Ta Chen Stainless Steel Pipe, Ltd. v. United States

25 Ct. Int'l Trade 1349, 2001 CIT 143
United States Court of International Trade·Decided December 10, 2001·No. Court 99-07-00446·Published

Opinion

Opinion

Restani, Judge:

This antidumping duty matter is before the court following remand. See Ta Chen Stainless Steel Pipe, Inc. v. United States, Slip Op. 01-101, 2001WL 915254 (Ct. Int’l Trade August 14, 2001) (“Ta Chen III”), familiarity with which is presumed. Plaintiff Ta Chen Stainless Steel Pipe, Ltd. (“Ta Chen”) received an adverse Best Information Available (BIA) dumping margin because the Department of Commerce concluded that Ta Chen had inexcusably failed to provide sales data for two entities related to it, San Shing Hardware Works, USA (“San Shing”) and Sun Stainless Steel, Inc. (“Sun”).

The first question to be addressed by Commerce on remand was whether San Shing and Sun are parties “by whom or for whose account *1350 merchandise is imported into the United States” under pre-URAA 1 19 U.S.C. § 1677(13) (1988). 2 This is the first step in finding them to be related “exporters” from whom sales data was required.

Commerce determined that Sun and San Shing had replaced Ta Chen International (“TCI”) as Ta Chen’s welded pipe distributor in the United States and that the overwhelming majority of Ta Chen’s sales in the relevant reviews were imported for the account of San Shing and Sun. Contrary to Ta Chen’s argument, this is not a finding that § 1677(13) is satisfied by mere sales to customers. Commerce’s finding of virtual identity for this purpose between TCI and San Shing and Sun, and mutual dependence between San Shing and Sun on one hand and Ta Chen on the other is supported by the following evidence: (1) the purchase by San Shing and Sun of all of TCI’s inventoiy, thereby effectively (even if not technically or legally) replacing TCI as the sole distributor of subject merchandise in the U.S. for at least part of the period of investigation (POI); 3 (2) the fact that 85% or 88% (depending on whether the appropriate measurement is weight or length) of Ta Chen’s sales in the first review and over 80% in the second review were to customers sharing San Shing’s and Sun’s d/b/a names; (3) Ta Chen was the exclusive supplier for San Shing and Sun.

This analysis recognizes the business reahties of this situation in which Ta Chen, which was making U.S. sales through related TCI, would have received Exporter Sales Price (ESP) treatment, but the reporting requirements were allegedly too burdensome. See Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe from Taiwan, 64 Fed. Reg. 33,243 (1999). Ta Chen restructured its distribution arrangements after the antidumping duty order was issued in an attempt to have all the Ta Chen sales treated as Purchase Price transactions, but did not in fact cease selling through a U.S. distributor, as described above.

This matter is distinguishable from Certain Small Business Telephone Systems and Subassemblies Thereof from Korea, 54 Fed. Reg. 53,141, 53,151 (1989) (“Small Business Telephone”) as to the first step of § 1677(13) because, inter alia, the buyer from the U.S. distributor whom petitioner there sought to have recognized as the one for whose *1351 account the merchandise was imported did not not buy the entire sales inventory of the U.S. distributor and the U.S. distributor was recognized as the exporter for ESP purposes.

Defendant now recognizes that Small Business Telephones is not distinguishable for purposes of the second step of § 1677(13), which was also to be addressed on remand, and that Commerce’s new policy which allows relatedness through control to be determined on other than ownership bases is different from that of Small Business Telephones and Disposable Pocket Lighters from Thailand, 60 Fed. Reg. 14,263, 14,267-68 (1995), in which control through equity ownership only determined relatedness.

Ta Chen misunderstands Commerce’s duty of explanation of a policy change, as now admittedly occurred here. It is hornbook administrative law that an agency may change its policy, practice or legal interpretation, subject only to the constraint that it explain the reason for its change and that the new policy remains consistent with the governing statute. The reason for the change may simply be a reversal of the agency’s position because it believes the new position to be more sound; no intervening event is required to justify the change. Cf. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. F.C.C., 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Leventhal, J.) (“An agency’s view of what is in the public interest may change, either with or without a change in circumstances.”). To impose a requirement of changed circumstances, as Ta Chen would have the court do, would result in the ossification of the entire administrative state. In this regard, Ta Chen also misapplies retroactivity analysis. An agency is free to adopt, employ, and alter rules made entirely through the course of adjudication, and therefore presumably through “investigations” such as these. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 219-25 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting distinction between retroactivity in rule-making and adjudication contexts, and recognizing permissibility of retroactive application through adjudication). For example, such adjudicatory rule-making is the NLRB’s virtually exclusive means of setting policies. See, e.g., Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998). Identifying the Department’s actions here as impermissible retroactivity would call into question every change in agency policy accomplished through adjudication or “investigation. ”

Here, Commerce cites to the Statement of Administration Action (“SAA”) for the URAA as to the reason.it changed its policy under prior law:

“[Cjontrol” exists if one person is legally or operationally in a position to exercise restraint or direction over another person. The Administration believes that including control in the definition of “affiliated” will permit a more sophisticated analysis which better reflects the realities of the marketplace.
The traditional focus on control through stock ownership fails to address adequately modern business arrangements, which often find one firm “operationally in a position to exercise restraint or di *1352 rection” over another even in the absence of an equity relationship. A company may be in a position to exercise restraint or direction, for example, through corporate or family groupings, franchises or joint venture agreements, debt financing, or close supplier relationships in which the supplier or buyer becomes reliant upon the other.

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Ta Chen Stainless Steel Pipe, Ltd. v. United States, 25 Ct. Int'l Trade 1349, 2001 CIT 143 (cit 2001).

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