1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 HERMAN TAMRAT, Case No. 20-cv-08503-PJH
8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF SERVICE v. 9
10 SONOMA COUNTY MAIN ADULT DETENTION FACILITY 11 ADMINISTRATION, et al., Defendants. 12 13 Plaintiff, a state prisoner, proceeds with a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 14 U.S.C. § 1983. The original complaint was dismissed with leave to amend and plaintiff 15 has filed an amended complaint. 16 DISCUSSION 17 STANDARD OF REVIEW 18 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners 19 seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 20 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and 21 dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief 22 may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 23 relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. 24 Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 25 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement 26 of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "Specific facts are not 27 necessary; the statement need only '"give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim 1 (citations omitted). Although in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed 2 factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds’ of his 'entitle[ment] 3 to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 4 elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to 5 raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 6 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer "enough facts to state 7 a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. The United States Supreme 8 Court has recently explained the “plausible on its face” standard of Twombly: “While legal 9 conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual 10 allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 11 veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 12 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 13 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 14 elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 15 violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the 16 color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 17 LEGAL CLAIMS 18 Plaintiff alleges that he was the victim of excessive force and then denied medical 19 care.1 20 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a post- 21 arraignment pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to 22 punishment. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 23 441 U.S. 520, 535-39 (1979)). To prove an excessive force claim under § 1983, a pretrial 24 detainee must show only that the “force purposely or knowingly used against him was 25 objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015). “A 26 court must make this determination from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the 27 1 scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” 2 Id. “A court (judge or jury) cannot apply this standard mechanically.” Id. “[O]bjective 3 reasonableness turns on the ‘facts and circumstances of each particular case.’” Id. 4 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 396). 5 A non-exhaustive list of considerations that may bear on the reasonableness of 6 the force used include “the relationship between the need for the use of force and the 7 amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff's injury; any effort made by the officer to 8 temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the 9 threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively 10 resisting.” Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473. 11 Because the Kingsley standard applicable to excessive force claims by pretrial 12 detainees is purely objective, it does not matter whether the defendant understood that 13 the force used was excessive or intended it to be excessive. Castro v. Cnty. of Los 14 Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1069 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). A pretrial detainee can prevail 15 by providing “‘objective evidence that the challenged governmental action is not rationally 16 related to a legitimate governmental objective or that it is excessive in relation to that 17 purpose.’” Id. (quoting Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473-74)) (emphasis in original). 18 A claim for a violation of a pretrial detainee’s right to adequate medical care arises 19 under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment. See Gordon v. 20 County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1122 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2018). The claim is evaluated 21 under an objective deliberate indifference standard.
22 [T]he elements of a pretrial detainee’s medical care claim against an individual defendant under the due process clause 23 of the Fourteenth Amendment are: (i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which 24 the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant 25 did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would 26 have appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and (iv) by 27 not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s 1 Id. at 1125. With regard to the third element, a defendant’s conduct must be objectively 2 unreasonable – “a test that will necessarily ‘turn[] on the facts and circumstances of each 3 particular case.’” Id. (citation omitted). The four-part test described in Gordon requires 4 plaintiffs to prove more than negligence, but less than subjective intent – something akin 5 to reckless disregard. Id. 6 Plaintiff states that on October 25, 2019, in an act of protest he pushed his food try 7 through the slot in his door to the ground and placed his hands through the slot. 8 Defendant Sergeant Alcala ordered plaintiff to remove his hands from the slot and keep 9 his hands in his cell. Plaintiff refused and Alcala attempted to rip loose plaintiff’s firm grip 10 with the aid of defendant Deputy Mann. Alcala then began to hit plaintiff’s wrist with a 11 closed fist and then hit plaintiff’s hand and knuckles with a flashlight and punched plaintiff 12 in the face.
