Sweeney v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company

District Court, S.D. Ohio·Decided April 24, 2023·No. 2:20-cv-01569·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

RYAN SWEENEY, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. Civil Action 2:20-cv-1569 Judge James L. Graham Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiffs, Ryan Sweeney and Bryan Marshall (“Plaintiffs”), bring this putative class action asserting violations of the Employment Retirement Security Act of 1974, as amended, (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Discovery (ECF Nos. 111, 115). For the following reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs’ allegations are summarized in detail in the Court’s Opinion and Order of March 18, 2022 (ECF Nos. 64, 67). In short, Defendant Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (“Nationwide Mutual”) sponsors a defined-contribution pension plan (the “Plan”) for its employees. Plan participants have a variety of investment vehicles to choose from when making contributions to the Plan, and the most popular option is the Guaranteed Investment Fund (“GIF”). The GIF is a group annuity contract between the Plan and Defendant Nationwide Life Insurance Company (“Nationwide Life”), an indirect subsidiary of Nationwide Mutual. Contributions to the GIF are transferred to and maintained in Nationwide Life’s general account, where they are invested by Nationwide Life. Nationwide Life guarantees the contributions made to the GIF and also pays the Plan a declared interest rate on those contributions. The interest rate is called a “crediting rate” and is

set annually by Nationwide Life. Nationwide Life provides custodial, actuarial, investment, and accounting services to the Plan related to the Guaranteed Investment Fund. In return, Nationwide Life compensates itself by reducing the credit otherwise owed to the Plan. The amount of compensation is not dictated by contract; instead, Nationwide Life determines the amount of compensation it will earn. Plaintiffs filed the present putative class action on January 26, 2020. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint asserts claims under ERISA for violation of fiduciary duties under 29 U.S.C. § 1104, prohibited transactions with parties in interest under § 1106, self- dealing under § 1106, and inurement of plan benefits to the employer under § 1103. (ECF Nos. 26, 34.) Plaintiffs have since moved to certify a class consisting of “[a]ll participants and

beneficiaries in the Nationwide Savings Plan who were invested in the Guaranteed [Investment] Fund at any time from March 26, 2014 through the date of final judgment in this action, excluding the individual Defendants.” (Mot. for Class Certification, ECF Nos. 117, 120.) After an informal conference with the Court to discuss several discovery disputes, Plaintiffs filed the subject Motion to Compel Discovery. (ECF Nos. 111, 115.) Plaintiffs seeks further production of documents and interrogatory answers relating to compensation received by Nationwide Life in connection with the GIF, the assets in Nationwide Life’s general account, and Nationwide Life’s guaranteed annuity contracts with other institutions and plans. Defendants oppose the Motion on grounds that the requested discovery is not relevant to the claims or defenses in this action and is not proportional to the needs of the case. (Defs.’ Mem. in Opp’n, ECF Nos. 123, 127.) II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, which sets forth the permissible scope of discovery, provides:

Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Determining the scope of discovery is within the Court’s discretion. Bush v. Dictaphone Corp., 161 F.3d 363, 367 (6th Cir. 1998). As the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has recognized, “[t]he scope of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is traditionally quite broad.” Lewis v. ACB Bus. Serv., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 402 (6th Cir. 1998). However, revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 2015 “encourage judges to be more aggressive in identifying and discouraging discovery overuse.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, Advisory Committee Notes to the 2015 Amendment. “The proportionality standard is the instrument by which judges and practitioners are to bring about a change in the culture of discovery, requiring lawyers, with the guidance of involved judges, to ‘size and shape their discovery requests to the requisites of a case.’” Waters v. Drake, 222 F. Supp. 3d 582, 605 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (quoting Chief Justice Roberts, 2015 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary at 7). “[T]he proponent of a motion to compel discovery bears the initial burden of proving that the information sought is relevant.” Guinn v. Mount Carmel Health Sys., No. 2:09-cv-226, 2010 WL 2927254, at *5 (S.D. Ohio July 23, 2010) (quoting Clumm v. Manes, No. 2:08–cv–567, 2010 WL 2161890 (S.D. Ohio May 27, 2010)); see also Berryman v. Supervalu Holdings, Inc., No. 3:05-cv-169, 2008 WL 4934007, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 18, 2008) (“At least when the relevance of a discovery request has been challenged the burden is on the requester to show the relevance

of the requested information.”) (internal citation omitted). However, the burden to demonstrate that the requested discovery would be disproportional to the needs of the case rests with the objecting party. Bros. Trading Co. v. Goodman Factors, No. 1:14-CV-975, 2016 WL 9781140, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 2, 2016) (Rule 26(b)(1) does not place the burden of addressing proportionality considerations on the requesting party; nor does it permit the opposing party to avoid responding simply by making a boilerplate objection on grounds of proportionality) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P 26, Advisory Committee Notes (2015)). III. ANALYSIS As an initial matter, Defendants’ arguments against supplementing their discovery responses rely heavily on their asserted statutory defenses—namely, (1) that the Plan is a “transition policy” that satisfies the requirements of 29 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(2) and 29 C.F.R.

§ 2250.401c-1, such that Defendants are insulated from liability under 29 U.S.C.

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Sweeney v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, (S.D. Ohio 2023).

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