Taal v. Zwirner, et al.

2003 DNH 062

Opinion

Taal v . Zwirner, et a l . CV-02-131-M 04/09/03 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Baboucar B. Taal and Guylaine L . Taal, Plaintiffs

v. Civil N o . 02-131-M Opinion N o . 2003 DNH 062 Patricia Zwirner and Kim Lacey, Defendants

O R D E R

Pro se plaintiffs, Baboucar and Guylaine Taal, filed this

civil action against defendants, alleging that they conspired to

interfere with plaintiffs’ civil rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), and

violated provisions of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. §

3601, et seq. They seek $21 million in compensatory and punitive

damages. By order dated March 1 0 , 2003, the court granted the

motion for summary judgment submitted by defendant State Farm

Mutual Auto Insurance Company.

Pending before the court are the following motions:

plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration of the court’s March 10

order (document n o . 9 2 ) ; defendant Zwirner’s motion to compel discovery from plaintiffs (document n o . 9 1 ) ; defendant Lacey’s

motion to compel discovery from Guylaine Taal (document n o . 8 3 ) ;

defendant Lacey’s motion to compel discovery from Baboucar Taal

(document n o . 9 3 ) ; defendant Lacey’s motion to strike plaintiffs’

objection (document n o . 9 9 ) ; and plaintiffs’ motion for leave to

file a response to State Farm’s objection (document n o . 9 8 ) .

Those motions are resolved as follows.

I. Plaintiffs’ Motions.

Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is granted to the

extent it moves the court to reconsider its order dated March 1 0 ,

2003. Having reconsidered that order, the court reaffirms it in

all material respects. Nothing in plaintiffs’ motion to

reconsider persuades the court that the rulings set forth in its

order dated March 1 0 , 2003, were erroneous, either factually or

legally.

Dissatisfied with the court’s order granting State Farm’s

motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs now (appear to) seek

relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). See Plaintiffs’ memorandum

at 1 (“State Farm[’s] motion for summary judgment [was] by all

2 standard[s] premature as Rule 56(f) clearly indicates that a

party opposing summary judgment must be allowed adequate

opportunity to conduct discover[y] or otherwise develop the

evidence in opposition of the summary judgment motion.”). To

the extent plaintiffs do seek relief under Rule 56(f), their

request is neither properly supported nor is it timely. See,

e.g., Mass. School of Law at Andover v . American Bar Ass’n., 142

F.3d 2 6 , 44 (1st Cir. 1998) (“To savor the balm of Rule 56(f), a

party must act in a timely fashion. Moreover, the moving papers

must contain a proffer which, at a bare minimum, articulates a

plausible basis for the movant’s belief that previously

undisclosed or undocumented facts exist, that those facts can be

secured by further discovery, and that, if obtained, there is

some credible prospect that the new evidence will create a

trialworthy issue.”) (citations omitted). See also Peterson-

Leitch Co., Inc. v . Mass. Municipal Wholesale Elec. Co., 840 F.2d

985, 988-90 (1st Cir. 1988).

Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a response to State

Farm’s objection (document n o . 98) is denied as moot.

Parenthetically, the court notes that plaintiffs’ motion also

3 lacks the certification required by the court’s order dated March

10, 2003.

11. Defendant Zwirner’s Motion to Compel.

Defendant’s motion to compel (document n o . 91) is granted in

part and denied in part. To the extent it seeks an order

compelling plaintiffs to comply with their discovery obligations,

it is granted. To the extent it seeks attorneys’ fees, it is

denied as premature, without prejudice to defendant’s right to

seek such fees should plaintiffs fail to comply with this order.

III. Defendant Lacey’s Motions to Compel and to Strike.

Defendant’s motions to compel (document nos. 83 and 93) are

likewise granted in part and denied in part. To the extent they

seek an order compelling plaintiffs to comply with their

discovery obligations, the motions are granted. To the extent

they seek attorneys’ fees, they are denied as premature, without

prejudice to defendant’s right to seek such fees should

plaintiffs fail to comply with this order.

4 Defendant Lacey’s motion to strike (document n o . 99) is

denied as moot.

Conclusion

Defendants’ motions to compel (document nos. 8 3 , 9 1 , and 93)

are granted to the extent defendants seek an order compelling

plaintiffs to produce the requested discovery; those motions are,

however, denied as premature to the extent they seek an award of

attorneys’ fees. Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration

(document n o . 92) is denied insofar as it is both unsupported and

untimely. Defendant Lacey’s motion to strike (document n o . 99)

is denied as moot. Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a

response (document n o . 98) is also denied as moot.

Plaintiffs shall produce the discovery referenced in

defendants’ various motions to compel on or before April 25,

2003. Plaintiffs should understand that failure to comply with

this order will expose them to the imposition of appropriate

sanctions, which may include precluding the presentation of

evidence at trial, or even dismissal of their claims.

5 SO ORDERED.

Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge

April 9, 2003

cc: Baboucar B . Taal Guylaine L . Taal Wilfred J. Desmarais, Jr., Esq. Christopher J. Pyles, Esq. Russell F. Hilliard, Esq.