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 HERMAN TAMRAT, Case No. 20-cv-08503-PJH
8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF SERVICE v. 9
10 SONOMA COUNTY MAIN ADULT DETENTION FACILITY 11 ADMINISTRATION, et al., Defendants. 12 13 Plaintiff, a state prisoner, proceeds with a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 14 U.S.C. § 1983. The original complaint was dismissed with leave to amend and plaintiff 15 has filed an amended complaint. 16 DISCUSSION 17 STANDARD OF REVIEW 18 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners 19 seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 20 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and 21 dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief 22 may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 23 relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. 24 Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 25 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement 26 of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "Specific facts are not 27 necessary; the statement need only '"give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim 1 (citations omitted). Although in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed 2 factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds’ of his 'entitle[ment] 3 to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 4 elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to 5 raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 6 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer "enough facts to state 7 a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. The United States Supreme 8 Court has recently explained the “plausible on its face” standard of Twombly: “While legal 9 conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual 10 allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 11 veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 12 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 13 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 14 elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 15 violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the 16 color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 17 LEGAL CLAIMS 18 Plaintiff alleges that he was the victim of excessive force and then denied medical 19 care.1 20 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a post- 21 arraignment pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to 22 punishment. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 23 441 U.S. 520, 535-39 (1979)). To prove an excessive force claim under § 1983, a pretrial 24 detainee must show only that the “force purposely or knowingly used against him was 25 objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015). “A 26 court must make this determination from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the 27 1 scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” 2 Id. “A court (judge or jury) cannot apply this standard mechanically.” Id. “[O]bjective 3 reasonableness turns on the ‘facts and circumstances of each particular case.’” Id. 4 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 396). 5 A non-exhaustive list of considerations that may bear on the reasonableness of 6 the force used include “the relationship between the need for the use of force and the 7 amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff's injury; any effort made by the officer to 8 temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the 9 threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively 10 resisting.” Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473. 11 Because the Kingsley standard applicable to excessive force claims by pretrial 12 detainees is purely objective, it does not matter whether the defendant understood that 13 the force used was excessive or intended it to be excessive. Castro v. Cnty. of Los 14 Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1069 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). A pretrial detainee can prevail 15 by providing “‘objective evidence that the challenged governmental action is not rationally 16 related to a legitimate governmental objective or that it is excessive in relation to that 17 purpose.’” Id. (quoting Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473-74)) (emphasis in original). 18 A claim for a violation of a pretrial detainee’s right to adequate medical care arises 19 under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment. See Gordon v. 20 County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1122 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2018). The claim is evaluated 21 under an objective deliberate indifference standard.
22 [T]he elements of a pretrial detainee’s medical care claim against an individual defendant under the due process clause 23 of the Fourteenth Amendment are: (i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which 24 the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant 25 did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would 26 have appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and (iv) by 27 not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s 1 Id. at 1125. With regard to the third element, a defendant’s conduct must be objectively 2 unreasonable – “a test that will necessarily ‘turn[] on the facts and circumstances of each 3 particular case.’” Id. (citation omitted). The four-part test described in Gordon requires 4 plaintiffs to prove more than negligence, but less than subjective intent – something akin 5 to reckless disregard. Id. 6 Plaintiff states that on October 25, 2019, in an act of protest he pushed his food try 7 through the slot in his door to the ground and placed his hands through the slot. 8 Defendant Sergeant Alcala ordered plaintiff to remove his hands from the slot and keep 9 his hands in his cell. Plaintiff refused and Alcala attempted to rip loose plaintiff’s firm grip 10 with the aid of defendant Deputy Mann. Alcala then began to hit plaintiff’s wrist with a 11 closed fist and then hit plaintiff’s hand and knuckles with a flashlight and punched plaintiff 12 in the face. Alcala and Mann then twisted plaintiff’s arms and banged them against the 13 tray slot. As a result, plaintiff suffered injuries. These allegations are sufficient to state a 14 claim of excessive force against Alcala and Mann. Plaintiff also states that he later 15 requested medical care from Mann, but that his requests were ignored. This is also 16 sufficient to state a claim against Mann for denial of medical care. 17 CONCLUSION 18 1. The clerk shall issue a summons and the United States Marshal shall serve, 19 without prepayment of fees, copies of the amended complaint (Docket No. 7) with 20 attachments and copies of this order on Sergeant Alcala and Deputy Mann at the 21 Sonoma County Main Detention Facility. 