IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE
In the Matter of the Marriage of No. 67825-6-1 TAMI REMICK, (consolidated with No. 67921-0-1)
Appellant, ORDER DENYING MOTION and FOR RECONSIDERATION AND AMENDING OPINION ENOCH THIJS REMICK,
Respondent.
The respondent, Enoch Thijs Remick, has filed a motion for reconsideration herein.
The court has taken the matter under consideration and has determined that the motion for
reconsideration should be denied, and that the opinion of the court should be amended.
Now, therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED that the motion for reconsideration is denied; and, it is further
ORDERED that the opinion of the court in the above-entitled cause filed April 22,
2013, be amended to read as follows:
DELETE footnote 20 on page 14, which reads: 20 Enoch's response is not in the record.
Done this //^davofjW) ,2013.
FOR THE COURT: V^n Ckt^-A
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4~/#^ IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Marriage of No. 67825-6-1 (consolidated with No. 67921-0-1) TAMI REMICK, DIVISION ONE Appellant, UNPUBLISHED OPINION and
ENOCH THUS REMICK, f^5 >-- Respondent. FILED: April 22, 2013 KS =e^j=
= 5r~ Grosse, J. — For purposes of calculating child support, bonuses efr?d E5^ contract-related benefits must be included in a parent's income unless such
sources of income are nonrecurring. The trial court must make a finding that a
particular source of income is nonrecurring. Here, the trial court did not make a
finding as to whether the father's commitment-based incentive bonus and his stock income were nonrecurring income. The amount of the bonus and stock
income is not insubstantial. The trial court must make a determination of whether
the income is nonrecurring and whether it should have been included in the
father's income. For this reason and for other reasons discussed below, we
remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTS
Enoch Remick (Enoch) and Tami Remick (Tami) were married in August
2001 and separated in July 2010. They have two children—one born in May
2005 and another born in January 2007. No. 67825-6-1/2
A decree of dissolution was entered in September 2011. A final parenting
plan was also entered under which Tami is the primary residential parent. The
trial court awarded Tami child support.
Most of the issues presented on appeal pertain to the award of child
support for the first year. The dissolution decree provides in this regard:
[X] The husband shall pay undifferentiated support for the wife and children to the wife in the amount of one-half of his gross salary and RBI bonus immediately when received for one (1) year beginning September 1, 2011 through August 31, 2012, but not less than $6000 per month. Support shall not include Father's CBI bonus or stock awards. During this one-year period, the entire amount shall be considered child support for tax planning purposes.
[X] For the 24 months commencing the 1st of the month after final undifferentiated family support payment has been made, the husband shall pay the wife $4,000 per month in maintenance.
[X] For the 6 months commencing the 1st of the month after the 24 months of maintenance in the preceding paragraph have been made, the husband shall pay the wife $2,000 per month in maintenance, ending on March 1, 2015.
The child support order provides the following with regard to the transfer
payment:
The husband shall pay undifferentiated family support for the children and wife as set forth in the Dissolution Decree, Paragraph 3.7. Because the undifferentiated family support is for the wife and the children, the wife will not receive a separate maintenance transfer payment during the first 12 months. The support is made up of 50% of husband's net income, but not less than $6000/mo, including his regular quarterly bonus (RBI).
After the undifferentiated family support ends in September 2012, the obligor shall pay obligee $2,000 per month in child support for 30 months after which child support shall be reviewed, i.e., in March 2015. No. 67825-6-1 / 3
The two provisions conflict in that one refers to Enoch's gross income and
the other refers to his net income. On Enoch's motion to clarify, the trial court
clarified that the correct reference is to Enoch's net income.
ANALYSIS Standard of Review
We review a trial court's dissolution orders, including orders awarding
child support and maintenance, for abuse ofdiscretion.1 Child Support Order
1. CBI Bonus and Stock Income
Enoch is eligible to receive two types of bonuses as a Microsoft
employee—a revenue-based incentive (RBI) bonus and a commitment-based
incentive (CBI) bonus. Enoch earned a CBI bonus for the three years prior to the
dissolution trial. In 2010, his CBI bonus was $62,000; in 2009, his CBI bonus
was between $58,000 and $60,000; in 2008, he received a CBI bonus, but could
not recall the amount. Enoch also purchased Microsoft stock pursuant to an
Employee Stock Purchase Plan (ESPP) and placed the stock, along with any
proceeds from its sale, in a Fidelity account. At the time of the entry of the
dissolution decree, the court valued Enoch's stock award at $11,100. The trial
court included Enoch's RBI bonus in its calculation of his income, but did not
include his CBI bonus or stock income.
