Talon Diversified Holdings Inc. v. White

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 23 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

IN RE: PARKS DIVERSIFIED, L.P., No. 24-5516 DEBTOR D.C. No. 8:24-cv-00227-SVW TALON DIVERSIFIED HOLDINGS INC.; NORTH VALLEY MALL II, LLC; NORTH VALLEY REGIONAL MEMORANDUM* CENTER LLC; PARKS DIVERSIFIED, LP; RICHARD PARKS, individually and as trustee of the Parks Family Trust; LUCIA PARKS, individually and as trustee of the Parks Family Trust,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

MARC FORSYTHE, an individual; GOE FORSYTHE & HODGES, LLP, a limited liability partnership,

Defendants - Appellees,

and

KIMURA LONDON AND WHITE, LLP, a California limited liability partnership, LINDA WONG, an individual, MICHAEL S. LEBOFF, an individual, WILLIAM LONDON, an

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. individual, DAVID KLEIN, an individual, DARRELL P. WHITE, an individual, KLEIN & WILSON, an entity of form unknown, MAXX SHARP, an individual, TODD B. BECKER, an individual,

Defendants.

IN RE: PARKS DIVERSIFIED, L.P., No. 24-5517 DEBTOR D.C. No. TALON DIVERSIFIED HOLDINGS 8:23-cv-02230-SVW INC.; NORTH VALLEY MALL II, LLC; NORTH VALLEY REGIONAL CENTER LLC; PARKS DIVERSIFIED, LP; RICHARD PARKS, individually and as trustee of the Parks Family Trust; LUCIA PARKS, individually and as trustee of the Parks Family Trust,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

DAVID KLEIN; MARC FORSYTHE, an individual; GOE FORSYTHE & HODGES, LLP, a limited liability partnership; MICHAEL S. LEBOFF, an individual; KLEIN & WILSON, an entity of form unknown; DARRELL P. WHITE, an individual; WILLIAM LONDON, an individual; MAXX SHARP, an individual; KIMURA LONDON AND WHITE, LLP, a California limited liability partnership; LINDA WONG, an individual; TODD B. BECKER, an individual,

2 24-5516 Defendants - Appellees.

TALON DIVERSIFIED HOLDINGS INC.; No. 24-5911 NORTH VALLEY MALL II, LLC; NORTH VALLEY REGIONAL CENTER D.C. No. LLC; PARKS DIVERSIFIED, LP; 8:23-cv-02230-SVW RICHARD PARKS; LUCIA PARKS,

Plaintiffs - Appellees,

v.

DAVID KLEIN,

Defendant - Appellant,

and

MARC FORSYTHE, GOE FORSYTHE & HODGES, LLP, MICHAEL S. LEBOFF, KLEIN & WILSON, DARRELL P. WHITE, WILLIAM LONDON, MAXX SHARP, KIMURA LONDON AND WHITE, LLP, LINDA WONG, TODD B. BECKER,

Defendants.

TALON DIVERSIFIED HOLDINGS INC.; No. 24-5918 NORTH VALLEY MALL II, LLC; NORTH VALLEY REGIONAL CENTER D.C. No. LLC; PARKS DIVERSIFIED, LP; 8:23-cv-02230-SVW RICHARD PARKS; LUCIA PARKS,

Plaintiffs - Appellees,

v.

3 24-5516 DARRELL P. WHITE; WILLIAM LONDON; MAXX SHARP; KIMURA LONDON AND WHITE, LLP,

Defendants - Appellants,

and

DAVID KLEIN, MARC FORSYTHE, GOE FORSYTHE & HODGES, LLP, MICHAEL S. LEBOFF, KLEIN & WILSON, LINDA WONG, TODD B. BECKER,

Defendants.

TALON DIVERSIFIED HOLDINGS INC.; No. 24-5920 NORTH VALLEY MALL II, LLC; NORTH VALLEY REGIONAL CENTER D.C. No. LLC; PARKS DIVERSIFIED, LP; 8:23-cv-02230-SVW RICHARD PARKS; LUCIA PARKS,

Plaintiffs - Appellees,

v.

TODD B. BECKER,

Defendant - Appellant,

and

DAVID KLEIN, MARC FORSYTHE, GOE FORSYTHE & HODGES, LLP, MICHAEL S. LEBOFF, KLEIN & WILSON, DARRELL P. WHITE, WILLIAM LONDON, MAXX SHARP, KIMURA LONDON AND WHITE, LLP, LINDA WONG,

4 24-5516 Defendants.

