T-Mobile South LLC v. City of Milton

27 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 60 Communications Reg. (P&F) 1189, 2014 WL 2766092, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82681
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Georgia
DecidedJune 18, 2014
DocketCivil Action No. 1:10-CV-1638-RWS
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 27 F. Supp. 3d 1289 (T-Mobile South LLC v. City of Milton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
T-Mobile South LLC v. City of Milton, 27 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 60 Communications Reg. (P&F) 1189, 2014 WL 2766092, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82681 (N.D. Ga. 2014).

Opinion

ORDER

RICHARD W. STORY, District Judge.

This case is again before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [23]. The Court’s previous Orders on Plaintiffs motion ([33], [39]) were reversed by the Eleventh Circuit and the case was remanded. (11th Cir.Opin., [56].) After reviewing the Circuit Court’s opinion, the Parties’ submissions, and the record, the Court enters the following Order.

Background

The factual background is fully laid out in the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion [56] and the Court’s prior Order [33]. What follows is a brief overview of the case’s procedural history and the Circuit Court’s holding.

[1291]*1291T-Mobile moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether the City of Milton (“Milton”) violated 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii), which provides: “Any decision by a State or local government or instrumentality thereof to deny a request to place, construct, or modify personal wireless service facilities shall be in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in the written record.” On June 24, 2011, the Court entered an Order ( [33]) holding that Milton had failed to meet the statute’s writing requirement. In reaching its decision, the Court only considered Defendant’s initial decision letters (two denial letters and a conditional approval letter), which did not set forth the reasons underlying Milton’s decisions. ( [33] at 5-7.) The Court declined to consider other written documents in the record such as hearing transcripts and minutes. (Id.)

In that same Order, the Court remanded the case to Milton “to adequately state in writing its grounds for denial and/or conditional approval” because “[s]ueh a proper written denial by the Defendant is necessary in order for the Court to rule on the issue of whether there was substantial evidence to support Defendant’s decisions.” ([33] at 8.) But upon T-Mobile’s motion for reconsideration ([35]), which argued that remand is an improper remedy for failure to satisfy the Telecommunications Act’s (“Act”) writing requirement, the Court found that Milton’s conduct warranted an injunction. ([39]). Accordingly, the Court permanently enjoined Milton from denying T-Mobile’s applications, subject to T-Mobile producing proper wind load certifications for each of the three sites. ([39] at 7.) Milton appealed.

The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the Court’s interpretation of § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) and held that Milton had satisfied the Act’s writing requirement. (11th Cir. Opin., [56] at 26.) The Circuit Court stated:

The words of the statute we are interpreting require that the decision on a cell tower construction permit application be “in writing,” not that the decision be “in a separate writing” or in a “writing separate from the transcript of the hearing and the minutes of the meeting in which the hearing was held” or “in a single writing that itself contains all of the grounds and explanations for the decision.... All of the written documents should be considered collectively in deciding if the decision, whatever it must include, is in writing.

(Id. at 25.) According to the Circuit, to determine whether Milton satisfied § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii), the Court should have considered: (1) transcripts of the Planning Commission’s hearings; (2) transcripts of the City Council’s hearings; (3) the initial decision letters sent from Milton to T-Mobile; and (4) detailed minutes of the City Council hearings. (Id. at 25-26.) In light of the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion, the Court now considers whether, based on the whole written record, Milton’s decisions were supported by substantial evidence.

Discussion

I. Legal Standard — Summary Judgment

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires that summary judgment be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” “The moving party bears ‘the initial responsibility of informing the ... court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demon[1292]*1292strate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.’ ” Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir.2004) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). Where the moving party makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the non-movant, who must go beyond the pleadings and present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact does exist. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The applicable substantive law identifies which facts are material. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A fact is not material if a dispute over that fact will not affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id. An issue is genuine when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

Finally, in resolving a motion for summary judgment, the court must view all evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Patton v. Triad Guar. Ins. Corp., 277 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir.2002). But, the court is bound only to draw those inferences which are reasonable. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir.1997) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (internal citations omitted); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (once the moving party has met its burden under Rule 56(a), the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts”).

II. Decisions Supported by Substantial Evidence

A. Substantial Evidence Standard

“Substantial evidence” is not defined in the Act. “The Conference Committee for the [Act], however, expressly noted ‘substantial evidence’ is meant to be ‘the traditional standard used for judicial review of agency actions.’ ” Preferred Sites, LLC v. Troup Cnty.,

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27 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 60 Communications Reg. (P&F) 1189, 2014 WL 2766092, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82681, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/t-mobile-south-llc-v-city-of-milton-gand-2014.