Swift v. Wiley

40 Ky. 114, 1 B. Mon. 114, 1840 Ky. LEXIS 97
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedDecember 14, 1840
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 40 Ky. 114 (Swift v. Wiley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Swift v. Wiley, 40 Ky. 114, 1 B. Mon. 114, 1840 Ky. LEXIS 97 (Ky. Ct. App. 1840).

Opinion

Chief Justice Robertson

delivered the Opinion of the Court.

A paper puiporting to be the last will of John Wiley of Missouri, and devising real and personal estate in Kentucky as well as in Missouri, to his brother James Wiley, having been admitted to record in the proper court of probate in the latter state, the appellants, as heirs and distributees of the said John, filed their bill in the Court of Chancery of Louisville, (in which city so much of the real estate in Kentucky lies, as is embraced [115]*115in the testamentary paper,) charging fraud in the execution, and also denying any publication according to the statute of 'this state, and therefore, praying for a partition and distribution of the property here, conformably with our local law.

Decree of the. Chancellor.

After the institution of this suit, and during its pendency, the testamentary document was recorded in the clerk’s office of this Court, according to the provisions of the act of 1820, (Statute Law, 1548.)

James Wiley having, in his answer, denied the material allegations of the bill, the Chancellor, on a final hearing, there being no proof of fraud, decreed an absolute dismission of it; and conceding, as was decided in Sneed vs Ewing and wife, (4 J. J. Mar. 460,) that the real estate in Louisville, (which must pass according to the law of the situs and as to which the Probate Court of Missouri hacino jurisdiction,) gave cognizance of this case to the Chancellor — only one question is left for revision by this Court, and that is, whether the evidence proves a publication, according to the law of Kentucky.

The statute of this state of 1797, (Slat. Law, 1537-8,) prescribing the mode of devising real estate, contains the following provision: “so as such last will and testament “be signed by the testator or testatrix, or by some other “person in his or her presence, and by his or her direc: “tion; and moreover, if not wholly written by himself “or herself, be attested by two or more competent witnesses, subscribing their names in his or her presence.”

The controverted paper in this case, though not written by the testator, was dictated by him, when he was perfectly rational, in St. Louis, Missouri, during the night immediately preceding his death; was read to and approved by him, and attested by William Shenstone Gardner and William McDonald, who then subscribed their names as witnesses, in his presence and at his request, and, some hours afterwards, was subscribed with the testator’s own name, written by himself, and then again at tested also by his attending physician, William. Beaumont, at his request and in his presence, as well as in that of the said Gardner and McDonald, who, still remain[116]*116ing with him, then ■again acknowledged their respective signatures as subscribing witnesses.

Une subscribing witness to a will may .prove the attestation of all others, and if he prove theattesta-' tion of a sufficient number of witnesses, in presence, and at therequestofthe testator, it will authorize the presumption of publication and signature, before or at the moment of attestation.

The transcript of the record from Missouri, shows that the probate there was on the sole testimony of the subscribing witness Gardner, who proved that both McDonald and himself had subscribed their names as witnesses, in the presence and at the request of the testator, but did not state that the name of the testator was not previously subscribed. According to the judicial expositions of our statute, these facts, in the absence of any other, would be sufficient to establish the will, for it is well settled by this Court, 1st, That one subscribing witness alone, may prove the attestation of all who subscribed their names as witnesses, and 2ndly, That proof of the single fact, that the requisite number of witnesses subscribed their names, as such, in the presence and at the request of the testator, will authorize the presumption of publication and signature by the testator, before ot at the moment of attestation. Hall vs Sims (2 Mar. 46;) Harper et al. vs Wilson et al. (Sel. Ca. 503.)

But this presumption, as to.the time when the testator subscribed his own name, is defeated in this case by the testimony of Beaumont, the only subscribing witness whose deposition was read on the hearing before the Chancellor, and who proved that the subscription of the testator’s name was, as already stated, after that of the witnesses, Gardner and McDonald.

Then the question is whether, according to the facts as thus appearing, the attestation by Gardner and McDonald should be deemed sufficient under our statute.

As the statute requires two witnesses to the publication of a will disposing of real estate, the paper subscribed by the witnesses must, of course, be completed as a legal will at the time of attestation.

But waiving the question whether we might presume that, when the paper was first subscribed by Gardner and McDonald, the testator being en extremis, did not intend to subscribe his own name, but designed then to publish his will as signed only by his name written in the body of it, and which, if thus recognized by him as his signature and the only one contemplated by him, would, ac[117]*117cording to the case of Miles’ will, (4 Dana, 1,) have been a sufficient signing; we are of the opinion that, admitting that the testator even then considered the actual subscription of his name as necessary to an effectual publication, and intended to subscribe it, still the attestation, as now proved, was in substantial conformity with the statute, as to each and all of the subscribing witnesses.

Attesting means more than barely subscribing the name to the paper; it implies a Irnowledge of a publication and of the facts necessary to a legal publication. The orderoftime in which testator and witness subscribe their names is not material. A writing is published as a will, (though not signed at the end) & subscribed by 2 witnesses, it is afterwards signed by the testator and declared to be his will, in presence of one other witness (2 first being still present & again aclcno w ledge their signatures) ■who also subscribed as a witness, the 2 first need, not again subscribe their names, it is a sufficient attestation without.

[117]*117To attest the publication of a paper as a last will, and to subscribe to that paper the names of the witnesses, are very different things, and are required for obviously distinct and different ends. Attestation is the act of the senses, subscription is the act of the hand; the one is mental, the other mechanical, and to attest a will is to know that it was published as such, and to certify the facts required to constitute an actual and legal publication : but to subscribe a paper published as a will, is only to write on the same paper the names of the witnesses, for the sole purpose of identification. There may be a perfect attestation in fact, without subscription.

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Bluebook (online)
40 Ky. 114, 1 B. Mon. 114, 1840 Ky. LEXIS 97, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/swift-v-wiley-kyctapp-1840.