[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-4756
D. C. Docket No. 94-8110-CIV-KMM
ROSANNA TALAVERA, GERARD TALAVERA,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
SCHOOL BOARD OF PALM BEACH COUNTY, ANABELLE HART, individually and in her official capacity as Guidance Coordinator for Atlantic High School, JAMES D. WILLIAMS, individually and in his official capacity as Assistant Principal at Atlantic High School, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
(November 24, 1997)
Before ANDERSON, DUBINA and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
DUBINA, Circuit Judge: This appeal presents an issue of first impression in this
circuit: does a plaintiff's certification on an application for
social security disability benefits that she is totally disabled
bar her from asserting in a subsequent claim under the Americans
With Disabilities Act that she is capable, with reasonable
accommodation, of performing the essential functions of her job?
We join the majority of our sister circuits and answer the question
in the negative. I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Rosanna Talavera (“Talavera”) began working for the
School Board of Palm Beach County (“the school board”) as a
secretary in April 1990. She had a one-year, renewable employment
contract. Her job required her to stand at a counter for four to
five hours each day scheduling appointments for students to see a
guidance counselor. In September 1992, Talavera began experiencing
back pain and consulted a physician. She claims the doctor told
her to elevate her leg and avoid standing for long periods.
Talavera requested several workplace accommodations, including the
provision of a special chair and a handicapped parking place, but
she claims the school board did not provide them.
Talavera's condition worsened. In March 1993, she applied for
a transfer to a position in the school board's main office which
would have permitted her to sit all day. The school board informed
Talavera that she had the job, then called back two days later and
told her the position had been “blocked.” Immediately thereafter,
the school board sent Talavera a letter stating that it would not
2 renew her contract when it expired on June 30, 1993. In early
April 1993, the school board involuntarily transferred Talavera to
a position in the records filing area. Talavera was unable to
perform the job because it required her to stand all day. Talavera
became bedridden in May 1993, after which she took unpaid leave
until her contract expired.
Talavera has two bulging discs in her back. She has been
diagnosed with chronic osteoarthritis and fibroid myalgia.
Talavera applied for social security disability (“SSD”) benefits in
September 1993. Her application included the following statements:
I cannot stand up for more than 5 minutes. I cannot walk more than a few hundred feet. . . .
To try and compensate [at my job] I registered students sitting at my desk. As far as filing I used to take a chair to sit. I also lost a lot of days because at times I wasn't able to leave the house or get out of bed. Since then I wasn't reappointed & lost my job. No provisions were made for my handicap. . . .
I am in extreme pain & have trouble walking. I am in need of medical attention but cannot afford it. . . . I cannot walk to transportation & be able to climb up stairs to bus or train. I am now homebound.
I feel that my skills are good. However, I can no longer walk, bend, etc. Therefore when an employer sees me I look totally disabled. My mind is intact but my physical appearance is a deterrent. Unfortunately our society is only concerned with your appearance. I am finding it harder and harder to walk.
Disability Report 1-6. In October 1993, the Social Security
Administration (“SSA”) determined that Talavera was totally
disabled and awarded her benefits, which she continues to receive.
Talavera filed a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) in April 1993. She and her husband
3 filed suit in the district court in March 1994. Talavera alleged
that the school board violated her rights under the Americans With
Disabilities Act of 1991 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., by
failing to accommodate her disability and then terminating her
because of it. Talavera's husband brought a claim for loss of
consortium.1
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
school board on two alternative grounds: (1) Talavera was
judicially estopped from claiming she was a “qualified” individual
with a disability under the ADA, having certified to the SSA that
she was totally disabled; and (2) Talavera failed to raise a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether she could perform the
essential functions of her job. Plaintiffs then perfected this
appeal. In addition to the parties' briefs, we have the benefit of
an amicus brief from the EEOC supporting Talavera's position. II. ISSUES
A. Did the district court properly rule that Talavera's
application for SSD benefits judicially estops her from claiming in
this action that she is a “qualified individual with a disability”
entitled to protection under the ADA?
B. Did the district court properly rule that Talavera failed to
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she is a
1 The Talaveras brought suit against several individual defendants, as well. On appeal, they pursue only their claims against the school board.
4 “qualified individual with a disability”?2 III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de
novo, applying the same standard used by the district court. Scala
v. City of Winter Park , 116 F.3d 1396, 1398 (11th Cir. 1997). “Summary judgment is appropriate if the record shows no genuine
issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Id.
