5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT AT SEATTLE 7
8 LEO SYNORACKI, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, CASE NO. 2:18-cv-01784-RSL 9 Plaintiff, 10 v. 11 ORDER GRANTING IN PART LEAVE TO AMEND ALASKA AIRLINES, INC., 12
Defendant. 13
15 This matter comes before the Court on “Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File First 16 Amended Class Action Complaint to Amend the Class Action Allegations and to Amend 17 the Certified Class Definitions.” Dkt. 85. On May 31, 2022, the Court granted defendant’s 18 motion for summary judgment, finding inter alia that neither vacation nor sick time 19 accrual are seniority-based benefits, that leaves of absence for jury duty are not 20 comparable to the military leaves of absence (“MLOA”) at issue in this case, and that sick 21 leave is a form of deferred compensation, not a furlough or leave of absence that can be 22 compared to MLOA under the Uniform Services Employment and Reemployment Rights 23 Act of 1994 (“USERRA), 38 U.S.C. § 4301, et seq. Dkt. 70. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit 24 vacated the order as to plaintiff’s non-seniority benefits claims and remanded for 25 reconsideration in light of an intervening decision, Clarkson v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 59 26 F.4th 424 (9th Cir. 2023). Clarkson held in relevant part that “when assessing USERRA ORDER GRANTING IN PART LEAVE TO AMEND - 1 1 violations, comparability of the military leave taken by the servicemember and other paid 2 leave offered by the employer is to be determined by examining the length of the leave at 3 issue, rather than by using a categorical approach.” Synoracki v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., No. 4 22-35504, 2024 WL 4501072, at *2 (9th Cir. Oct. 16, 2024). The Ninth Circuit expressly 5 stated that “[o]n remand, the district court may consider certifying a narrower, temporally 6 limited class” if plaintiff, as master of his complaint, chose to limit his “request for 7 recovery of benefits to specific, shorter military leaves.” Id. 8 Plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint to seek recovery of vacation and sick time 9 accrual benefits related to military leaves of 90 days or less and to represent separate 10 subclasses of pilots who were on military leaves of 30 days or less, 31-60 days, and 61-90 11 days. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that “[t]he court should freely give 12 leave [to amend] when justice so requires,” and there is a strong public policy in favor of 13 permitting amendment. Bowles v. Reade, 198 F.3d 752, 757 (9th Cir. 1999); Benshoof v. 14 Ferguson, No. 2:24-cv-00808-JHC, 2025 WL 459884 at 1 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 11, 2025). 15 Rule 15(a) is to be applied with “extreme liberality.” Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 16 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). When determining whether leave to 17 amend should be granted, courts consider several factors, including: (1) bad faith; 18 (2) undue delay; (3) repeated failure to cure deficiencies in previously allowed amended 19 complaints; (4) prejudice to the opposing party; (5) futility; and (6) whether the party has 20 been previously granted leave to amend. Id. at 1052. This analysis should generally “be 21 performed with all inferences in favor of granting the motion.” Griggs v. Pace Am. Grp., 22 Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 1999). Absent prejudice or a strong showing of one of the 23 other factors, there is a presumption in favor of amendment. Eminence Cap., 316 F.3d at 24 1052; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gunwall, 675 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1136 (W.D. Wash. 2023). 25 Defendant argues that many of plaintiff’s proposed amendments would be futile and 26 should not be permitted. See AmeriSourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist W., Inc., 465 F.3d 946, ORDER GRANTING IN PART LEAVE TO AMEND - 2 1 951 (9th Cir. 2006); Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995). “An amendment 2 is futile if it merely restates the same facts as the original complaint in different terms, 3 reasserts a claim on which the court previously ruled, fails to state a legal theory, or could 4 not withstand a motion to dismiss.” Schasteen v. Saltchuk Res., Inc., No. 24-CV-01529- 5 EMC, 2024 WL 3560721, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2024) (citing Wheeler v. City of Santa 6 Clara, 894 F.3d 1046, 1059–1060 (9th Cir. 2018) and Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 7 617, 628–629 (9th Cir. 1991)). As a general matter, the addition of temporal limitations 8 designed to make the military leaves at issue more comparable to non-military furloughs or 9 leaves of absence materially changes the facts alleged, has not been considered by the 10 Court, and, as discussed in Clarkson, is not necessarily futile. 