Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education

306 F. Supp. 1291, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8878
District Court, W.D. North Carolina·Decided August 15, 1969·No. Civ. A. 1974·Published·Cited by 22 cases

Opinion

ORDER

McMILLAN, District Judge.

PRELIMINARY SUMMARY

Pursuant to this court’s June 20, 1969 order, 300 F.Supp. 1381, the defendants submitted on July 29, 1969 an amended plan for desegregation of the CharlotteMecklenburg schools, including a highly significant policy statement accepting for the first time the Board’s affirmative constitutional duty to desegregate students, teachers, principals and staffs “at the earliest possible date.” On August 4, 1969, a report was filed in connection with the plan. A hearing was conducted on August 5, 1969. The plan is before the court for approval.

Because the schools must open September 2, and because the Board’s plan includes both substantial action and genuine assurance of sustained effort toward prompt compliance with the law of the land, the plan of operation, for 1969-70 only, is approved and as indicated below, the defendants are directed to prepare and file by November 17, 1969, detailed plans and undertakings for completion of the job of desegregating the schools effective in September, 1970.

THE AMENDED PLAN — AND ITS RECEPTION

The plan proposes, among other things, to close seven old all-black inner-city schools and to assign their 3,000 students to various outlying schools, now predominantly white, mostly in high rent districts.

This technique of school closing and reassignment has been employed in dozens of school districts to promote school desegregation. It is not original with the local School Board.

The school closing issue has provoked strident protests from black citizens and from others; evidence showed that an estimated 19,000 names are listed on a petition denouncing the plan as unfair and discriminatory. The signers add their own brand of protest to that of the 21,000 whites who last May (though protesting their acceptance of the principles of desegregation) raised a “silk-stocking” community outcry against bus transportation except to schools of individual choice. Another 800 white Paw Creek petitioners have joined in protest against a part of the plan under which some 200 fifth and sixth grade pupils would be assigned to re-opened Woodland, a now unused (and formerly black) school. Comment from people who have not studied the evidence tends to ignore the law — the reason this question is before a court, for decision — -and to concentrate on public acceptance or what will make people happy. A correspondent who signs “Puzzled” inquires:

“If the whites don’t want it and the blacks don’t want it, why do we have to have it?”

The answer is, the Constitution of the United States.

THE CONSTITUTION — THE LAW OF THE LAND — REQUIRES DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS

North Carolina reportedly refused to ratify the United States Constitution until the Bill of Rights had been incorporated into it. The Fourteenth Amendment to that Constitution, now part of the Bill of Rights, guarantees to all citizens the “equal protection of laws.” In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954), 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed. 1083 (1955), the Supreme Court held that racial segregation in public schools produces inferior education and morale, restricts opportunity for association, and thus violates the equal protection guaranty of the Constitution and is unlawful. In Green v. New Kent County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 88 S.Ct. 1689, 20 L.Ed.2d 716 (1968), and two other simul *1294 taneous unanimous decisions, the Supreme Court held that school boards have the affirmative duty to get rid of dual school systems, to eliminate “black schools” and “white schools,” and to operate “just schools.” The Court said:

“The burden on a school board today is to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work and promises realistically to work now.” (Emphasis on the word “now” was put in the text by the Supreme Court.)

For years people of this community and all over the south have quoted wistfully the statement in Briggs v. Elliott, D.C., 132 F.Supp. 776 by Judge John J. Parker (who at his death was one of my few remaining heroes) that though the Constitution forbids segregation it does not require integration. Passage of time, and the revelation of conditions which might well have changed Judge Parker’s views if he had lived, have left Judge Parker’s words as a landmark but no longer a guide. The latest decision on this subject by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals (which is the court that first reviews my actions) contains this statement:

“The famous Briggs v. Elliott dictum —adhered to by this court for many years — that the Constitution forbids segregation but does not require integration, (132 F.Supp. 776, E.D.S.C. 1955) is now dead.” Hawthorne v. County School Board of Lunenburg County, Virginia, 413 F.2d 53, Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, July 11, 1969.

“Freedom of choice,” as this court has already pointed out, does not legalize a segregated school system. A plan with freedom of choice' must be judged by the same standard as a plan without freedom of choice — whether or not the plan desegregates the public schools. The courts are concerned primarily not with the techniques of assigning students or controlling school populations, but with whether those techniques get rid of segregation of children in public schools. The test is pragmatic, not theoretical.

CONTINUED OPERATION OF SEGREGATED PUBLIC SCHOOLS IS UNLAWFUL

The issue is one of law and order. Unless and until the Constitution is amended it is and will be unlawful to operate segregated public schools. Amending the Constitution takes heavy majorities of voters or lawmakers. It is difficult to imagine any majority of Supreme Court, of Congress or of popular vote in favor of changing the Constitution to say that public school pupils may lawfully be kept in separate schools because they are black. A community bent on “law and order” should expect its school board members to obey the United States Constitution, and should encourage them in every move they make toward such compliance. The call for “law and order” in the streets and slums is necessary, but it sounds hollow when it issues from people content with segregated public schools.

The question is not whether people like desegregated public schools, but what the law requires of those who operate them.

THE DUTY TO OBSERVE THE CONSTITUTION AND DESEGREGATE THE SCHOOLS CANNOT BE REDUCED OR AVOIDED BECAUSE OF SOOTHING SAYINGS FROM OTHER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS NOR OUTCRIES FROM THOSE WHO WANT THE LAW TO GO AWAY

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Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 306 F. Supp. 1291, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8878 (W.D.N.C. 1969).

306 F. Supp. 1291 (Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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