TALON DIVERSIFIED HOLDINGS INC.; No. 24-6314 NORTH VALLEY MALL II, LLC; NORTH VALLEY REGIONAL CENTER D.C. No. LLC; PARKS DIVERSIFIED, LP; 8:23-cv-02230-SVW RICHARD PARKS, individually and as trustee of the Parks Family Trust; LUCIA PARKS, individually and as trustee of the Parks Family Trust,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

DAVID KLEIN, an individual; MARC FORSYTHE, an individual; GOE FORSYTHE & HODGES, LLP, a limited liability partnership; MICHAEL S. LEBOFF, an individual; KLEIN & WILSON, an entity of form unknown; DARRELL P. WHITE, an individual; WILLIAM LONDON, an individual; MAXX SHARP, an individual; KIMURA LONDON AND WHITE, LLP, a California limited liability partnership; LINDA WONG, an individual; TODD B. BECKER, an individual,

Defendants - Appellees.

IN RE: PARKS, DIVERSIFIED, L.P., No. 24-6638 DEBTOR D.C. No. TALON DIVERSIFIED HOLDINGS 8:24-cv-00228-SVW INC.; NORTH VALLEY MALL II, LLC; NORTH VALLEY REGIONAL CENTER LLC; PARKS DIVERSIFIED,

5 24-5516 LP; RICHARD PARKS; LUCIA PARKS,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

DAVID KLEIN; MARC FORSYTHE; GOE FORSYTHE & HODGES, LLP; MICHAEL S. LEBOFF; KLEIN & WILSON; DARRELL P. WHITE; WILLIAM LONDON; MAXX SHARP; KIMURA LONDON AND WHITE, LLP; LINDA WONG; TODD B. BECKER,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 9, 2026 Submission Vacated March 3, 2026 Resubmitted July 23, 2026 Pasadena, California

Before: OWENS, VANDYKE, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

Appellants Richard and Lucia Parks (collectively “the Parkses”); Parks

Diversified, L.P. (“Parks Diversified”); Talon Diversified Holdings, Inc. (“Talon”);

North Valley Mall II, LLC (“North Valley Mall II”); and North Valley Regional

Center, LLC (“North Valley Regional Center”) appeal from the district court’s

resolution of an appeal from the bankruptcy court’s dismissal of claims against

Appellees David Klein (“Klein”); Marc Forsythe and Goe Forsythe & Hodges, LLP

6 24-5516 (collectively “Goe Forsythe”); Michael LeBoff and Klein & Wilson (collectively

“K&W”), Darrel White, Willim London, Maxx Sharp, and Kimura London & White

LLP (collectively “Kimura”); and Todd Becker (“Becker”). Appellants also appeal

from the district court’s order imposing sanctions on them. Cross-Appellants Klein,

Kimura, and Becker appeal from the district court’s order directing the bankruptcy

court to remand the claims against them to state court. We dismiss in part for lack

of jurisdiction, affirm in part, and remand.1

We have jurisdiction to determine whether we have jurisdiction, see

Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 833 n.5 (9th Cir. 2003), and we review our

own jurisdiction de novo, see Silver Sage Partners, Ltd. v. City of Desert Hot Springs

(In re City of Desert Hot Springs), 339 F.3d 782, 787 (9th Cir. 2003). We review

the scope of the bankruptcy court’s subject-matter jurisdiction de novo. See Piombo

Corp. v. Castlerock Props. (In re Castlerock Props.), 781 F.2d 159, 161 (9th Cir.

1986). We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s imposition of sanctions

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.,

496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990). A district court abuses its discretion if it “base[s] its ruling

on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the

evidence.” Id.

1 We previously resolved a portion of this matter in an opinion filed on March 3, 2026. See Talon Diversified Holdings Inc. v. Forsythe (In re Parks Diversified, L.P.), 168 F.4th 1188 (9th Cir. 2026).

7 24-5516 1. We lack jurisdiction over Cross-Appellants’ appeal of the district court’s

order to remand claims to state court. In general, “[a]n order remanding a case to

the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or

otherwise ….” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516

U.S. 124 (1995), which affirmed the Sixth Circuit’s dismissal of a similar appeal for

lack of jurisdiction, is instructive. Like the defendant in Things Remembered, Goe

Forsythe removed a state-court action to the bankruptcy court under the bankruptcy

removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1452. See Things Remembered, 516 U.S. at 126. Like

the bankruptcy court in Things Remembered, the bankruptcy court here denied

remand. See id. And like the district court in Things Remembered, the district court

here explicitly rejected the bankruptcy court’s finding of removal jurisdiction and

remanded the case for the bankruptcy court to remand claims to state court. See id.

