Swain v. Cook County

Opinion

2026 IL App (1st) 251319-U No. 1-25-1319

Order filed September 3, 2026 FOURTH DIVISION

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

DORIAN SWAIN, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Cook County, Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Chancery Division.

)

v. ) No. 2023 CH 09410 )

COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS; TOM DART, ) Honorable Sheriff of Cook County; COOK COUNTY ) David B. Atkins, SHERIFF’S MERIT BOARD; JOHN ) Judge, presiding.

DALICANDRO, Chairman; BYRON RAZIER, )

Vice Chairman; VINCENT T. WINTERS, )

Secretary; MARLA M. KAIDEN, Board )

Member; TERRENCE WALSH, Board Member; )

WADE INGRAM SR., Board Member; JAMES )

J. SEXTON, Board Member; and KIMBERLY )

PATE GODDEN, Board Member, )

)

Defendants-Appellees. )

JUSTICE MITCHELL delivered the judgment of the court.

Justice Mikva and Presiding Justice Oden Johnson concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

Held: This court lacks jurisdiction where plaintiff did not timely appeal the circuit court’s order affirming and remanding the agency decision.

¶1 In this administrative review, plaintiff Dorian Swain appeals a circuit court order that affirmed the Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board’s decision to terminate his employment with the Cook County Sheriff’s Office for violating the office’s conflict of interest policy. Plaintiff also appeals the circuit court’s subsequent order that denied his “motion to secure final order.” Plaintiff argues the circuit court erred in denying his motion to secure final order because the circuit court retained jurisdiction over the case where it remanded the case back to the Merit Board. Plaintiff also argues that the circuit court erred when it affirmed the Merit Board’s termination decision because the sheriff’s office either knew or should have known about the alleged conflict of interest yet failed to enforce the policy. However, we dismiss this appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

¶2 I. BACKGROUND

¶3 Plaintiff was employed in the electronic monitoring unit of the Cook County Sheriff’s Office. The Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board terminated plaintiff’s employment after the Merit Board found that plaintiff’s son was subject to the office’s electronic monitoring, and plaintiff approved his son’s movements in violation of the office’s conflict of interest policy. Plaintiff sought review in the circuit court of Cook County. 735 ILCS 5/3-103 (West 2022).

¶4 Following an evidentiary hearing, on October 24, 2024, the circuit court issued a written order that affirmed the Merit Board’s termination finding but remanded with instructions to change plaintiff’s termination date:

“Based on the Board’s findings that Plaintiff violated certain policies, the court finds there was sufficient basis for its conclusion that there was cause for discharge, and the termination was not arbitrary or unreasonable, or unrelated to the requirements of service. ***.

The court does not find a basis for the Board’s decision retroactively terminating Plaintiff and remands with instruction for the termination date to be the date of the Board’s final decision.

3

For these reasons, the Board’s October 12, 2023 [d]ecision is hereby reversed in part in that the court finds the Board did not have jurisdiction to retroactively terminate Plaintiff. This matter is remanded to the Board for further proceedings consistent with this Order.”

On January 16, 2025, the Merit Board issued a second decision with an updated termination date in accordance with the remand.

¶5 Plaintiff then filed a motion with the circuit court titled “Motion to Secure Final Order.” He sought “to confirm that the Merit Board ruling was in accordance with this Court’s remand order and secure a Final Order in this case.” The circuit court denied the motion on June 12, 2025, reasoning that it lacked jurisdiction under section 3-103 of the Administrative Review Law because more than 35 days had passed since the Merit Board’s second order that updated the termination date. 735 ILCS 5/3-103.

¶6 Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal with the appellate court on July 8, 2025. He seeks reversal of two orders: (1) the circuit court’s June 12, 2025 order denying his motion to secure a final order and (2) the October 24, 2024 order that upheld the Merit Board’s termination decision.

¶7 “Jurisdiction is a threshold issue which may be raised at any time [citation], and this court has an independent duty to consider its jurisdiction and dismiss an appeal where jurisdiction is lacking [citation]. The appellant bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction.” In re Marriage of Salviola, 2020 IL App (1st) 182185, ¶ 36.

