and attempt to secure a state forum. Id. Here, 18 Tramell expressly pleads a federal FDCPA claim. (Compl. ¶¶ 186–90.) Accordingly, 19 Tramell’s FDCPA claim presents a federal question and properly invokes this Court’s 20 federal question jurisdiction. 21 B. Procedural Defects in Removal 22 Tramell next argues that Defendants’ removal was procedurally defective 23 because Defendants failed to obtain valid unanimous consent for removal and violated 24 the forum defendant rule. (Mot. 3.) 25 As an initial matter, Tramell has waived any objections she might have had to 26 Defendants’ removal process. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), “[a] motion to remand the 27 case on the basis of any defect in removal procedure must be made within [thirty] 28 days after the filing of the notice of removal.” The purpose of this time limit is “to 1 resolve the choice of forum at the early stages of litigation,” and therefore it is strictly 2 construed. N. Cal. Dist. Council of Labs. v. Pittsburg-Des Moines Steel Co., 69 F.3d 3 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 1995). If a party fails to object within the specified deadline, the 4 party waives the defect. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see In re Edward Jones Holders Litig., 5 453 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1212–13 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (holding that all objections to 6 procedural defects in the removal were waived where plaintiffs’ motion to remand 7 was untimely by two days). 8 Here, Tramell has waived all her objections to any procedural defects in 9 Defendants’ removal. Defendants filed the Notice of Removal on November 13, 10 2025. (NOR.) Tramell had thirty days from that date to raise any objections. She did 11 not raise such objections until January 12, 2026, as part of this Motion. (See generally 12 Mot.) Even accepting that Defendants’ alleged invalid consent and noncompliance 13 with the forum defendant rule qualify as procedural defects, Tramell failed to timely 14 raise them within the thirty-day deadline and has thus waived them. 15 As the Court finds that Tramell has waived all objections to any procedural 16 deficiencies in Defendants’ removal process, the Court declines to consider Tramell’s 17 arguments that Defendants’ removal violated both the unanimity rule and the forum 18 defendant rule. (Mot. 3.) In any event, both arguments fail on the merits. First, 19 Defendants’ Notice of Removal unequivocally states that all Defendants consented to 20 the removal, and the Notice of Removal also bears the signature of Santander’s 21 attorney of record. (NOR 3–4.) Thus, Defendants’ removal complied with the 22 unanimity rule. Second, the forum defendant rule applies only when a case is 23 removed based on diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2); see Lively v. Wild 24 Oats Mkts., Inc., 456 F.3d 933, 939 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that the forum defendant 25 rule “confines removal on the basis of diversity jurisdiction to instances where no 26 defendant is a citizen of the forum state”). As noted above, Defendants removed this 27 action based on federal question jurisdiction. (NOR 1–2.) Therefore, the forum 28 defendant rule does not apply, and Tramell’s argument to the contrary fails. 1 In sum, the Court concludes that it has subject matter jurisdiction over this 2 | action based on federal question jurisdiction and that Tramell has failed to preserve 3 || her right to challenge the removal on the basis of procedural defects. 4 V. CONCLUSION 5 For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES Tramell’s Motion to 6 || Remand. (Dkt. No. 26.) 7 8 IT IS SO ORDERED.
10 April 15, 2026 oes
12 UNITED STATES, DISTRICT JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28