Sweetsir v. Chandler

56 A. 584, 98 Me. 145, 1903 Me. LEXIS 78
CourtSupreme Judicial Court of Maine
DecidedNovember 24, 1903
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 56 A. 584 (Sweetsir v. Chandler) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Judicial Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sweetsir v. Chandler, 56 A. 584, 98 Me. 145, 1903 Me. LEXIS 78 (Me. 1903).

Opinion

Savage, J.

Action of debt by a collector for taxes assessed by a supplemental assessment.

It appears that the town of New Gloucester at its annual meeting in March 1902 voted to raise by taxation the sum of $12,019. To this the assessors added an overlay of $503.72. The amount of the state tax was $2,808.25, and of the county tax $1,120.09. And the total sum, $16,451.06 was legally assessed to the tax payers by the duly elected and qualified assessors for the year 1902. The [150]*150assessors seasonably gave notice in writing to the inhabitants of the town to make and bring in true and perfect lists of all their polls and .estates, of which they were possessed on the first day of April of that year. R. S. (1883) c. 6, § 92. Solomon H. Chandler, the defendant, a resident of the town failed to bring in any list, whereupon the assessors assessed him for 92 shares of national bank stock, which was returned to them by banks in accordance with the statute, in the sum of $8,875, and for “money at interest in excess of debts” in the sum of $321,350. The assessment of the “money at interest” was a “doom” so-called. The assessors had no knowledge of any particular items of money at interest, but the assessment represented their judgment of the amount for which the defendant was liable to be taxed, on that account. No other property was assessed. The invoice, valuation and list of assessments were signed by the assessors May 31, 1902, as of April 1, 1902. The tax thus assessed has been paid.

On May 20, 1902, the defendant was adjudged to be of unsound mind by the probate court for Cumberland County, and John "W. True was appointed his guardian. The guardian then filed an inventory in the probate court, in which were returned sundry railroad, water, municipal and other bonds, and railroad, water, and other stocks and scrip, amounting in all to $551,586, all of which it is admitted were possessed by the defendant on April 1, 1902, and were liable to taxation. Of these bonds, stock and scrip, the assessors had no knowledge, until after the original assessment was made and committed, although when they made that assessment, they undoubtedly had in inind the reputed large wealth of Mr. Chandler, which it now appears was made up of these bonds and stocks.

On December 27, 1902, in accordance with R. S. (1883), o. 6, § 35, the assessors assessed a supplemental tax to the defendant upon the specific items of bonds, stock and scrip, -which had been returned by the guardian in his inventory, certifying in the assessment and in the subsequent commitment thereof to the collector, that the property thus assessed had been omitted by mistake from the original invoice, valuation and list of assessments of May 31, 1902. The last assess[151]*151ment was duly committed to the plaintiff as collector. He made legal demand before suit was brought and payment was refused.

This case was heard at nisi prius by the court without a jury, with the right of exceptions. The presiding justice ruled that the assessment or “doom” of money at interest applied to the bonds assessed in the supplemental assessment, and that the supplemental tax upon these was invalid, but that the tax on the stocks and scrip was valid, and being valued and assessed separately, could be enforced, and was recoverable in this suit, and rendered judgment accordingly. Both parties excepted.

I. The plaintiff excepts to so much of the ruling as holds that “the doom of money at interest applied to the bonds and the supplemental tax upon these is invalid.” We do not understand the plaintiff to deny that in its ordinary commercial sense the. term “bond” signifies an obligation to pay money. Such a bond contains a promise to pay money, usually to bearer, and hence is negotiable and is transferable by delivery. Lane v. Embden, 72 Maine, 354. It performs the office of a promissory note. It represents, and is the evidence of, an indebtedness. Its coupons represent the instalments of interest as they become due. The person or corporation issuing the bonds is a borrower, and the purchaser is a lender. The bond purchased has no greater value than a piece of paper except as evidence of the loan and as the means to secure its payment when due. When due the debtor does not buy back the bond, but does pay the debt. Such is the ordinary significance of the term “bonds” when applied to securities such as were assessed in this supplemental assessment as “bonds”, and such is its significance with reference to such bonds, when they are assessed for taxes.

Nevertheless the plaintiff claims that in this case, although money at interest was assessed originally, these bonds were not assessed. The assessors testify that the $321,350 assessed as upon money at interest was for money at interest on mortgages and notes as they understood it, that they did not know that Mr. Chandler owned any bonds or stocks, and that they did not intend to include and did not include any bonds or stocks in the item for money at interest. They point out that on the assessment sheet there, was a column for Bonds [152]*152Stocks; that in that column they placed the bank stock which they assessed, and that they intended to include in that part of the assessment all bonds and stocks of the defendant, that it did include all the stocks that they knew about and included no bonds specifically, because they knew of none.

To sustain the validity of a supplemental assessment it must appear that the items of property assessed were not assessed in the original assessment. It must appear that the property itself had not been assessed at all, and that it had been omitted by mistake. It is not sufficient that the assesssors through lack of information or otherwise have erred in their judgment of the quantity, quality or value of the thing assessed. Dresden v. Bridge, 90 Maine, 489. If the assessors have once assessed that property, that assessment cannot be revised by a supplemental assessment.

And in determining what was assessed in the first place, we must be governed not by what the assessors intended to do, nor by what they thought they did do, but by what they did do. And in determining what was done by them we are controlled by the official record of their doings, that is by the assessment itself. The assessment cannot be modified or limited by evidence aliunde. This record shows that money at interest was assesssed, and we think such an expression was broad enough to cover all forms of interest-bearing securities, whether represented by notes or bonds or otherwise. And further we hold that all such securities must be deemed to be covered by the phrase, money at interest, unless the contrary appears from the assessment itself. If the assessors have erred in determining the amount of money at interest, they cannot cure their error by securing a revaluation through a supplemental assessment, even though their error arose from their ignorance of the specific kinds of securities in which the money at interest was invested.

But the plaintiff claims that the original assessment here does show that “bonds” were not included in the money at interest. The assessment sheet was ruled into columns. One column was headed by the words STOCKS BONDS, another by the words, MONEY AT INTEREST. And it.is argued that because the word Bonds is placed at the head of a column, distinct from a column headed by [153]*153the words Money at Interest, it must be held that the assessors did not intend to include, and did not include bonds under the assessment of money at interest.

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Bluebook (online)
56 A. 584, 98 Me. 145, 1903 Me. LEXIS 78, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sweetsir-v-chandler-me-1903.