¶8 II. ANALYSIS

¶9 Plaintiff maintains we have appellate jurisdiction under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017) because his notice of appeal was filed on July 8, 2025, which is within 30 days of the circuit court’s order denying his motion to secure a final order.

4

¶ 10 An administrative review to the circuit court must be filed within 35 days of service of the final administrative decision upon the affected party. Nudell v. Forest Preserve District of Cook County, 207 Ill. 2d 409, 413-14 (2003); 735 ILCS 5/3-103. A circuit court’s final administrative review order is reviewable by the appellate court, as in any other civil action, and must be timely filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303. See Harris v. Department of Employment Security, 2023 IL App (1st) 220405-U, ¶ 14; 735 ILCS 5/3-112 (West 2024); Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(1).

¶ 11 Under Rule 303(a)(1), notice of appeal in a civil case must be filed “within 30 days of [the final] judgment or, if a timely motion directed against the final judgment is filed, within 30 days after the denial of that postjudgment motion.” Royal Oak Condominium Ass’n, v. Stevenson, 2025 IL App (1st) 242317, ¶ 16; Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(1). In an administrative review appeal, the 30-day clock runs from the date of the circuit court’s final administrative review order. See, e.g., Hawthorne v. Department of Employment Security, 2022 IL App (1st) 210745-U, ¶¶ 11, 15.

¶ 12 “A judgment or order is final if it disposes of the rights of the parties, either on the entire case or on some definite and separate part of the controversy.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dubina v. Mesirow Realty Development, Inc., 178 Ill. 2d 496, 502 (1997). Our supreme court has explained that an order that affirms but remands is final if no material controversies remain for the lower court or agency to adjudicate:

“if, upon remandment, the [court or administrative body] has only to enter a judgment or decree in accordance with the directions of the reviewing court, or to conduct further proceedings on uncontroverted incidental matters, then, irrespective of the remanding clause in the judgment order, the judgment of the [reviewing court] is final and reviewable.

***.

The ultimate question to be decided in each case is whether the judgment fully and finally disposes of the rights of the parties to the cause so that no material controverted issue remains to be determined.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wilkey v. Illinois Racing

5

Board, 96 Ill. 2d 245, 249 (1983) (applying the finality standard for appellate review orders to circuit court administrative review orders).

Thus, the October 24, 2024 order was a final appealable order because it settled all parties’ rights in the entire controversy: it affirmed the Merit Board’s termination of plaintiff and determined the appropriate termination date. While the order “remand[ed] with instruction for the termination date to be the date of the [Merit] Board’s final decision,” that remand did not alter finality. The remaining task for the Merit Board was ministerial because it was not required to take evidence, make legal or factual findings, or exercise any discretion. See Martin v. Cajda, 238 Ill. App. 3d 721, 727 (1992) (dismissing an untimely appeal and explaining the circuit court’s remand order was final because “[t]he Board was instructed only to enter an order of discharge; the [circuit] court left it no facts to redetermine nor any legal issues to redecide—the archetypical remand order that the Wilkey court identified as being substantively final and thus appealable”); Hickey v. Riera, 332 Ill. App. 3d 532, 541 (2001) (explaining a circuit court’s remand order in an administrative review case was final and appealable because “nothing [was] left to the discretion of the Board other than the ministerial act of entering an order”).

¶ 13 “The notions of *** the parties as to the finality of an order will not render a final order nonfinal.” Martin, 238 Ill. App. 3d at 728. Because the October 24, 2024 order was final, plaintiff’s notice of appeal on July 8, 2025 was untimely. Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(1). Accordingly, the appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Carr v. City of Chicago, 2025 IL App (1st) 241639, ¶ 9 (“When an appeal is untimely under a supreme court rule, this court has no discretion to take any action other than dismissing the appeal.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). Further, plaintiff’s effort to appeal the circuit court’s June 12, 2025 order fails because, as the circuit court found,

6

more than 35 days had passed since service of the last decision of the Merit Board. Nudell, 207 Ill. 2d at 413-14; 735 ILCS 5/3-103.

¶ 14 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 15 The appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

¶ 16 Dismissed.