The school board argues that we should review the district court's application of judicial estoppel for abuse of discretion.
See McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 616-17 (3rd Cir.
1996) (applying abuse of discretion review), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 958 (1997); Yanez v. United States, 989 F.2d 323, 326 (9th Cir.
1993) (same). Although this circuit has not explicitly identified
the applicable standard of review, the language in the few Eleventh
Circuit cases involving judicial estoppel is consistent with abuse
of discretion review. See, e.g., Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Rebhan, 842 F.2d 1257, 1261 (11th Cir. 1988) (“We think it proper simply to
review the bankruptcy court's application of judicial estoppel to
ascertain whether it was consonant with the policy interests which
originally gave rise to the doctrine.”). We note that “[t]he abuse
of discretion standard includes review to determine that the
discretion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions.” Koon v.
2 The school board also seeks summary judgment on the ground that Talavera was not “disabled” within the meaning of the ADA when the alleged violations occurred. The school board did not raise this argument before the district court; therefore, we will not consider it now. See Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556, 564 (11th Cir. 1996).
5 United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2048 (1996). IV. DISCUSSION
Talavera claims that the school board violated her rights
under the ADA by failing to provide reasonable accommodations for
her disability and terminating her because of her disability. To
establish a prima facie case under the ADA, Talavera must show (1)
that she has a disability; (2) that she is qualified for the
position in question; and (3) that the school board discriminated
against her because of her disability. Pritchard v. Southern Co.
Servs., 92 F.3d 1130, 1132 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 2453 (1997); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). The ADA defines a
“qualified” individual as “an individual with a disability who,
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions” of the job she holds or desires. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)
(emphasis added). If a qualified individual with a disability
requires a reasonable accommodation to perform the essential
functions of her job, then the ADA requires the employer to provide
the accommodation unless the employer can demonstrate that doing so
would constitute an undue hardship. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
Reasonable accommodations may include job restructuring, part-time
or modified work schedules, and acquisition or modification of
equipment or devices. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
A. Judicial Estoppel The district court ruled that Talavera could not establish a
prima facie case because she was judicially estopped from claiming
she was “qualified” under the ADA. The district court found
6 Talavera's application for and receipt of SSD benefits
fundamentally incompatible with her position in this lawsuit that
she could perform the essential functions of her job with
reasonable accommodation. Accordingly, the district court invoked
judicial estoppel. Judicial estoppel “is applied to the calculated
assertion of divergent sworn positions. The doctrine is designed
to prevent parties from making a mockery of justice by inconsistent
pleadings.” McKinnon v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 935 F.2d
1187, 1192 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting American Nat'l Bank v. Federal
Dep. Ins. Corp., 710 F.2d 1528, 1536 (11th Cir. 1983)).
This circuit has not addressed the effect of an application
for disability benefits upon a subsequent ADA claim. Numerous
other circuit and district courts have addressed the issue,
including several district courts in this circuit. The holdings of
these courts vary widely.
The Third Circuit has held that a plaintiff who certifies
total disability on an application for benefits is judicially
estopped from later bringing an ADA claim. McNemar v. Disney
Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610 (3rd Cir. 1996). In McNemar, the
plaintiff (McNemar) was terminated from his position as assistant
manager at a Disney Store for theft after divulging that he was HIV
positive. McNemar then applied for SSD benefits and stated on the
standardized application form that he was totally disabled and
unable to work as of five weeks prior to his discharge. He made
similar statements on applications for forbearance of student loan
payments and state disability benefits. Shortly thereafter,
7 McNemar brought disability claims against the Disney Store under
both the ADA and state law. The district court dismissed the
disability claims on judicial estoppel grounds, and the Third
Circuit affirmed. According to the Third Circuit, “[c]learly
McNemar has asserted inconsistent positions regarding his ability
to work.” Id. at 618. He certified in his applications for
benefits that he was totally and permanently disabled and unable to
work and earn money; but in his disability claims he stated he
could perform the essential functions of his job. Id. The court
further observed that the ADA was not intended to cover people who
are unable to work. Accordingly, the court held that the district
court properly applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel.