Tami argues that the trial court erred by failing to include Enoch's CBI bonus and stock income in his income for purposes of calculating his child
1 In re Marriage of MacDonald. 104 Wn.2d 745, 751, 709 P.2d 1196 (1985). We reject Enoch's argument that review of the issue regarding modifiability of the maintenance award should be de novo. No. 67825-6-1/4
support obligation. RCW 26.19.071(3) lists bonuses and contract-related
benefits as items that must be included in income.2 A source of income may, however, be excluded from the calculation of the basic support obligation if it is
not a recurring source of income.3 "Deviations for nonrecurring income [must] be based on a review of the nonrecurring income received in the previous two
calendar years."4 And, under the statute, the trial court must make a finding that the source of income is not a recurring source of income. Here, the trial court did
not make a finding that Enoch's CBI bonus and stock income were nonrecurring
income. It appears from the record that the CBI bonus is recurring and
accordingly should have been included in the calculation of Enoch's income. We
cannot ascertain from the record whether Enoch's stock income is recurring
income or nonrecurring income.
Enoch does not argue that the CBI bonus and stock income should not
have been included in his income pursuant to RCW 26.19.071. Rather, he
argues that even if the trial court erred in not including all of Enoch's income,
remand for recalculation of his income is not necessary because the trial court
would have reached the same result even if it included Enoch's CBI bonus and
2RCW 26.19.071(3)(0, (r). 3RCW 26.19.075(1 )(b). This section provides in full: The court may deviate from the standard calculation based on a finding that a particular source of income included in the calculation of the basic support obligation is not a recurring source of income. Depending on the circumstances, nonrecurring income may include overtime, contract-related benefits, bonuses, or income from second jobs. Deviations for nonrecurring income shall be based on a review of the nonrecurring income received in the previous two calendar years. 4 RCW 26.19.075(1 )(b). No. 67825-6-1 / 5
stock income in the calculation of his income. In support, Enoch cites In re
Marriage of Awad.5 But in that case, the court determined that remand was not
necessary to remedy the trial court's failure to include stock options exercised by
the father because the trial court correctly determined, given the particular facts
of the case, that the child support transfer payment would remain the same even
if the father's monthly net income were properly calculated.6 Here, contrary to Enoch's counsel's assertion at oral argument, the trial court made no such
determination. Because we are unable to determine whether the income at issue
was nonrecurring or recurring and, accordingly, whether the income should have
been included, and because the trial court did not state that it would have arrived
at the same transfer payment had the CBI bonus and stock income been
included in Enoch's income, we remand for further proceedings on this issue.
2. Adjustment of Child Support
The order of child support (entered September 2011) provides:
3.16 PERIODIC ADJUSTMENT.
[X] Child support shall be adjusted periodically as follows:
[X] Beginning March, 2015 the child support shall be reviewed.
Tami argues that the trial court cannot prohibit child support adjustments
for more than 24 months. Her argument is based on two statutes. One statute,
RCW 26.09.100(2), provides that provisions for periodic adjustment or
modification of child support may not conflict with RCW 26.09.170, except that
5110 Wn. App. 462, 38 P.3d 1033 (2002). 6Awad. 110 Wn. App. at 470-71. No. 67825-6-1 / 6
the decree may require periodic adjustments or modifications more frequently
than the time periods established pursuant to RCW 26.09.170. The time period
established in RCW 26.09.170 on which Tami relies is RCW 26.09.170(7)(a),
which provides that if 24 months have passed from the date of entry of the child
support order, the order may be adjusted without a showing of substantially
changed circumstances based upon changes in the income of the parties or
changes in the economic table or standards in chapter 26.19 RCW.
The child support order was entered in September 2011. Tami argues
that because the provision says "Beginning March, 2015" no modifications or
adjustments are permitted prior to that date (three and a half years after entry of the order) and, for that reason, the provision runs contrary to RCW
26.09.170(7)(a), which allows a parent to move for adjustment or modification 24 months after entry of the order and RCW 26.09.100(2), which provides that provisions for adjustment or modification cannot conflict with RCW 26.09.170. We disagree. Neither this nor any other language in the child support order purports to limit either party's ability to pursue adjustment or modification of child support if circumstances warrant it under RCW 26.09.170.
