Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education

362 F. Supp. 1223
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. North Carolina
DecidedAugust 16, 1973
Docket1974
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 362 F. Supp. 1223 (Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 362 F. Supp. 1223 (W.D.N.C. 1973).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

SUMMARY

McMILLAN, District Judge.

This case, now nine years old, was heard again on May 8, 9 and 15, 1973, upon motions for further relief, and upon evidence which presents anew the same collection of questions presented by plaintiffs and intervenors in the summer and fall of 1971. The principal question is whether the racial discrimination, found by the court on October 21, 1971, to be still active and vigorous, has been eliminated from the system, or will be eliminated by the measures now proposed by the defendants. Although much genuine progress is promised by current Board proposals (virtually all of which, for 1973-74, are approved), they do not yet satisfy the constitutional requirements of equal protection of laws (fairness); jurisdiction will be retained for the time being, pending development of some changes in pupil assignment for 1973-74, and the development and implementation of an equitable overall plan for the following years.

PERTINENT LAW OF THE CASE

In this court’s original opinion filed on April 23, 1969, the view was expressed 300 F.Supp. 1358 at page 1371 that:

“[Substantial equalization of the racial proportions in the schools] would tend to eliminate shopping around for schools; all the schools, in the New Kent County language, would be ‘just schools’; it would make all schools equally ‘desirable’ or ‘undesirable’ depending on the point of view; it would equalize the benefits and burdens of desegregation over the whole county instead of leaving them resting largely upon the people of the northern, western and southwestern parts of the county; it would get the Board out of the business of lawsuits and real estate zoning and leave it in the education business; and it would be a tremendous step toward the stability of real estate values in the community and the progress of education of children. Though seemingly radical in nature, if viewed by people who live in totally segregated neighborhoods, it may like surgery be the most conservative solution to the whole problem and the one most likely to produce good education for all at minimum cost.”

Later 1969 and 1970 orders, excerpted in 334 F.Supp. 623, 630-631 (1971) provided :

“December 1, 1969, page 8, p5: ‘On the facts in this record and with this background of de jure segregation extending full fifteen years since Brown I, this court is of the opinion that all the black and predominantly black schools in the system are illegally segregated, Green v. New Kent County; Henry v. Clarksdale; United States v. Hinds County.’
*1225 “February 5, 1970, page S, 5: ‘That no school be operated with an all-black or predominantly black student body.’
“February 5, 1970, page 4 p: ‘That the defendants maintain a continuing control over the race of children in each school, just as was done for many decades before Brown v. Board of Education, and maintain the racial make-up of each school (including any new and any reopened schools) to prevent any school from becoming racially identifiable.’
“February 5, 1970, page 4, p5: ‘That the Board adopt and implement a continuing program, computerized or otherwise, of assigning pupils and teachers during the school year as well as at the start of each year for the conscious purpose of maintaining each school and each faculty in a condition of desegregation.’
“Supplementary Findings of Fact dated March 21, 1970, page 10, \26: ‘Some 600 or more pupils transfer from one school to another or register for the first time into the system during the course of each month of the typical school year. It is the assignment of these children which is the particular subject of the reference in paragraph 13 of the order to the manner of handling assignments within the school year.’
“February 5, 1970, pages 4 and 5, pd: ‘The duty imposed by the law and by this order is the desegregation of schools and the maintenance of that condition. The plans discussed in this order, whether prepared by Board and staff or by outside consultants, such as computer expert, Mr. John W. Weil, or by Dr. John A. Finger, Jr., are illustrations of means or partial means to that end. The defendants are encouraged to use their full “know-how” and resources to attain the results above described, and thus to achieve the constitutional end by any means at their disposal. The test is not the method or plan, but the results.’ ” 334 F.Supp. 623, 630-631 (1971).

The Supreme Court of the United States, in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (April 20, 1971), affirmed prior rulings of this court, in an opinion including language pertinent to the present situation as follows:

“The objective today remains to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation. * * * [S]chool authorities are ‘clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.’ (402 U.S. p. 15, 91 S.Ct. p. 1275)
* * * * * •*
“If school authorities fail in their affirmative obligations . . ^judicial authority ’ may be invoked. Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court’s equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.” (p. 15, 91 S.Ct. p. 1276)
* * * * * *
“ ‘The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it. The qualities of mercy and practicality have made equity the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest and private needs as well as between competing private claims.’ Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-330 [64 S.Ct. 587, 592, 88 L.Ed. 754] (1944), cited in Brown II, supra [349 U.S. 249] at 300 [75 S.Ct. 753, at 756, 99 L.Ed. 1083]’” (p. 15, 91 S.Ct. p. 1276)
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“. . . The task is to correct, by a balancing of the individual and *1226 collective interests, the condition that offends the Constitution.” (p. 16, 91 S.Ct. p. 1276)
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. . In default -by the school authorities of their obligation to proffer acceptable remedies, a district court has broad power to fashion a remedy that will assure a unitary school system.” (p. 16, 91 S.Ct. p. 1276)
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Related

Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education
269 F.3d 305 (Fourth Circuit, 2001)
Terry Belk Dwayne Collins, on Behalf of Themselves and the Class They Represent, William Capacchione, Individually and on Behalf of Christina Capacchione, a Minor Michael P. Grant Richard Easterling Lawrence Gauvreau Karen Bentley Charles Thompson Scott C. Willard v. The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Boardof Education Eric Smith, Superintendent, in His Official Capacity Arthur Griffin, Chairman of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School Board, in His Official Capacity, United States of America North Carolina School Boards Association National School Boards Association, Amici Curiae. William Capacchione, Individually and on Behalf of Christina Capacchione, a Minor Michael P. Grant Richard Easterling Lawrence Gauvreau Karen Bentley Charles Thompson Scott C. Willard, and Terry Belk Dwayne Collins, on Behalf of Themselves and the Class They Represent v. The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Boardof Education Eric Smith, Superintendent, in His Official Capacity Arthur Griffin, Chairman of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School Board, in His Official Capacity, United States of America North Carolina School Boards Association National School Boards Association, Amici Curiae. William Capacchione, Individually and on Behalf of Christina Capacchione, a Minor Michael P. Grant Richard Easterling Lawrence Gauvreau Karen Bentley Charles Thompson Scott C. Willard,plaintiffs-Appellees, and Terry Belk Dwayne Collins, on Behalf of Themselves and the Class They Represent v. The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Boardof Education Eric Smith, Superintendent, in His Official Capacity Arthur Griffin, Chairman of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School Board, in His Official Capacity, United States of America North Carolina School Boards Association National School Boards Association, Amici Curiae. William Capacchione, Individually and on Behalf of Christina Capacchione, a Minor Michael P. Grant Richard Easterling Lawrence Gauvreau Karen Bentley Charles Thompson Scott C. Willard, and Terry Belk Dwayne Collins, on Behalf of Themselves and the Class They Represent v. The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Boardof Education Eric Smith, Superintendent, in His Official Capacity Arthur Griffin, Chairman of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School Board, in His Official Capacity, United States of America North Carolina School Boards Association National School Boards Association, Amici Curiae
269 F.3d 305 (Fourth Circuit, 2001)
Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Fourth Circuit, 2001
Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools
57 F. Supp. 2d 228 (W.D. North Carolina, 1999)
Bennett v. City School District
114 A.D.2d 58 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1985)
Martin v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education
475 F. Supp. 1318 (W.D. North Carolina, 1979)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
362 F. Supp. 1223, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/swann-v-charlotte-mecklenburg-board-of-education-ncwd-1973.