Swanston v. Swanston

746 So. 2d 566, 1999 WL 1261832
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedDecember 16, 1999
Docket99-1013
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 746 So. 2d 566 (Swanston v. Swanston) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Swanston v. Swanston, 746 So. 2d 566, 1999 WL 1261832 (Fla. Ct. App. 1999).

Opinion

746 So.2d 566 (1999)

Edward H. SWANSTON, Appellant,
v.
Joyce E. SWANSTON, Appellee.

No. 99-1013.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

December 16, 1999.

*567 Robert Allen, Pensacola, for Appellant.

No appearance for Appellee.

BARFIELD, C.J.

In this appeal from a final judgment of dissolution of marriage, the husband challenges the awards of alimony and child support. Although the record contains no transcript of the dissolution hearing, we reverse because the errors are apparent from the final judgment. See Sugrim v. Sugrim, 649 So.2d 936 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).

The parties were married in 1981 and their daughter was born in 1982. In 1997, the wife filed a petition for dissolution which sought, inter alia, alimony and child support, as well as an equitable division of the marital property, including the husband's military retirement benefits. According to the wife's financial affidavit and the January 1999 child support worksheet, she is employed as a police communications officer for the University of West Florida, with a gross monthly income of $1,437.33 and total monthly expenses of $1,145.66, including "children's expenses" of less than $200, while the husband receives a $1,422.00 monthly retirement payment and $1,256.67 in monthly gross income from his employment at Scotty's. The worksheet indicates that the parties' income deductions total $262.26 for the husband and $59.38 for the wife, calculates their combined net monthly income as $3,794.36, and lists no adjustments to the $784 per month basic child support obligation.

The final judgment of dissolution awarded the wife twenty-nine percent of the husband's retirement benefits, named the wife as the primary residential parent, and allowed the husband to claim the child for tax purposes. It ordered the husband to pay the wife $525 per month as child support, noting that the deviation above the child support guidelines amount was "due to the added expenses of the minor child." It also ordered the husband to pay the wife $200 per month as permanent periodic alimony until termination of the child support obligation, then $500 per month for the following sixty months, and thereafter $200 per month "until the death of either party or the remarriage of the Petitioner/Wife." It ordered the husband to maintain life insurance to secure the child support obligation and to maintain health insurance coverage on the child, and it ordered the parties to split the uncovered health, dental, and optical expenses of the child.

We agree with the husband's first contention, that the final judgment is legally deficient because it fails to include any findings of fact that support the alimony award. Section 61.08(1), Florida Statutes (1997), requires the trial court to make findings of fact relative to the factors enumerated in subsection 61.08(2) supporting the award or denial of alimony. These factors include the standard of living established during the marriage, the duration of the marriage, the age of each party, *568 the physical and emotional condition of each party, the contribution of each party to the marriage, all sources of income available to each party, the financial resources of each party, and the assets and liabilities distributed to each. A final judgment lacking such findings frustrates appellate review, and must therefore be reversed and remanded to the trial court for factual findings explicating the rationale for the alimony award, i.e., the trial court's determination of one spouse's needs and the other spouse's ability to provide for such needs. See McCarty v. McCarty, 710 So.2d 713 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Dal Ponte v. Dal Ponte, 692 So.2d 283 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Thompson v. Thompson, 658 So.2d 1214 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Jacques v. Jacques, 609 So.2d 74 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). This final judgment contains only two findings of fact: that the marriage is irretrievably broken, and that the wife has been a continuous resident of Florida for at least six months prior to the petition. Without adequate factual findings concerning the statutory factors relative to the issue of alimony, it is impossible for this court to assess the reasonableness of the permanent alimony award in this case, and we find nothing in the record before us which supports an award of alimony.

If we assume that the gross income amounts stated on the January 1999 child support worksheet are correct, and if we take into account the court's award of twenty-nine percent of the husband's retirement benefits to the wife, the husband's gross monthly income is $2,266.23 and the wife's gross monthly income is $1849.77. If we assume that the income deductions stated on the worksheet are correct, the husband's net monthly income is only $213.58 greater that the wife's net monthly income. In the absence of specific findings by the trial court that there is a gross disparity in the parties' financial resources, in their physical and/or emotional conditions, or in their contributions to the marriage, we are unable to find that the award of alimony in any form or amount is appropriate, much less that the award of $200 per month to the wife is appropriate.

Assuming, however, that on remand the trial court were to make specific factual findings which would justify the $200 per month initial alimony award, we would agree with the husband that the court nevertheless reversibly erred by including in the final judgment a provision automatically adjusting the amount of alimony upon termination of his child support obligation, without making specific factual findings of extenuating circumstances that would support the automatic increase in alimony after the child reaches majority. See Umstead v. Umstead, 620 So.2d 1074 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 552 So.2d 929 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Spanogle v. Spanogle, 376 So.2d 249 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979); Reid v. Reid, 365 So.2d 1050 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).

With respect to the child support award, the husband contends that the trial court's failure to adjust the parties' incomes based upon the alimony award resulted in a miscalculation of the amount he was ordered to pay, citing Shrove v. Shrove, 724 So.2d 679 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), and that the final judgment improperly ordered him to pay an amount of child support which deviated more than five percent from the child support guidelines set out in section 61.30, Florida Statutes (1997), without an adequate explanation of why ordering payment of the guideline amount "would be unjust or inappropriate." We find that the final judgment must be reversed because it does not state the minimum child support need calculated under the section 61.30, nor does it give any relevant details regarding that calculation, and its cryptic explanation for the more than five percent upward deviation from the guideline amount, as "due to the added expenses of the minor child," is wholly inadequate. See Burton v. Burton, 697 So.2d 1295 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Segall v. Segall, 708 So.2d 983 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).

*569 A child support guideline amount which has been properly calculated under section 61.30 presumptively establishes the amount of child support to be ordered. See § 61.30(1)(a); State, Dept. of Revenue, By and On Behalf of Young v. Sumblin, 675 So.2d 691 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).

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Bluebook (online)
746 So. 2d 566, 1999 WL 1261832, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/swanston-v-swanston-fladistctapp-1999.