22 2. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the court orders as follows: 23 a. No later than sixty days from the date of service, defendants shall file a 24 motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. The motion shall be supported 25 by adequate factual documentation and shall conform in all respects to Federal Rule of 26 Civil Procedure 56, and shall include as exhibits all records and incident reports 27 stemming from the events at issue. If defendants are of the opinion that this case cannot 1 summary judgment motion is due. All papers filed with the court shall be promptly served 2 on the plaintiff. 3 b. At the time the dispositive motion is served, defendants shall also serve, 4 on a separate paper, the appropriate notice or notices required by Rand v. Rowland, 154 5 F.3d 952, 953-954 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), and Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 6 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2003). See Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 940-941 (9th Cir. 2012) (Rand 7 and Wyatt notices must be given at the time motion for summary judgment or motion to 8 dismiss for nonexhaustion is filed, not earlier); Rand at 960 (separate paper requirement). 9 c. Plaintiff's opposition to the dispositive motion, if any, shall be filed with 10 the court and served upon defendants no later than thirty days from the date the motion 11 was served upon him. Plaintiff must read the attached page headed "NOTICE -- 12 WARNING," which is provided to him pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 953- 13 954 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), and Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 14 1988). 15 If defendants file a motion for summary judgment claiming that plaintiff failed to 16 exhaust his available administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), 17 plaintiff should take note of the attached page headed "NOTICE -- WARNING 18 (EXHAUSTION)," which is provided to him as required by Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 19 1108, 1120 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2003). 20 d. If defendant wishes to file a reply brief, he shall do so no later than 21 fifteen days after the opposition is served upon her. 22 e. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is 23 due. No hearing will be held on the motion unless the court so orders at a later date. 24 3. All communications by plaintiff with the court must be served on defendant, or 25 defendant’s counsel once counsel has been designated, by mailing a true copy of the 26 document to defendants or defendants' counsel. 27 4. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil 1 Local Rule 16 is required before the parties may conduct discovery. 2 5. It is plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the court 3 informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed 4 “Notice of Change of Address.” He also must comply with the court's orders in a timely 5 fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute 6 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 Dated: May 20, 2021 9 10 /s/ Phyllis J. Hamilton PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON 11 United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 1 NOTICE -- WARNING (SUMMARY JUDGMENT) 2 If defendants move for summary judgment, they are seeking to have your case 3 dismissed. A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil 4 Procedure will, if granted, end your case. 5 Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a motion for summary 6 judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be granted when there is no genuine issue 7 of material fact--that is, if there is no real dispute about any fact that would affect the 8 result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as 9 a matter of law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing makes a motion 10 for summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn 11 testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set 12 out specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated 13 documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts shown in the defendant’s 14 declarations and documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for 15 trial. If you do not submit your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if 16 appropriate, may be entered against you. If summary judgment is granted, your case will 17 be dismissed and there will be no trial. 18 NOTICE -- WARNING (EXHAUSTION) 19 If defendants file a motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust, they are 20 seeking to have your case dismissed. If the motion is granted it will end your case. 21 You have the right to present any evidence you may have which tends to show 22 that you did exhaust your administrative remedies. Such evidence may be in the form of 23 declarations (statements signed under penalty of perjury) or authenticated documents, 24 that is, documents accompanied by a declaration showing where they came from and 25 why they are authentic, or other sworn papers, such as answers to interrogatories or 26 depositions. If defendants file a motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust and it 27 is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial.