Swack v. Credit Suisse First Boston

230 F.R.D. 250, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20564, 2005 WL 2323158
CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedSeptember 14, 2005
DocketNo. Civ.A. 02-11943-DPW
StatusPublished
Cited by34 cases

This text of 230 F.R.D. 250 (Swack v. Credit Suisse First Boston) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Swack v. Credit Suisse First Boston, 230 F.R.D. 250, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20564, 2005 WL 2323158 (D. Mass. 2005).

Opinion

[252]*252 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

W00DL0CK, District Judge.

In this putative class action litigation, plaintiff Terry Swack (“Swack”) alleges that defendants Credit Suisse First Boston LLC (“CSFB”) and its analyst Mark Wolfenberger (‘Wolfenberger”) (collectively, the “Defendants”) violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as well as Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10-b, by issuing intentionally false and misleading research reports regarding Ra-zorfish, Inc. (“Razorfish”). Specifically, Swack alleges that the Defendants issued overly optimistic reports regarding Razorfish in order to generate additional income for CSFB through the investment banking services it provided to Razorfish, as well as additional bonuses for Wolfenberger, compensation that was linked to CSFB’s investment banking fees as per the instruction of CSFB management. Swack further alleges that these false and misleading research reports had the effect of artificially inflating the value of Razorfish stock for a period of time, and that she and the other class members were injured when the price of the stock thereafter deflated.

Swack, who has previously been appointed Lead Plaintiff for the putative class,2 now moves the Court to certify a class of plaintiffs comprising all those individuals and entities who purchased Razorfish common stock between May 24, 1999 and May 4, 2001, inclusive (the “Class Period”). The Defendants oppose the motion, arguing that various of the requirements for certification under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 have not been met. In particular, the Defendants contend that Swack, who purchased her stock directly from the issuer as part of a merger and who had the opportunity to question Razorfish executives personally, is not a typical plaintiff and cannot adequately represent a class of those who for the most part purchased their shares in the market.

After extended consideration, I am satisfied that a functional analysis of Swack’s posture in this litigation justifies appointing her to be class representative for all of the class-wide issues. See Section II.B.2. below for a list of some of the common questions of law and fact. It is only when, if ever, the question of individual damages is addressed that the limitations to proceeding with her— or any other individual plaintiff, for that matter — as class representative will become material. There will be time enough at that point in the litigation to revisit the question of class litigation. I make this decision recognizing that some of the case law has declined to permit a plaintiff in Swack’s circumstances to act as class representative in fraud-on-the-market securities litigation such as this. I find, however, that these cases treated the issue in a mechanical fashion, ignoring the true purpose of the typicality inquiry.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual History3

1. Relationship Between Razorfish and CSFB

The CSFB Global Technology Group (“CSFB Tech Group” or “Tech Group”), which housed both research analysts and investment banking sales personnel, was the lead manager for Razorfish’s Initial Public Offering (“IPO”) on April 27, 1999. Compl. 1163. Thereafter, the CSFB Tech Group continued to manage a substantial portion of Razorfish’s investment banking business. Id. CSFB research analyst Wolfenberger initiated CSFB’s research coverage of Razorfish stock on May 24, 1999 with a “buy” rating. Id. H 64. Wolfenberger reiterated the “buy” rating in subsequent research reports issued in June and July 1999. Id. 1165. In October 1999, CSFB and Razorfish discussed a secondary stock offering by Razorfish, and CSFB acted as an investment bank[253]*253er advising Razorfish on the acquisition of International Integration Incorporated (“i-Cube”) in exchange for Razorfish stock. Id. H 66.

In subsequent months, numerous e-mail exchanges between Wolfenberger and Ra-zorfish CEO Jeff Dachis (“Dachis”) suggest close coordination on research reports between the producer and the subject of the reports in order to boost Razorfish’s stock price. For example, on October 29, 1999, Wolfenberger sent an e-mail to Dachis concerning re-initiation of coverage of Razorfish in which he stated:

I want your opinion on rating. We would have taken you to a strong buy but given the recent stock run, does it make sense for us to keep the upgrade in our back pocket in case we need it? Either way I don’t care. You guys deserve it, I just don’t want to waste it.

Id. H 76. Dachis responded by e-mail asking Wolfenberger to “re-initiate with a buy and a higher price target and keep the upgrade for a little while.” Id. K 77 (adding “[although its [sic] getting hard to justify the valuations”). In this same message, Dachis also stated: “[G]et the secondary out above 100, and see how it goes ... what do you think?” Id. 1181. On November 3, 1999 Wolfenber-ger issued a research report raising Razorfish’s rating to “strong buy.” Id. H 78.

On December 2,1999, Wolfenberger issued another report rating Razorfish as a “strong buy.” Id. H 68. In January 2000, the price of Razorfish stock began to decline. Id. Nevertheless, Wolfenberger issued “strong buy” ratings for Razorfish from January 2000 through May 2000 and set optimistic price targets for the stock. Id. During this time period, CSFB publicly maintained that its Tech Group was the “largest, most credible and insightful team on Wall Street” and that its members were encouraged “to interpret [industry] information in a fair and objective manner.” Id. 1147.

On March 3, 2000 — a day on which Wolfen-berger issued another “strong buy” report for Razorfish — he sent an e-mail to Dachis proposing a joint plan to boost Razorfish’s price: “We’ll work the phones, you work the road show.” Id. 1186. Later that same day, Wolfenberger sent another e-mail to Dachis explaining that “[w]ith the call we made and the market and you on the road, this stock should be higher than $5.” Id. 1187. As on many — although not a majority — of the dates on which Wolfenberger issued his positive research reports, Razorfish’s stock price increased: the stock rose more than 11% for the day, well above the NASDAQ’s overall increase of 3.4%. Id. ! 86.

On June 14, 2000, Wolfenberger e-mailed Dachis to say “I’d like to do a note before the quiet period to try and move the stock.” Id. 1188. He sent further e-mails in July 2000 explaining how he was “[w]orking the stock” in the Midwest. Id. H 89. In the summer and fall of 2000, Wolfenberger continued to issue “strong buy” ratings for Razorfish. Dachis was grateful for this effort, writing in an e-mail “You da man ... I won’t forget this effort ... thank you.” Id. H 94. Later, in response to a report forwarded to him, Dachis thanked Wolfenberger by e-mail for the fact that Razorfish — along with many other companies — maintained its “strong buy” rating while several other “information technology service companies” had been downgraded.

On October 6, 2000, Wolfenberger issued a report rating Razorfish a “strong buy” and set a price target of $15 per share, even though the stock was then trading at $8.75 per share. Id. H 98.

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230 F.R.D. 250, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20564, 2005 WL 2323158, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/swack-v-credit-suisse-first-boston-mad-2005.