at 126–27 & n.2. Although the district court in Things Remembered found a

procedural defect in removal and the district court here found that the bankruptcy

court had acted beyond its subject-matter jurisdiction, see id. at 126, that distinction

makes no difference, see id. at 127–28 (“As long as a district court’s remand is based

on a timely raised defect in removal procedure or on lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction … a court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to entertain an appeal of the

remand order under § 1447(d).” (emphasis added)). Finally, like the district court’s

order in Things Remembered, the district court’s order here left the bankruptcy court

8 24-5516 with “no option but to remand” to state court the claims over which the bankruptcy

court purportedly lacked jurisdiction. Id. at 127 n.2.

Contrary to Kimura’s argument, it is of no moment that the district court didn’t

order the remand of the entire case to state court. When the district court ordered

the claims against Cross-Appellants to be remanded to state court, the district court

effectively severed those claims from the other claims in the removed Act II case.

Thus, the claims the district court ordered remanded became their own “case” under

§ 1447(d). See DeMartini v. DeMartini, 964 F.3d 813, 821 (9th Cir. 2020).

2. For the same reasons stated in the previously filed opinion in this case, we

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1) over the remaining issues on appeal.

See In re Parks Diversified, L.P., 168 F.4th at 1195–97.

3. We affirm the district court’s conclusion that the bankruptcy court had

subject-matter jurisdiction over the Act II claims against Goe Forsythe and K&W.

Both the original and amended Act II complaints contain scores of convoluted

claims, but many of the allegations center around the theory that the initial Parks

Diversified Chapter 11 petition was filed without the requisite authority and that Goe

Forsythe and K&W—with knowledge of the lack of authority—enabled Klein to

attempt to expel his parents from the Parks Diversified partnership and file the

bankruptcy petition. Thus, some claims in the Act II complaint “by [their] nature,

could arise only in the context of a bankruptcy case” and were therefore “core”

9 24-5516 claims that were properly removed to the bankruptcy court. Gruntz v. County of Los

Angeles (In re Gruntz), 202 F.3d 1074, 1081 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citation

omitted); see also Gonzales v. Parks, 830 F.2d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Filings

of bankruptcy petitions are a matter of exclusive federal jurisdiction.”); 28 U.S.C.

§ 1452(a).

To the extent that either the original or amended Act II complaint contained

claims against Goe Forsythe or K&W that were not “core,” the bankruptcy court

validly exercised its ancillary jurisdiction to resolve them. “Where a settlement

agreement led to the dismissal of a case, a court has jurisdiction to vindicate its

authority or effectuate its decree if the court’s dismissal order explicitly retained

jurisdiction or incorporated the terms of the settlement agreement.” Sea Hawk

Seafoods, Inc. v. Alaska (In re Valdez Fisheries Dev. Ass’n), 439 F.3d 545, 549 (9th

Cir. 2006). Here, the bankruptcy court approved a stipulation that provided that the

court would “retain jurisdiction over issues relating to this Bankruptcy Case and the

rights arising out of this agreement.” 2 Thus, the bankruptcy court had ancillary

2 Although no one explicitly signed the stipulation on behalf of Parks Diversified, the stipulation was signed by all three owners of Parks Diversified, everyone who could have been a general partner of Parks Diversified, and the counsel that represented Parks Diversified in the bankruptcy proceeding. And though the Parkses signed the stipulation only in their individual capacities and not in their capacities as trustees of the Parks Family Trust, that doesn’t mean that the stipulation didn’t bind them in their capacities as trustees. See JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Ward, 245 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 303, 309 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019) (“Where a trustee signs a contract of

10 24-5516 jurisdiction to “effectuate its decree” and dismiss the claims that Parks Diversified

and the Parkses had explicitly waived in the stipulation. Id.

4. The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Rule 11 sanctions

against Appellants. Although Appellants argue that their motion for rehearing was

necessary “to seek clarification from the [district] court” about the scope of the

remand order, the district court’s remand order was clear on its own terms. In light

of that clarity, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that

Appellants’ request for clarification was “frivolous.” And Appellants don’t contend

that their request amounted to “a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying,

or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2).

We therefore DISMISS in part for lack of appellate jurisdiction, AFFIRM

the district court’s judgment in all other respects, and REMAND the case to the

district court with instructions that the district court carry out its remand order.

sale or deed without reference to his or her representative capacity, the contract or deed is enforceable against the trust.” (citation modified)).

11 24-5516