11 To the extent plaintiff seeks to allege that “sick leave is comparable” to military 12 leaves of various lengths, however, the new allegations do not alter the Court’s conclusion 13 that “sick leave is not a furlough or leave of absence and does not, therefore, fall within the 14 ambit of § 4316(b)(1)(B).” Dkt. 85-1 at ¶ 63; Dkt. 70 at 15. Because these new allegations 15 merely reassert a claim on which the Court has already ruled in defendant’s favor, they are 16 futile. See, e.g., Hall v. United States, 233 F.R.D. 591, 595 (D. Nev. 2005) (finding that 17 amendment would be futile where the new allegations do not alter the court’s prior 18 analysis or conclusion).1 19 With regards to the new allegations of unpaid benefits owned to pilots who took 20 military leaves of 30 days or less, those claims are barred by the settlement negotiated and 21 approved in Clarkson v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., No. 2:19-cv-0005-TOR, Dkt. 257 (W.D. 22 Wash. Jan. 15, 2025). Mr. Clarkson represented a class of Alaska Airlines pilots, including 23
24 1 Nothing in Clarkson, 59 F.4th 424, compels a different conclusion. The Ninth Circuit was not asked to determine whether sick leave was a “furlough or leave of absence” under USERRA, instead simply accepting plaintiff’s 25 allegations on the issue. This matter was remanded so that the undersigned could evaluate comparability based on temporally-limited military leaves if plaintiff chose to amend his complaint. He has done so, but the new allegations 26 offer no basis on which to reconsider the Court’s finding that sick leave is a form of deferred compensation that does not fall within the ambit of § 4316(b)(1)(B). ORDER GRANTING IN PART LEAVE TO AMEND - 3 1 the plaintiff in this case, who took at least one short-term military leave of absence. Mr. 2 Clarkson alleged that pilots who took non-military leave, such as jury duty, bereavement 3 leave, and/or sick leave, were paid, and that the failure to pay pilots on military leaves of 4 30 days or less violated USERRA. As part of the settlement, the class released Alaska 5 Airlines2 from any and all claims under § 4316(b) “based on or arising out of the same 6 factual predicate as Count IV” of the Amended Complaint. No. 2:19-cv-0005-TOR, Dkt. 7 257 at 23-24. While Count IV alleged that the class had been deprived of wages, salaries, 8 and compensation, No. 2:19-cv-0005-TOR, Dkt.
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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT AT SEATTLE 7
8 LEO SYNORACKI, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, CASE NO. 2:18-cv-01784-RSL 9 Plaintiff, 10 v. 11 ORDER GRANTING IN PART LEAVE TO AMEND ALASKA AIRLINES, INC., 12
Defendant. 13
15 This matter comes before the Court on “Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File First 16 Amended Class Action Complaint to Amend the Class Action Allegations and to Amend 17 the Certified Class Definitions.” Dkt. 85. On May 31, 2022, the Court granted defendant’s 18 motion for summary judgment, finding inter alia that neither vacation nor sick time 19 accrual are seniority-based benefits, that leaves of absence for jury duty are not 20 comparable to the military leaves of absence (“MLOA”) at issue in this case, and that sick 21 leave is a form of deferred compensation, not a furlough or leave of absence that can be 22 compared to MLOA under the Uniform Services Employment and Reemployment Rights 23 Act of 1994 (“USERRA), 38 U.S.C. § 4301, et seq. Dkt. 70. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit 24 vacated the order as to plaintiff’s non-seniority benefits claims and remanded for 25 reconsideration in light of an intervening decision, Clarkson v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 59 26 F.4th 424 (9th Cir. 2023). Clarkson held in relevant part that “when assessing USERRA ORDER GRANTING IN PART LEAVE TO AMEND - 1 1 violations, comparability of the military leave taken by the servicemember and other paid 2 leave offered by the employer is to be determined by examining the length of the leave at 3 issue, rather than by using a categorical approach.” Synoracki v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., No. 4 22-35504, 2024 WL 4501072, at *2 (9th Cir. Oct. 16, 2024). The Ninth Circuit expressly 5 stated that “[o]n remand, the district court may consider certifying a narrower, temporally 6 limited class” if plaintiff, as master of his complaint, chose to limit his “request for 7 recovery of benefits to specific, shorter military leaves.” Id. 8 Plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint to seek recovery of vacation and sick time 9 accrual benefits related to military leaves of 90 days or less and to represent separate 10 subclasses of pilots who were on military leaves of 30 days or less, 31-60 days, and 61-90 11 days. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that “[t]he court should freely give 12 leave [to amend] when justice so requires,” and there is a strong public policy in favor of 13 permitting amendment. Bowles v. Reade, 198 F.3d 752, 757 (9th Cir. 1999); Benshoof v. 14 Ferguson, No. 2:24-cv-00808-JHC, 2025 WL 459884 at 1 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 11, 2025). 15 Rule 15(a) is to be applied with “extreme liberality.” Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 16 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). When determining whether leave to 17 amend should be granted, courts consider several factors, including: (1) bad faith; 18 (2) undue delay; (3) repeated failure to cure deficiencies in previously allowed amended 19 complaints; (4) prejudice to the opposing party; (5) futility; and (6) whether the party has 20 been previously granted leave to amend. Id. at 1052. This analysis should generally “be 21 performed with all inferences in favor of granting the motion.” Griggs v. Pace Am. Grp., 22 Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 1999). Absent prejudice or a strong showing of one of the 23 other factors, there is a presumption in favor of amendment. Eminence Cap., 316 F.3d at 24 1052; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gunwall, 675 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1136 (W.D. Wash. 2023). 25 Defendant argues that many of plaintiff’s proposed amendments would be futile and 26 should not be permitted. See AmeriSourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist W., Inc., 465 F.3d 946, ORDER GRANTING IN PART LEAVE TO AMEND - 2 1 951 (9th Cir. 2006); Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995). “An amendment 2 is futile if it merely restates the same facts as the original complaint in different terms, 3 reasserts a claim on which the court previously ruled, fails to state a legal theory, or could 4 not withstand a motion to dismiss.” Schasteen v. Saltchuk Res., Inc., No. 24-CV-01529- 5 EMC, 2024 WL 3560721, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2024) (citing Wheeler v. City of Santa 6 Clara, 894 F.3d 1046, 1059–1060 (9th Cir. 2018) and Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 7 617, 628–629 (9th Cir. 1991)). As a general matter, the addition of temporal limitations 8 designed to make the military leaves at issue more comparable to non-military furloughs or 9 leaves of absence materially changes the facts alleged, has not been considered by the 10 Court, and, as discussed in Clarkson, is not necessarily futile. 11 To the extent plaintiff seeks to allege that “sick leave is comparable” to military 12 leaves of various lengths, however, the new allegations do not alter the Court’s conclusion 13 that “sick leave is not a furlough or leave of absence and does not, therefore, fall within the 14 ambit of § 4316(b)(1)(B).” Dkt. 85-1 at ¶ 63; Dkt. 70 at 15. Because these new allegations 15 merely reassert a claim on which the Court has already ruled in defendant’s favor, they are 16 futile. See, e.g., Hall v. United States, 233 F.R.D. 591, 595 (D. Nev. 2005) (finding that 17 amendment would be futile where the new allegations do not alter the court’s prior 18 analysis or conclusion).1 19 With regards to the new allegations of unpaid benefits owned to pilots who took 20 military leaves of 30 days or less, those claims are barred by the settlement negotiated and 21 approved in Clarkson v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., No. 2:19-cv-0005-TOR, Dkt. 257 (W.D. 22 Wash. Jan. 15, 2025). Mr. Clarkson represented a class of Alaska Airlines pilots, including 23
24 1 Nothing in Clarkson, 59 F.4th 424, compels a different conclusion. The Ninth Circuit was not asked to determine whether sick leave was a “furlough or leave of absence” under USERRA, instead simply accepting plaintiff’s 25 allegations on the issue. This matter was remanded so that the undersigned could evaluate comparability based on temporally-limited military leaves if plaintiff chose to amend his complaint. He has done so, but the new allegations 26 offer no basis on which to reconsider the Court’s finding that sick leave is a form of deferred compensation that does not fall within the ambit of § 4316(b)(1)(B). ORDER GRANTING IN PART LEAVE TO AMEND - 3 1 the plaintiff in this case, who took at least one short-term military leave of absence. Mr. 2 Clarkson alleged that pilots who took non-military leave, such as jury duty, bereavement 3 leave, and/or