Swan v. 31457 Toyota

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Texas
DecidedOctober 7, 2024
Docket3:24-cv-02470
StatusUnknown

This text of Swan v. 31457 Toyota (Swan v. 31457 Toyota) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Swan v. 31457 Toyota, (N.D. Tex. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

GLENN SWAN, § § Plaintiff, § § V. § No. 3:24-cv-2470-K-BN § 31457 TOYOTA, § § Defendant. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Without paying the statutory filing fee, Plaintiff Glenn Swan submitted a filing pro se that has been construed as a civil complaint. See Dkt. No. 3. United States District Judge Ed Kinkeade referred Swan’s complaint to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference. A district court is required to screen a civil complaint filed in forma pauperis (that is, without payment of the filing fee) and may summarily dismiss that complaint (or any portion of it) if the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). “The language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Black v. Warren, 134 F.3d 732, 733-34 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). And “[i]t is well-established that a district court may dismiss a complaint on its own motion under [Rule] 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may granted.” Starrett v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, No. 3:18-cv-2851-M-BH, 2018 WL 6069969, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2018) (citing Carroll v. Fort James Corp., 470 F.3d 1171 (5th Cir. 2006)), rec. accepted, 2018 WL 6068991 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2018), aff’d, 763 F.

App’x 383 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 142 (2019). A district court may exercise its “inherent authority ... to dismiss a complaint on its own motion ... ‘as long as the procedure employed is fair.’” Gaffney v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 294 F. App’x 975, 977 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (quoting Carroll, 470 F.3d at 1177; citation omitted). “[F]airness in this context requires both notice of the court’s intention to dismiss sua sponte and an opportunity to respond.” Id. (cleaned up; quoting Lozano

v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 489 F.3d 636, 643 (5th Cir. 2007)); see also Carver v. Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021) (“The broad rule is that ‘a district court may dismiss a claim on its own motion as long as the procedure employed is fair.’ More specifically, ‘fairness in this context requires both notice of the court’s intention and an opportunity to respond’ before dismissing sua sponte with prejudice.” (citations omitted)).

And these findings, conclusions, and recommendations provides notice, while the period for filing objections affords an opportunity to respond. See, e.g., Starrett, 2018 WL 6069969, at *2 (citations omitted). A district court’s authority to dismiss an action that “fails to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face’” extends to dismissal of “claims that are ‘clearly baseless,’ including ‘claims describing fantastic or delusional scenarios.’” Starrett, 763 F. App’x at 383-84 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, then Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989); citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (concluding that dismissal “is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of

the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them”)). A review of Swan’s filing reflects that the complaint presents allegations that qualify as clearly baseless, irrational, or wholly incredible, requiring dismissal with prejudice. Recommendation The Court should dismiss the complaint with prejudice.

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and

specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Assn, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996). DATED: October 7, 2024

DAVID L. HORAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Related

Black v. Warren
134 F.3d 732 (Fifth Circuit, 1998)
Lozano v. Ocwen Federal Bank, FSB
489 F.3d 636 (Fifth Circuit, 2007)
Gaffney Ex Rel. Gaffney v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
294 F. App'x 975 (Fifth Circuit, 2008)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Denton v. Hernandez
504 U.S. 25 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Carver v. Atwood
18 F.4th 494 (Fifth Circuit, 2021)

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Bluebook (online)
Swan v. 31457 Toyota, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/swan-v-31457-toyota-txnd-2024.