Swarthmore Radiation Oncology, Inc. v. Lapes

155 F.R.D. 90, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4141, 1994 WL 139524
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedMarch 31, 1994
DocketCiv. A. No. 92-3055
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 155 F.R.D. 90 (Swarthmore Radiation Oncology, Inc. v. Lapes) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Swarthmore Radiation Oncology, Inc. v. Lapes, 155 F.R.D. 90, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4141, 1994 WL 139524 (E.D. Pa. 1994).

Opinion

[92]*92 MEMORANDUM

GAWTHROP, District Judge.

This case is once again graced with a discovery dispute — this one with some interesting wrinkles. Defendant, Riddle Memorial Hospital, has moved to compel the plaintiffs to answer certain discovery requests regarding potential witnesses. The plaintiffs assert that they have already provided most of the requested materials, and thus the majority of the motion is moot. They allege that the only genuine controversy surrounds the application of the work product doctrine to certain information sought by Riddle. Riddle, on the other hand, contends that the plaintiffs’ responses were inadequate, and that the work product doctrine is inapplicable to the interrogatory to which the plaintiffs have declined to respond. Upon the following reasoning, I shall grant the motion, but only in part.

Interrogatory 6 of Riddle’s second set of discovery requests that the plaintiffs:

Give the name and address of each physician (regardless of affiliation) and each other person (other than a current employee of yours) who has informed you (including your lawyers or people working for you or them) that (a) the person never heard of, or cannot recall hearing of, your Swarthmore cancer center, or (b) that the person does not think that any defendant, or anyone acting on behalf of any defendant, dissuaded anyone from sending patients to your Swarthmore cancer center, or (c) that the person does not know of anyone who was dissuaded from sending patients to your Swarthmore cancer center, or (d) that the person does not think that there was need for your center, or (e) that the person does not think your center was as good as Crozer-Chester or some other radiation therapy center; and for each such person, state whether the person falls in category (a), (b), (c), (d), and/or (e); and identify each document sent to the person and each document received from the person. (Exclude information obtained in depositions in this case.)

(Riddle’s Mem. in Support of its Mot. to Compel at 3).

The plaintiffs object to the parenthetical instruction in line 4 of the interrogatory, which makes the discovery request applicable to the plaintiffs’ lawyers or people working for them. They argue that this information is protected by work product immunity. Riddle contends, however, that the interrogatory is narrowly tailored to elicit facts only, which are not covered by the work product doctrine.

Riddle claims to have worded its interrogatory to avoid trenching upon protected information. In that regard, it does not request production of notes or memoranda prepared by the plaintiffs’ attorneys. Instead it provides five statements and asks counsel to identify which witnesses, if any, made the statement(s) to the plaintiffs or their attorneys. The information that Riddle seeks to discover is the “fact” of each physician’s lack of knowledge regarding, or negative opinion of, the Swarthmore center.

“[EJither party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession.” Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507, 67 S.Ct. 385, 392, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947). In this antitrust context, where the doctors are functioning as observers of the medical industry rather than as medical experts, that a physician holds a particular opinion or viewpoint is a discoverable fact. It is not protected by the work product doctrine. The process of conveying that opinion to plaintiffs’ attorneys does not transform it into work product. As one court explained:

Attorneys often refuse to disclose during discovery those facts that they have acquired through their investigative efforts and assert, as the basis for their refusal, the protections of the work product doctrine. Where such facts are concerned, as opposed to the documents containing them or the impressions and conclusions drawn from them, they must be disclosed to the opposing party in response to a proper request for discovery.

Protective Nat’l Ins. Co. of Omaha v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 137 F.R.D. 267, 280 (D.Neb.1989) (quoting Wolfson, Opinion Work Product — Solving the Dilemma of [93]*93Compelled, Disclosure, 64 Neb.L.Rev. 248, 256-57 (1985) (footnotes omitted)).

I think it fair game for Riddle’s carefully crafted interrogatory to be answered, so long as the scope of the inquiry is limited so as to solicit only clearly expressed positions of the physicians. That is, if the physician said, “I do not think that there was need for your center,” or words closely paralleling this statement, that, in my view, is a discoverable fact. On the other hand, if the person spoke generally about the various vicissitudes of the application of the law of supply and demand in the radiological oncological context in Delaware County, from which a thoughtful lawyer could draw the inference that the person felt there was not a need for this center, that would be protected work product. Such a conclusion, which had not been set forth by the declarant in so many words, would necessarily entail the mental impression of the lawyer. See Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 316 (3d Cir.) (opinion work product includes such items as the inferences an attorney draws from interviews of witnesses), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 903, 106 S.Ct. 232, 88 L.Ed.2d 230 (1985).

I recognize that there may be a gray area between fact and the lawyer’s conclusions regarding facts. In answering the interrogatory, plaintiffs’ counsel may distinguish between two types of interviews. The plaintiffs must disclose the names of doctors who informed them or their counsel of the things actually stated in the interrogatory. If, however, there were interviews wherein the attorneys, though not explicitly told, inferred from the totality of the conversation and circumstances, that the physicians held beliefs described in the interrogatory, counsel need not so disclose. Because defendant’s interrogatory comes close to touching protected material, if counsels’ notes or recollections are not sufficiently precise to enable them to reasonably determine whether or not a physician made an explicit statement, counsel may err on the side of nondisclosure.

Interrogatory 6 also requests that the plaintiffs identify each document sent to and received from the person interviewed. Riddle acknowledges that this aspect of its request may implicate the work product doctrine. Should plaintiffs assert objections based on work product, defendant Riddle is reminded that the “selection and compilation of documents by counsel ... in preparation for pretrial discovery,” in many circumstances constitutes protected opinion work product. Sporck, 759 F.2d at 316.

Interrogatories 2-4 of Riddle’s first set of discovery seek information regarding physicians who were dissuaded by defendants and non-defendants from referring patients to the Swarthmore Cancer Center. Specifically, these interrogatories state:

2. When you filed your amended complaint, did you have any information that any non-defendant who has not referred or would not refer a patient or patients to the Center was or had at some point been actually inclined to make such referral(s), but was dissuaded from that by a defendant? If yes, for each such dissuaded non-defendant:
a.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
155 F.R.D. 90, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4141, 1994 WL 139524, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/swarthmore-radiation-oncology-inc-v-lapes-paed-1994.