sick leave, were paid, and that the failure to pay pilots on military leaves of 4 30 days or less violated USERRA. As part of the settlement, the class released Alaska 5 Airlines2 from any and all claims under § 4316(b) “based on or arising out of the same 6 factual predicate as Count IV” of the Amended Complaint. No. 2:19-cv-0005-TOR, Dkt. 7 257 at 23-24. While Count IV alleged that the class had been deprived of wages, salaries, 8 and compensation, No. 2:19-cv-0005-TOR, Dkt. 31 at ¶ 85, the distinction between paid 9 and unpaid leave also determines whether the employee accrued other benefits, such as 10 vacation and sick time. The release, by its terms, extinguishes “any claim for damages for 11 paid short-term military leave . . . through May 31, 2023” and “all claims for prospective 12 relief that arise of the same factual predicate as Count IV, namely related to pay for short- 13 term military leave.” No. 2:19-cv-0005-TOR, Dkt. 242-2 at 30. Damages and prospective 14 relief related to pay include the loss of benefits associated with pay. 15 The district court record confirms that the parties in Clarkson intended to settle not 16 only the claim for unpaid wages, but also any claim for associated benefits. When seeking 17 preliminary approval of the settlement, class counsel represented to the court that the 18 maximum amount the class could reasonably hope to recover was $9.7 million, an amount 19 that include benefits afforded by Alaska to employees who take jury duty. No. 2:19-cv- 20 0005-TOR, Dkt. 242-1 at ¶ 7. This calculation was highlighted in both the motion for 21 preliminary approval and the motion for final approval: counsel argued that a negotiated 22 settlement fund of almost 49% of the maximum gross damages was both substantial and 23 better than most class action settlements achieve. No. 2:19-cv-0005-TOR, Dkt. 242 at 18 24 and Dkt. 250 at 12-13. The notice provided to class members described the lawsuit as 25
26 2 Horizon Air Industries, Inc., was also a defendant in Clarkson, but its release has no bearing on the viability of plaintiff’s claims in this case. ORDER GRANTING IN PART LEAVE TO AMEND - 4 1 alleging that Alaska had failed to provide “pay or benefits to employees who took short- 2 term military leave” and informed the class that final approval of the settlement would 3 release any claims against Alaska “for failure to provide pay or benefits under USERRA 4 during periods of short-term military leave.” No. 2:19-cv-0005-TOR, Dkt. 242-4 at 4 and 5 7. Even if there were some ambiguity in the meaning of the release provision (there is not), 6 these representations to the court and the class as part of the settlement process show that 7 the Clarkson settlement released any claim for damages – including claims for lost benefits 8 – arising from the failure to pay employees who took short-term military leaves of 9 absence. Plaintiff, as a member of the Clarkson class, cannot pursue a claim related to 10 vacation and sick time accrual for military leaves of 30 days or less. 11
12 For all of the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion to amend is GRANTED in part 13 and DENIED in part. Any claims based on the allegations that (a) sick leave is comparable 14 to military leave or (b) defendant failed to provide vacation or sick time accrual to pilots 15 on military leaves of 30 days or less cannot succeed and are therefore futile. Leave to 16 amend is DENIED as to those allegations and claims. Plaintiff may, however, file an 17 amended complaint within 14 days of the date of this Order that seeks recovery of vacation 18 and sick time accrual for military leaves that lasted 31-60 days or 61-90 days. 19 The Court declines to certify classes or subclasses in the context of this motion for 20 leave to amend the complaint, but presumes at this juncture that the 31-60 days and 61-90 21 days subclasses will be certified. Defendant shall, within 30 days of the filing of the 22
23 // 24
25 // 26 ORDER GRANTING IN PART LEAVE TO AMEND - 5 1 amended complaint, file its anticipated motion for summary judgment.3 2
3 Dated this 29th day of August, 2025.
4 A 5 Robert S. Lasnik 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 3 Discovery in this matter lasted a year and a half and closed in August 2020. While the Court is willing to allow 25 plaintiff to amend his complaint following the entry of judgment, it will not reopen discovery simply because plaintiff has come up with a new theory of the case. If a reasonable jury could find that jury duty leave is comparable to 26 military leave lasting 31-60 days and/or 61-90 days based on the evidence plaintiff developed during discovery, this case will move forward. If not, summary judgment would be appropriate. ORDER GRANTING IN PART LEAVE TO AMEND - 6