Tampa Port Authority v. M/V DUCHESS

65 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 2000 A.M.C. 114, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23355, 1997 WL 1137971
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedJune 6, 1997
Docket94-1727-CIV-T-23C
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 65 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (Tampa Port Authority v. M/V DUCHESS) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tampa Port Authority v. M/V DUCHESS, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 2000 A.M.C. 114, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23355, 1997 WL 1137971 (M.D. Fla. 1997).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JENKINS, United States Magistrate Judge.

This cause comes on for consideration of an admiralty matter brought pursuant to Rule 9(h), Fed.R.Civ.P. in connection with an allision on December 25, 1992 involving the vessel MW DUCHESS (“DUCHESS”) and the northwest corner of the Robert E. Knight Pier (“Pier”) owned by the Tampa Port Authority (“TPA”). 1

TPA brings a claim of negligence against DUCHESS in rem and its owner, *1282 B.T. Straits, Inc. (“B.T.Straits”). Intervening plaintiff Westchester Fire Insurance Company (“Westchester”) brings a subrogation claim against DUCHESS and B.T. Straits to recover insurance payments made to TPA in connection with the damage to the Pier. B.T. Straits and DUCHESS bring a third-party claim of negligence pursuant to Rule 14(c), Fed.R.Civ.P. against Lambert Ware (“Ware”), a Tampa Bay harbor pilot in command of the DUCHESS at the time of the allision.

On September 13,1996, partial summary judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff TPA and Westchester against the DUCHESS as the vessel had not rebutted the presumption that a vessel colliding with a fixed object is at fault in an allision. The order granting summary judgment did not make any findings allocating fault among the various parties for the allision or resolving damages issues; nor did the order determine the cause of the allision. (Dkt.58)

A four-day non-jury trial was conducted on October 15 - 19, 1996. The parties then engaged in supplemental discovery as a result of certain matters occurring at the trial. The court reopened the evidence and received additional testimony and exhibits on January 16 - 17,1997. 2

Thereafter, the parties filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and various memoranda, all of which have been considered by this court, in addition to the testimony and exhibits received at trial.

Pursuant to Rule 52, Fed.R.Civ.P., the following findings of fact and conclusions of law are entered.

Findings of Fact

1. Plaintiff, Tampa Port Authority (TPA), created under the laws of the State of Florida, owns and operates the REK Pier in Tampa Bay.

2. Intervening plaintiff Westchester, a corporation doing business in the State of Florida, was the property insurance carrier for TPA at the túne of the allision.

3. In rem defendant DUCHESS is a U.S. flag registered oil tanker, measuring 672 feet long and 89 feet wide and capable of carrying cargo of up to 40,000 tons. When fully loaded, the draft is approximately 35 feet.

4. In personam defendant B.T. Straits is a corporation which owned the DUCHESS at the time of the allision.

5. Third party defendant Lambert Ware (‘Ware”) is a Tampa Bay harbor pilot who was in command of the DUCHESS at the time of the allision as a compulsory pilot as required by U.S. law and Coast Guard regulations.

6. On December 25, 1992 at 0130 hours, the DUCHESS struck the northwest corner of the Richard E. Knight (REK) Pier (“Pier”). The allision occurred while the vessel, fully loaded with cargo weighing approximately 37,000 tons, was being shifted from Berth 220 to Berth 226.

7. The DUCHESS sustained a three inch indentation in its bow as a result of the allision, which did not affect the seaworthiness of the vessel and was determined by a marine survey to be repairable at the next drydocking of the vessel. No claim for damages to the vessel is made in this case. Rather, the dispute in this case centers on what dock damage was caused by the DUCHESS and what damage preexisted the allision.

8. Ware, a Tampa Bay harbor pilot with approximately 24 years experience, possessed all necessary Florida and Coast Guard licenses. He was very familiar with the Pier and its berths, including the condition of the Pier at the time of the allision. Ware had also piloted the DUCHESS on at least one other occasion.

*1283 9. Pilot Ware was assisted by the master of the vessel, Captain Herman F. Cus-tin (“Custin”), licensed by the Coast Guard as a master in 1948 who had served as a ship captain since 1964.

10. The REK Pier is a concrete structure referred to as a “finger pier,” approximately 900 feet long and 40 feet wide, which is owned and operated by the TPA in an area known as Hooker’s Point, Cut D, a 400 foot wide channel which empties into Tampa Bay.

11. The Pier includes two berths: Berth 226 is on the north side of the pier and Berth 227 is on the south side of the pier.

12. The pier is used for five different terminal storage transfer facilities, four involving petroleum products and one a hydrous ammonia facility.

13. According to Steven L. Fidler (“Fi-dler”), TPA operations manager, approximately 400 vessels use the REK Pier annually resulting in approximately one and one-half billion dollars of revenue from this activity. (JX 113,115) 3

14. At the time of the DUCHESS allision, the outboard 100 foot section of the Pier was under repair pursuant to a project known as the “fender renovation project.” However, the Pier was still being used for commerce during this construction period.

15. Both Ware and Custin were aware of the weakened condition of the Pier and the need to use extra caution in docking at the berths. In fact, Ware stated that the pilots nicknamed the concrete corner of the Pier, which did not have fendering, as “the can opener.” He testified that the northwest corner was “a horror story waiting to happen for a loaded tanker of gasoline to be punched in the side” because there were no “double-hulled tankers back in those days and it would be easy to spill.” (Tl, p. 163)

The Maneuver

16. Prior to commencing the shifting maneuver, Ware met with the captain and the officers and was acquainted with the vessel’s specifications. He had piloted the DUCHESS on at least one prior occasion.

17. During the entire shifting operation, Ware and Custin were on the bridge of the vessel, starboard side. Ware, as the compulsory pilot, gave the engine commands and steering orders.

18. The DUCHESS proceeded in a northerly direction from Berth 220 towards Berth 226 at a speed of two to three knots assisted by two tugs. Visibility was good and- there were no unusual wind or weather conditions.

19. Ware received accurate and timely distances from the ship’s officer stationed at the bow of the vessel throughout the maneuver. The tugs were also in good working order and followed the pilot’s commands.

20. As was his custom in docking a vessel at Berth 226 from the south, Ware planned to stop the headway of the vessel to bring the bow due west of the pier. Using the tugs, the vessel would then be pivoted starboard and moved into the slip parallel to the berth.

21. However, as the DUCHESS drew even with the Pier the forward momentum continued. A 0122 a dead slow order was given by Ware. At 0124 the tug ORANGE was shifted to the stern.

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Bluebook (online)
65 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 2000 A.M.C. 114, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23355, 1997 WL 1137971, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tampa-port-authority-v-mv-duchess-flmd-1997.