Some confusion has arisen regarding the holding in McNemar,
particularly as to whether it created a per se rule of judicial
estoppel. Some courts, along with the EEOC, have interpreted
McNemar as creating a per se rule. See, e.g., Dush v. Appleton
Elec. Co., 124 F.3d 957, 961 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that the
Third Circuit in McNemar affirmed the district court's application
of “judicial estoppel as a per se bar”); Norris v. Allied-Sysco
Food Servs., Inc., 948 F.Supp. 1418, 1441 (N.D.Cal. 1996) (listing
McNemar as one of the cases holding that judicial estoppel creates
a per se bar); and EEOC Notice No. 915.002, 31 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) E-1 at 14 (Feb. 14, 1997) (criticizing the McNemar court for
failing “to conduct the individualized inquiry mandated by the ADA
definition of 'qualified individual with a disability'”).
However, in Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., ___ F.3d ___,
8 (3rd Cir. Sept. 26, 1997), Judge Becker, writing for a panel of the
Third Circuit, responded to the “considerable criticism” of the
McNemar decision and indicated that McNemar articulated a
relatively fact-specific holding. Id. at *6 nn.3 & 5. The
district court in Krouse granted summary judgment on the ground
that the plaintiff was judicially estopped from establishing the
qualifications element of his ADA claim. Although the Third
Circuit affirmed on different grounds, the court stated in a
footnote that “district courts in this circuit are misapplying
McNemar without first considering the unique facts of that case.”
Id. at *6 n.5. The court instructed that “[c]ourts should not
assume that McNemar always bars an individual’s ADA claims merely
because prior representations or determinations of disability exist
in the record.” Id. Another footnote stated that “Judge Becker is
persuaded . . . that McNemar was wrongly decided, and believes that
the court should reconsider it at its first opportunity. Id. at *6
n.4.
Taking into consideration the Krouse court’s discussion of
McNemar, it appears that no court of appeals has adopted the
position that a plaintiff who has claimed total disability on a
benefits application is per se estopped from claiming he could work
with reasonable accommodations under the ADA. However, numerous
district courts have so held, including at least one in this
circuit. See, e.g., Thomas v. Fort Myers Housing Auth'y, 955 F.
Supp. 1463 (M.D. Fla. 1997); Simon v. Safelite Glass Corp., 943 F.
Supp. 261 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Reiff v. Interim Personnel, Inc., 906 F.
9 Supp. 1280 (D. Minn. 1995); Nguyen v. IBP, Inc., 905 F. Supp.
1471, 1484-85 (D. Kan. 1995).
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the District of Columbia
Circuit has held that representations on an application for
disability benefits are merely one piece of evidence that an ADA
plaintiff is not “qualified,” rather than an absolute bar. See
Swanks v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth'y, 116 F.3d 582 (D.C.
Cir. 1997). In Swanks, the plaintiff (Swanks), who suffered from
spinal bifida, sought and received SSD benefits after he was fired
from his job as a police officer with the transit authority.
Swanks then filed an ADA claim, alleging that the transit authority
refused to accommodate his disability and then fired him because of
it. The district court entered summary judgment for the transit
authority because Swanks' “disability determination renders [him]
unqualified for the position which he held either as it was or with
a reasonable accommodation.” Id. at 584. The court of appeals
reversed.
The court of appeals began by outlining the SSD application
process. Id. at 584-85. Under the Social Security Act, an
individual is entitled to disability benefits
if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). The Act does not address the effect of
10 a reasonable accommodation on a claimant's disability status. In
administering the Act, the SSA has developed a five-step procedure
for evaluating disability claims. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (1996).
The five steps are as follows:
(1) The SSA ascertains whether the claimant is currently
engaged in “substantial gainful activity.” If so, the
agency denies the application; if not, it proceeds to
step two.
(2) The agency determines whether the claimant has a
“severe” impairment. If not, the application is denied.
If so, the agency proceeds to step three.
(3) The agency checks whether the impairment is listed as
presumptively disabling in the regulations.3 If the
claimant's condition is listed, the agency awards with no
further inquiry. If the condition is not listed, the agency
proceeds to step four.
(4) The agency determines whether the claimant is able to
perform his past work. If so, benefits are denied. If not,
the agency proceeds to the final step.
(5) Considering the claimant's age, educational experience,
past work experience, and residual functional capacity, the
agency determines whether the claimant can do “other work”--
i.e., jobs “that exist in significant number in the national
economy.” 20 C.F.R. § 1560(c). If so, the agency denies the
3 The list includes conditions such as certain spinal disorders, certain amputations, epilepsy, etc. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d).
11 application. If not, the agency awards benefits.