3. Extraordinary Expenses
With regard to daycare expenses, educational expenses, and expenses for agreed extracurricular activities, the child support order provides that Tami and Enoch will each pay 50 percent of those expenses from September 1, 2011 through August 31, 2012. The order provides further: Beginning September 1, 2012 through August 31, 2015 this shall be 36.5% by the petitioner [Tami] and 63.5% by respondent No. 67825-6-1 / 7
[Enoch]. Starting September 1, 2014 through March 1, 2015 this shall be 19.8% by the petitioner and 80.2% by the respondent^]
Tami argues that the 50/50 apportionment of these expenses during the
first year is erroneous under RCW 26.19.080(3). That statute provides in
relevant part:
Day care and special child rearing expenses ... are not included in the economic table. These expenses shall be shared by the parents in the same proportion as the basic child support obligation.
Despite the mandatory nature of the statutory language, case law has
created an exception to the rule in cases where the trial court deviated from the
basic support obligation.7 Here, the trial court deviated from the basic support obligation for the first year and, accordingly, was not required to apportion day
care and special child rearing expenses in proportion to the basic support
obligation. Because we remand this matter with regard to Enoch's CBI bonus
and stock income, the trial court on remand is directed to reexamine the
apportionment of these extraordinary expenses and revise the apportionment if
warranted. Also, as it is currently written, the provision regarding extraordinary
expenses contains an error because the two time periods identified in the order
overlap. The latter period falls within the former period, so it is impossible to
state what the parties' obligations are during this latter period. This error must be
corrected on remand.
7 In re Marriage of Casey. 88 Wn. App. 662, 666-67, 967 P.2d 982 (1997): In re Paternity of Hewitt. 98 Wn. App. 85, 89-90, 988 P.2d 496 (1999); In re Yeamans. 117 Wn. App. 593, 600-01, 72 P.3d 775 (2003). No. 67825-6-1 / 8
4. Child Support Worksheets
RCW 26.19.035(4) requires that child support worksheets "shall be
attached to the decree or order or if filed separately shall be initialed or signed by
the judge and filed with the order." This language is mandatory; there are no
exceptions to the requirement that worksheets be filed in every proceeding in
which child support is determined.8 Even where the record and the trial court's findings support the child support award, remand is nonetheless required for the
preparation and entry of child support worksheets.9 Here, the trial court did not attach a child support worksheet for the first
year of support to the dissolution decree or child support order, nor did it file a
worksheet with the order. It did, however, attach worksheets for the September
2012 to August 2014 period and the September 2014 to March 2015 period. For
purposes of any further review, on remand, the trial court is directed to attach a
child support worksheet for the first year to the order of child support.
5. Inclusion of Child Support as Income to Tami
Child support should not have been included as income to Tami.10 Because there are no child support worksheets for the first year in the record, we
are unable to ascertain whether child support was or was not included in her
8 In re Marriage of Sievers. 78 Wn. App. 287, 305-06, 897 P.2d 388 (1995). 9 Sievers. 78 Wn. App. at 305-06 (noting, however, that because the award was supported by the record and the court's findings, the court of appeals did not have to vacate the award). 10 Fuoua v. Fuoua. 88 Wn.2d 100, 105, 558 P.2d 801 (1977) ("A child's custodian receives support money as a trustee and not in his or her own right.").
8 No. 67825-6-1 / 9
income. On remand, the trial court is directed to reexamine this issue and
correct any error.
6. Inclusion of Maintenance Ordered But Not Received
Tami argues that the trial court improperly included in her income
maintenance the court ordered but which she had not received and deducting the
support ordered but not paid from Enoch's income. The child support orders and
worksheets which Tami proposed included maintenance in Tami's income.
Having invited the error, Tami cannot complain about it on appeal.11 7. Taxability of Undifferentiated Support Payment
Tami argues that the trial court erred by characterizing the first year of
support as "undifferentiated support" because, by so doing, the court rendered
the award taxable to Tami. In support, she cites Bav v. C.I.R..12 in which the court stated that "in the case of unallocated or undifferentiated support for a wife
and children, all of the support is taxable to the wife and deductible by the
husband."13 But, that opinion also states that where the payment is specifically earmarked as child support, the payment is not taxable to the recipient.14 Here, the decree of dissolution specifically provides that the entire amount
of the $6,000 monthly payment to Tami during the first year "shall be considered
child support for tax planning purposes." Enoch agrees that the entire amount
11 See Home v. Aune. 130 Wn. App. 183, 191 n.2, 121 P.3d 1227 (2005). 12 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 396, 1994 WL 442107 (U.S. Tax Ct. 1994). 13 Bay, 1994WL.442107*2. 14 Bay, 1994 WL 442107 *4; see also C.I.R. v. Lester. 366 U.S. 299, 306, 81 S. Ct. 1343, 6LEd.2d306(1961)
9 No. 67825-6-1/10
paid during the first year is not taxable. Tami's argument that there is error with
regard to the taxability of the first year's payments is without merit.
