Swenson v. Commissioner

14 B.T.A. 675, 1928 BTA LEXIS 2945
CourtUnited States Board of Tax Appeals
DecidedDecember 10, 1928
DocketDocket No. 16177.
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 14 B.T.A. 675 (Swenson v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Board of Tax Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Swenson v. Commissioner, 14 B.T.A. 675, 1928 BTA LEXIS 2945 (bta 1928).

Opinion

[678]*678OPINION.

Love:

Upon a consideration of the facts as set forth above, we are called upon to determine whether or not the exchange in 1919 of the oil lease' in question for 2,400 shares of the capital stock of the Swensondale Oil Co. was such a transaction as gave rise to or produced any taxable income to the petitioner.

The attorney for the respondent truly says that the taxpayer’s sole reliance must be in the provisions of the Revenue Act of 1918, and not in the subsequent modifications or ameliorations of the later acts, but the petitioner does not suffer by that limitation. Indeed, we are of the opinion that the 1918 Act is more to this taxpayer’s purpose and benefit than those of later years might have been had the transaction occurred when such acts were effective.

There was less than 22 per cent of the 11,000 shares authorized that was offered for sale. The shares sold were not offered on the general market, but were sold to acquaintances of the one or more of the old stockholders at private sale. Had the whole issue been thrown on [679]*679the market it may well be assumed that such would have found purchasers, only at nominal prices under conditions as then existed and known. The evidence does not tend to show that there was a market, as that term is understood in the marts of trade, existing at date of issuance of the stock in question, which was the date of its receipt by the taxpayer.

It is a matter of general knowledge that drilling for oil, even under the most favorable conditions, is a highly speculative venture. A well almost wholly surrounded by paying properties only a few yards away, may, and often does, prove to be a worthless “ dry hole ” or a “ gasser.” In this case the indications, on April 17, 1919, when the stock of the Swensondale Oil Co. was increased, were, from anything to the contrary that appears in the record, at best no more than dubious. The well had been sunk about 2,200 feet with no indications of oil. On the other hand, some salt water had been encountered— always a bad sign — and gas at considerable pressure. There were a few wells in the territory, some completed and others still being drilled, but all of them were more than two miles away, the most productive ones lying principally toward the north and east, thus serving to indicate that the Swenson well might be upon the southwest edge of the oil pool, if there was one, or outside of it altogether.

The respondent introduced evidence by some experts in regard to the geological formation of the terrane into which the well was being driven, but sustaining expert opinions are not difficult to obtain, after the fact. Giving to this evidence its full weight, it does little or nothing to establish the contention of the respondent that the stock had a fair market value at par or more at any given time before oil -was actually struck. In reply to the question of the respondent’s attorney, “ Is it possible under conditions such as you have described to bring in a large well within a reasonable distance of a dry hole? ” the witness (Meredith) answered, “Very possible.” Now if that be true, the converse of that proposition must unquestionably be true, the result at best is highly speculative, so that no expert opinion as to the characteristics of the terrane as a whole could afford any assurance as to the outcome of any particular drilling operation. That is an event wholly dependent upon chance, though the probability of striking oil is of course greater in a proven territory ” than in one which is being prospected, as was the case in this field at that time. So that, admitting the full strength of the respondent’s case, we are still of the opinion that the adverse considerations of the petitioner are the stronger, for the uncontrovertible fact remains that until oil is actually struck, no human prescience, though guided by the widest experience, can say with certainty that oil is there at the spot where the drilling is in progress.

[680]*680The issue here is simply whether the fair market value of the stock received for the lease was in excess of the fair market value of the lease itself at the time of the exchange. If it was not, or if the fair market values of the lease or of the stock can not be determined as of that instant, there can be no taxable gain from the transaction. We are of the opinion that in the instant case no such excess of fair market value has been shown, nor has it been proven that either the lease or the stock exchanged therefor had any fair market value at the time the contract was executed and the lessor’s rights determined and foreclosed thereby. The agreement of April 17, 1919, by which the leasehold was acquired by the corporation provided only for a subscription to the new capital stock, and did not constitute a sale of it, nor has it been shown that it was then known that even a single share of that portion that was to be offered for sale for cash could certainly be sold at any price. Nor does it affect the situation as it then existed that 2,350 shares of the stock were shortly thereafter sold by the trustee at par, nor that after the well “ came in ” some sales between individuals outside of the corporation were made at 200 or 300 or more. Up to the time of this action neither Peter Swenson nor his wife had ever sold a single share of that stock, nor actually realized one dollar of taxable profit from the appreciation of the stock, except what had accrued to them in the form of stock dividends.

The respondent relies to a considerable extent upon the recital in the amendment to the charter that the lease was of a reasonable value of $865,000 and more, but that was purely an arbitrary amount written in to meet the exigencies of the stock flotation in accordance with well recognized practice. The witness (Schow) testified that the amount of $865,000 was inserted at the request and insistence of the Secretary of State. He says that the intention was to put the increased valuation on sections 5 and 6 of the leased lands, but “the Secretary of State objected to us putting any further value on sections 5 and 6, and told us we could put a high value on section 49, and we could pass muster on the amendment to the charter. At the suggestion of the Secretary of State, Mr. Pool made the change in the instrument, and we signed it.”

Q. Mr. Schow, in writing in that value in the contract and in the affidavit and any other papers from which it appears it has been discussed, was there an effort made to fix that value as representing any sales value of the leases at all?
A. No. There was no way of fixing it.

We are not unmindful of the fact that considerations other than those which appear in the record may have been known to or, at least, suspected by the owners and promoters of this enterprise, [681]*681which influenced them in the increase of stock at this time and may have materially assisted in its successful and prompt flotation, but no real weight can be attached to surmises of this kind. The answer to the question must rest wholly upon the known facts at the instant the agreement was consummated, and no other material facts than those herein recited appear in the record. It matters not that even the very next day or hour, occurrences might have increased the value of the oil lease a hundredfold, such sudden increases were supposedly admitted by the attorney for the respondent. But such sudden increase did not in fact occur in this case. The agreement was entered into on April 17,

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Related

Helvering v. Kaufmann
136 F.2d 356 (Fourth Circuit, 1943)
Dohrmann v. Commissioner
19 B.T.A. 507 (Board of Tax Appeals, 1930)
Swenson v. Commissioner
14 B.T.A. 675 (Board of Tax Appeals, 1928)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
14 B.T.A. 675, 1928 BTA LEXIS 2945, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/swenson-v-commissioner-bta-1928.