After explaining this procedure, the Swanks court pointed out
that “[n]owhere in this five-step process does the Social Security
Administration take account of the possible effect of reasonable
accommodation on a claimant's ability to work.” Swanks, 116 F.3d
at 585. A claimant can be found disabled at the third step if she
has a “listed” impairment, with no inquiry into her actual ability
to work. In addition, a claimant can be deemed eligible for
benefits at the fifth step, where the inquiry focuses on the
general availability of particular types of work and not on whether 4 a reasonable accommodation would enable a claimant to work. In
short, an individual can meet the requirements for SSD eligibility
and still be a “qualified individual with a disability” under the
ADA.5 The Swanks court recognized that there is no inherent
inconsistency.
However, the Swanks court noted that specific representations
a particular individual makes in the benefits application process
may be relevant to a subsequent ADA claim. “For example, ADA
plaintiffs who in support of claims for disability benefits tell
4 Indeed, the SSA has issued an Information Memorandum explicitly stating that, for the purpose of the fifth step assessment, “[w]hether or how an employer might be willing (or required) to alter job duties to suit the limitations of a specific individual would not be relevant.” Daniel L. Skoler, Assoc. Comm'r, SSA, DISABILITIES ACT INFO. MEM. at 3, (June 2, 1993) (No. SG3P2). The Memorandum also stresses that “[h]ypothetical inquiries about whether an employer would or could make accommodations that would allow return to a prior job would not be appropriate.” Id. 5 Both the SSA and the EEOC have taken the position that there is no inherent inconsistency. See Swanks, 116 F.3d at 586.
12 the SSA they cannot perform the essential functions of their job
even with accommodation could well be barred from asserting, for
ADA purposes, that accommodation would have allowed them to perform
that same job.” Id. at 587 (emphasis added). Thus, the Swanks
court declined to apply estoppel in all such cases in favor of a
case-by-case inquiry that examines the specific statements a
disability discrimination plaintiff makes in connection with
applications for disability benefits.
While declining to establish a per se rule of judicial
estoppel, other circuit courts have shown reluctance to hold that
individuals who are “totally disabled” for SSD purposes are covered
by the ADA. In Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 120 F.3d 513
(5th Cir. 1997), the Fifth Circuit held that there is a “rebuttable
presumption” that an applicant for or recipient of SSD benefits is
not a “qualified individual with a disability.” Id. at 518.
Despite its obvious skepticism, the court stopped short of holding
that all SSD applications should be estopped: “It is at least
theoretically conceivable that under some limited and highly
unusual set of circumstances the two claims would not necessarily
be mutually exclusive . . .” Id. at 517. In Dush v. Appleton
Elec. Co., 124 F.3d 957 (8th Cir. 1997), the Eighth Circuit ruled
that an ADA plaintiff who had characterized herself as “totally
disabled” in a previous workers' compensation proceeding failed to
present evidence showing she was a “qualified individual with a
disability.” Although the court declined to hold that judicial
estoppel precluded all such plaintiffs from proceeding with an ADA
13 claim,6 it made the following observations:
Where, as here, the party opposing the [summary judgment] motion has made sworn statements attesting to her total disability and has actually received payments as a result of her condition, the courts should carefully scrutinize the evidence she marshals in an attempt to show she is covered by the ADA. The burden faced by ADA claimants in this position is, by their own making, particularly cumbersome, for summary judgment should issue unless there is strong countervailing evidence that the employee . . . is, in fact, qualified.
Id. at 963 (citation omitted).
Still other courts of appeals presented with this question
have limited themselves to the facts of their cases, without
articulating any broad rules. See Blanton v. Inco Alloys Int'l,
Inc., 108 F.3d 104 (6th Cir. 1997) (judicial estoppel barred
plaintiff's claim that he was qualified for former position as
extrusion press crew leader because he specifically represented on
disability benefits application that he could not perform that job,
but plaintiff was not estopped from claiming he was qualified for
vacant light duty position);7 D'Aprile v. Fleet Servs. Corp., 92 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1996) (ADA plaintiff's statements on
application for disability benefits “may not have constituted [a]
broad admission of incapacity,” so the ADA claim was not
automatically barred); Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477,
1480-82 (9th Cir. 1996) (examining entire record, including ADA
plaintiff's statements on SSD application, to find no genuine issue
6 The Dush court explicitly declined to reach the issue of judicial estoppel. 7 The Sixth Circuit applies judicial estoppel only to “successful assertions made in one proceeding when a contrary assertion is made in another.” Blanton, 108 F.3d at 109.
