Swenson v. Mobilityless, LLC

CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedJune 29, 2022
Docket3:19-cv-30168
StatusUnknown

This text of Swenson v. Mobilityless, LLC (Swenson v. Mobilityless, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Swenson v. Mobilityless, LLC, (D. Mass. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

BARBARA SWENSON; GERALD ) SHEARON and all similarly situated ) persons, ) ) Plaintiffs ) ) v. ) Civil Case No. 3:19-30168-MGM ) MOBILITYLESS, LLC; GABOR ) SMATKO, et al. ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY (Dkt. No. 54) I. Relevant Background This is a putative class action referred to the undersigned for pretrial management. The named plaintiffs, Barbara Swenson and Gerald Shearon, allege in their second amended complaint (SAC) (Dkt. No. 63)1 that defendant Gabor Smatko (Smatko) operates a website through which he advertises various products for sale, including electric tricycles. The named plaintiffs assert that each of them ordered an electric tricycle through Smatko’s website and that Smatko’s business shipped defective and nonconforming goods and committed various fraudulent acts when the named plaintiffs sought to repair or return the defective goods they had received (SAC, ¶¶ 54-119). The SAC notes that in or around 2006, the State of Connecticut filed suit against Smatko and his registered business, which sold mobility scooters, electric scooters,

1 On June 28, 2022, Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a third amended complaint was granted in the absence of any timely filed opposition (Dkt. No. 78). Plaintiffs filed their third amended complaint on the same day (Dkt. No. 79). 1 and gas-powered scooters primarily to the elderly, for violating the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act by a variety of unlawful acts (SCA, ¶¶ 16-20). In 2010, Smatko and his company entered into a consent decree with the State of Connecticut that prohibited them from engaging in enumerated illegal acts and required them to pay restitution to customers who had filed

complaints against the company (SAC, ¶¶ 20-21). The SAC further notes that in 2014, the State of Connecticut filed a motion for contempt against Smatko and his company that was resolved by a stipulated post-judgment order that enjoined them from engaging in various fraudulent acts and committed them to paying additional restitution to injured customers (SAC, ¶¶ 22-25). The SAC alleges that, after this litigation in Connecticut, Smatko opened two limited liability companies in Massachusetts in an attempt to continue his business operations beyond the reach of the Connecticut Attorney General (SAC, ¶¶ 28, 31) and has continued to engage in conduct similar to the conduct that caused him to be sued by the State of Connecticut (SAC, ¶¶ 38-53). Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint on December 23, 2019 (Dkt. No. 1). On May 12, 2020, the court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to make alternative service of process based on

evidence submitted by Plaintiffs’ counsel that the defendants were seeking to evade service of process (Dkt. Nos. 5-10, 24). On June 22, 2020, the court entered a notice of default as to the defendants (Dkt. No. 15). With Plaintiffs’ assent, the entry of default was set aside (Dkt. No. 24). The defendants’ motion to dismiss the first amended complaint was denied (Dkt. No. 41). Now before the court, against this backdrop, is Plaintiffs’ First Motion to Compel Discovery (Dkt. No. 54), which seeks to compel production of additional documents and answers to interrogatories from Smatko and Mobilityless (Dkt. No. 54). The court held an April 21, 2022 hearing on plaintiffs’ motion, and took Plaintiffs’ motion under advisement (Dkt. No. 68). For

2 the reasons stated at the hearing, and those set forth herein, Plaintiffs’ motion to compel further discovery responses is granted as follows. II. Analysis A. Applicable legal principles

Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, “[u]nless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case …. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” The proportionality provision was added to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (b)(1) in December 2015 to emphasize that there are intended to be limits on the breadth of discovery to which a party is entitled. See, e.g., Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Silkman, No. 1:16-cv-00205-JAW, 2017 WL 6597510, at *6-7 (D. Me. Dec. 26, 2017). Nonetheless, “[a]s a general matter, relevancy must be broadly construed at the discovery stage such that information is discoverable if there is any possibility it might be relevant to the subject

matter of the action.” Cherkaoui v. City of Quincy, Civil Action No. 14-cv-10571-LTS, 2015 WL 4504937, at *1 (D. Mass. July 23, 2015) (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Electro-Term, Inc., 167 F.R.D. 344, 346 (D. Mass. 1996)). “[B]ecause discovery itself is designed to help define and clarify the issues, the limits set forth in Rule 26 must be construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Green v. Cosby, 152 F. Supp. 3d 31, 34 (D. Mass. 2015) (quoting In re New England Compounding Pharmacy, Inc. Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 13-2419-FDS, 2013 WL 6058483, at *4 (D. Mass. Nov. 13, 2013)). The party seeking information in discovery has the burden of showing its relevance. See, e.g., Cont’l W. Ins. Co. v. Opechee Constr. Corp., Civil 3 No. 15-cv-006-JD, 2016 WL 1642626, at *1 (D.N.H. Apr. 25, 2016) (citing Caouette v. OfficeMax, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 134, 136 (D.N.H. 2005)); see also Whittingham v. Amherst Coll., 164 F.R.D. 124, 127 (D. Mass. 1995); Gagne v. Reddy, 104 F.R.D. 454, 456 (D. Mass. 1984). Conversely, “[w]hen a party resists the production of evidence, it ‘bears the burden of

establishing lack of relevancy or undue burden.’” Autoridad de Carreteras y Transportacion v. Transcore Atl., Inc., 319 F.R.D. 422, 427 (D.P.R. 2016) (quoting Sánchez-Medina v. UNICCO Serv. Co., 265 F.R.D. 24, 27 (D.P.R. 2009)); see also Cont’l W. Ins. Co., 2016 WL 1642626, at *1. Plaintiffs seeking to represent a class or classes generally are entitled to conduct discovery related to defining a potential class or classes of individuals to whom the defendant(s) may be liable and to the nature and scope of class-wide claims. See generally Bartok v. Hometown Am., LLC, Civil No. 21-10790-LTS, 2022 WL 970079 (D. Mass. Mar. 30, 2022) (directing discovery related to class certification in advance of ruling on the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification). Plaintiffs have alleged that defendants engage in business practices that are fraudulent and in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, §§ 2 and 9, including policies related to returns of

goods, cancellations of orders, substitution of goods, confusing, untruthful and fraudulent responses to customer complaints, and illegal debt collection practices, that they have engaged in fraudulent transfers to conceal assets, and that the entire enterprise’s affairs, which rely on interstate communications and transportation of goods, are conducted through a pattern of racketeering activity (SAC ¶¶ 153-254). Plaintiffs seeks to represent a class of individuals harmed by defendants’ conduct. Plaintiffs have agreed that their requests for documents be limited to documents dated on or after September 6, 2018 through the present.

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Related

Caouette v. OfficeMax, Inc.
352 F. Supp. 2d 134 (D. New Hampshire, 2005)
Green v. Cosby
152 F. Supp. 3d 31 (D. Massachusetts, 2015)
Sánchez-Medina v. Unicco Service Co.
265 F.R.D. 24 (D. Puerto Rico, 2009)
Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
73 F.R.D. 73 (D. Massachusetts, 1976)
Gagne v. Reddy
104 F.R.D. 454 (D. Massachusetts, 1984)
Cardente v. Fleet Bank of Maine, Inc.
146 F.R.D. 13 (D. Maine, 1993)
Whittingham v. Amherst College
164 F.R.D. 124 (D. Massachusetts, 1995)

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Swenson v. Mobilityless, LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/swenson-v-mobilityless-llc-mad-2022.