Order on Motion to Clarify
1. Modification or Clarification
After the decree of dissolution was entered, Enoch filed a motion to clarify.
One item in the motion concerned the family's residence. The trial court awarded
it to Tami. After trial, Tami decided she did not want the house. The dissolution
orders were entered September 16, 2011, but Tami claimed to need until
October 16, 2011 to move out. In his motion to clarify, Enoch asked for an offset
for the amounts he paid for child support, maintenance, mortgage payments,
etc., while Tami remained in the family home and paid nothing. The trial court awarded Enoch an offset of $3,750, representing a month and a half of
reasonable rent.
Tami claims that this offset amounted to a modification of the decree,
rather than a clarification because it altered the property distribution from the
distribution originally ordered by the trial court. We disagree. A trial court has discretion to charge rent for one party's occupation of the home as an offset for that party's use of the home.15 The trial court acted within its discretion in ordering rentand did not, in so doing, improperly modify the decree. Tami also claims that the court's order on Enoch's motion for clarification erroneously changed the first year of undifferentiated support from nontaxable to Tami to taxable to Tami. The clarification did nothing more than clarify that
15 Lindemann v. Lindemann. 92 Wn. App. 64, 78, 960 P.2d 966 (1998).
10 No. 67825-6-1/11
Enoch was required to pay half of his net pay, rather than his gross pay, for the
first year. The award did not change the taxable nature of the funds. Per the
original order, the entire $6,000 monthly payment was to be deemed child
support and was therefore not taxable to Tami.
2. Trial Court's Jurisdiction
When the trial court entered its order on Enoch's motion to clarify, it
directed the parties to "jointly move the court of appeals for jurisdiction to enter
this order." Tami filed a motion in this court asking it to relinquish jurisdiction to
the trial court pursuant to RAP 7.2(e).16 Enoch replied that he had no objection to this court relinquishing jurisdiction. A commissioner of this court granted the
motion.
Despite having been the movant on the RAP 7.2(e) motion, Tami now
argues that the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter the order on Enoch's motion for clarification. She argues that she asked this court to relinquish
jurisdiction only to the extent needed to allow the trial court to distribute personal property and award an equalizing payment. Distributing personal property and awarding an equalizing payment were two matters addressed in the order on
16 RAP 7.2(e) provides in part: The trial court has authority to hear and determine (1) postjudgment motions authorized by the civil rules, the criminal rules, or statutes, and (2) actions to change or modify a decision that is subject to modification by the court that initially made the decision. The postjudgment motion or action shall first be heard by the trial court, which shall decide the matter. If the trial court determination will change a decision then being reviewed by the appellate court, the permission of the appellate court must be obtained prior to the formal entry of the trial court decision. A party should seek the required permission by motion. The decision granting or denying a postjudgment motion may be subject to review.
11 No. 67825-6-1/12
Enoch's motion to clarify. The other matters addressed were (1) clarification of
the fact that the $6,000 per month award was based on Enoch's net pay, rather
than his gross pay, and (2) the requirement that Tami pay rent as an offset for
the period she remained in the family home.
Once this court relinquished jurisdiction, the trial court had jurisdiction to -
and did - enter the order in its entirety. We find no merit to Tami's argument that
despite the fact that the entire order on motion to clarify was entered, the trial court had jurisdiction to act on only part of that order. The trial court acted within
its jurisdiction in this regard.
Other Issues
1. Modifiability of Maintenance
The dissolution decree provides that the maintenance awarded to Tami "shall be non-modifiable in amount or duration." Tami argues that the trial court
lacked the authority to make such provision absent the parties' consent. Except as otherwise allowed by RCW 26.09.070(7), a maintenance award is modifiable, but only as to installments accruing subsequent to the petition for modification and only upon a showing of a substantial change of circumstances.17 RCW 26.09.070(7) provides in pertinent part: "When the separation contract so provides, the decree may expressly preclude or limit modification of any provision for maintenance set forth in the decree." "Under
17 RCW 26.09.170(1).
12 No. 67825-6-1/13
this provision, a nonmodifiable maintenance award is permissible if such a
provision was included in a separation contractthe parties entered."18 Enoch does not argue that a separation contract exists that includes a
provision in which the parties agreed that maintenance can be nonmodifiable.
Rather, he argues that Tami invited any error by including the nonmodifiable
provision in the decree of dissolution she proposed.