14 8 of fact that plaintiff was not “qualified”); Weigel v. Target
Stores, 122 F.3d 461, 466-67 (7th Cir. 1997) (explaining that an
SSA total disability determination, while relevant, is not
dispositive of the issue of an ADA claimant's status as a
“qualified individual with a disability”).
We agree with the majority of our sister circuits that a
certification of total disability on an SSD benefits application is
not inherently inconsistent with being a “qualified individual with
a disability” under the ADA. A certification of total disability
on an SSD application does mean that the applicant cannot perform
the essential functions of her job without reasonable
accommodation. It does not necessarily mean that the applicant
cannot perform the essential functions of her job with reasonable
accommodation. Whether in any particular situation there is an
inconsistency between applying for SSD benefits and bringing an ADA
claim will depend upon the facts of the case, including the
specific representations made in the application for disability
benefits and the nature and extent of the medical evidence in the
record. However, we do hold that an ADA plaintiff is estopped from
denying the truth of any statements made in her disability
application. Our basis for this holding is that an ADA plaintiff
should not be permitted to disavow any statements she made in order
to obtain SSD benefits.
After examining the record in this case, we hold that the
8 The Ninth Circuit also declined to consider whether the doctrine of judicial estoppel applied. Kennedy, 90 F.3d at 1481 n. 3.
15 district court abused its discretion in applying a per se rule of
judicial estoppel. Talavera stated on her application that she had
great difficulty walking and standing for any length of time.
However, she made no statements indicating that she could not
perform her job if she were accorded reasonable accommodation. To
the contrary, she stated that “[n]o provision was made for my
handicap” at work. Disability Report 1-6. She also explained: “I
feel that my skills are good. However, I can no longer walk, bend,
etc. Therefore when an employer sees me I look totally disabled.
My mind is intact but my physical appearance is a deterrent.
Unfortunately our society is only concerned with your appearance.”
Id. These statements indicate that Talavera felt she remained able
to work. They are not inconsistent with her position in the ADA
claim that she was “qualified.” Therefore, per se judicial
estoppel is not warranted in this case.
B. “Qualified Individual with a Disability” As for the district court's alternative ruling, we hold that
genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on the
question of whether Talavera was “qualified” under the ADA. Thus,
the district court erred by finding that summary judgment would be
warranted even if judicial estoppel were not applied. The district
court pointed to Talavera's statements in her SSD benefits
application that she could not stand more than five minutes, walk
more than 100 feet, nor bend; that at times she could not get out
of bed or leave the house; that she was home-bound; and that her
doctor told her she was “totally disabled.” Dist. Ct. Op. at 9.
16 The district court properly considered those statements as true
because, as we have pointed out, Talavera is estopped from denying
any statements she made in her SSD application. However, there is
still a dispute of fact as to whether Talavera's problems walking
and standing rendered her unable to perform the essential functions
of her job, with accommodation.
Talavera sought permission to perform her filing and
scheduling duties while seated in a chair. She also requested a
handicapped parking place to minimize the distance she had to walk
to and from the cafeteria. Finally, she applied for and received
a different secretarial position within the school board which
would have involved sitting all day, but the school board “blocked”
the transfer and decided not to renew Talavera's contract. It is
not clear from the present record whether these accommodations
would have been reasonable or whether they would have enabled
Talavera to perform the essential functions of her job. Indeed,
the record does not indicate what the essential functions of
Talavera's job were (either her initial position in the guidance
office or the position for which she sought a transfer). However,
Talavera presented the affidavits of her doctors and a
rehabilitation expert, who averred that Talavera could have
continued to work had the school board limited her need to stand
and walk by providing her with a wheelchair, ergonomically correct
chair, or sedentary position; and restricted her lifting.
Additionally, Talavera states that the only reason she was
homebound was that after her termination she was unable to keep her
17 car, and her physical limitations prevented her from using public
transportation. This evidence renders inappropriate summary
judgment on the issue of Talavera's ability to perform her job with
reasonable accommodation. V. CONCLUSION
We decline to adopt the position that SSD recipients are
judicially estopped in all circumstances from bringing claims under
the ADA. In this case, accepting Talavera's SSD application
statements as true, those statements do not rule out the
possibility that she could perform the essential functions of her
job with reasonable accommodation. Moreover, the record indicates
that issues of fact remain as to whether Talavera was “qualified”
under the ADA. We reverse the district court's grant of summary
judgment and remand this case for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.