The trial court's oral opinion contains no reference to the issue of whether
maintenance was modifiable or nonmodifiable. At oral argument, Tami's counsel
conceded that it was Tami who originally proposed that maintenance be
nonmodifiable. Under the invited error doctrine, a party may not set up an error
at trial and then complain of it on appeal.19 Tami argues that she attempted to cure the error by bringing it to the trial court's attention and that therefore the
doctrine of invited error does not preclude review of the issue. The record,
however, does not provide support for Tami's argument.
After receiving Tami's proposed orders, Enoch made some modifications,
but did not alter the provision making maintenance nonmodifiable. Tami filed a
notice of presentation of final orders, noting that Enoch's proposed modifications
raised issues that needed to be addressed by the court. In her notice, she states
that her proposed orders accompanied the motion, but these documents are not
in the record. Accordingly, it is not possible to ascertain whether her proposed
orders that accompanied her notice of presentation eliminated the provision
18 In re Marriage of Hulscher. 143 Wn. App. 708, 715,180 P.3d 199 (2008) (citing In re Marriage of Short. 125 Wn.2d 865, 876, 890 P.2d 12 (1995)). 19 Angelo Prop. Co.. LP v. Hafiz. 167 Wn. App. 789, 823, 274 P.3d 1075 (2012).
13 No. 67825-6-1 /14
making maintenance nonmodifiable. The only document in the record that shows
that Tami raised this issue is her reply to Enoch's response to her notice of
presentation of final orders.20 In this document, Tami claims that Enoch's
proposed order - not hers - contained the nonmodifiable provision. While
Enoch's proposed order did contain the provision, it contained it because Enoch
incorporated it from Tami's proposed order.
From the record, all that can be ascertained is that Tami proposed the
provision she now claims is error. And, she did not bring the error to the trial
court's attention until her reply on her notice of presentation of final orders. She
did not seek reconsideration of the maintenance award. We agree with Enoch
that Tami is not permitted to raise this issue as error on appeal.
2. Order of Sanctions
In her statement of arrangements, Tami stated that she did not intend to
file a verbatim report of proceedings (VRP). Enoch filed an objection, arguing
that a transcript of the entire trial was necessary for review of the issues on
appeal. Enoch also filed a motion in the trial court for an order requiring Tami to
submit a full VRP. A commissioner of this court ordered Tami to inform this court
whether she intended to file a VRP. Tami responded with an amended
statement in lieu of a statement of arrangements pursuant to RAP 9.2(c). In it,
she identified the issues she intended to raise on review and argued that the
issues could be adequately reviewed with only the designated clerk's papers.
20 Enoch's response is not in the record.
14 No. 67825-6-1/15
The trial court ordered Tami to file an amended statement of
arrangements and to arrange for the transcription of the entire four-day trial at
her own expense. The trial court also ordered Tami to pay Enoch $500 in
attorney fees for having to bring the motion.
Enoch then moved in this court to dismiss Tami's appeal because she
failed to file an amended statement of arrangements, make arrangements to
have the four-day trial transcribed, and pay the $500 in attorney fees. Enoch
sought another award of $500 in attorney fees. Tami responded by arguing once
again that a VRP was not necessary to review the issues on appeal and that
dismissal of her appeal was not warranted. Tami also filed a notice of appeal of
the trial court's order requiring her to provide a VRP.
A commissioner of this court denied Enoch's motion to dismiss the appeal.
The commissioner denied Tami's motion to overturn the trial court's order
requiring her to provide a VRP, reasoning that the trial court is in the best position to determine what record is necessary for review. Tami complied with the order and had the entire proceeding transcribed.
Tami challenges the award to Enoch of $500 as sanctions, arguing that the award was improper because a transcriptof the entire trial was not necessary
for review of the issues on appeal. We agree with Tami. The transcript of the entire trial is nearly 900 pages long. But, only a few ofthose pages were needed to review the issues presented in this appeal. The imposition of $500 in sanctions was excessive. We vacate the award in its entirety.
15 No. 67825-6-1/16
3. Attorney Fees on Appeal
Both parties ask for an award of attorney fees on appeal. Tami bases her
request on her need and Enoch's ability to pay. Enoch claims entitlement to fees
on the ground that Tami's appeal is frivolous. We deny both parties' requests for
fees.21
CONCLUSION
We remand this matter for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We
are aware that the judge who presided at the trial ofthis matter is now retired, but urge the trial court remand to attempt to secure the services of that judge as judge pro tern for the rehearing of this matter. We vacate the award of $500 in sanctions and deny both parties' requests for attorney fees on appeal.
*VX/ _i WE CONCUR:
21 Both parties bear some responsibility for the deficiencies in the record. Moreover, Tami's appeal is not frivolous. See Enslev v. Mollmann. 155 Wn. App. 744, 760, 230 P.3d 599 (2010).