Sutphin v. Ethicon, Inc.

District Court, S.D. West Virginia·Decided August 28, 2020·No. 2:14-cv-01379·Unknown

Opinion

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

CHARLESTON DIVISION

ANNETTE SUTPHIN,

Plaintiff,

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14-cv-01379

ETHICON, INC.,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the court are (1) Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Certain Testimony of Infectious Disease Specialist Experts, filed July 1, 2020, [ECF No. 283]; and (2) Plaintiff’s Motion to file a sur-surreply, filed August 12, 2020, [ECF No. 303]. Response and reply times have passed, and the motions are ripe for decision. In the Motion to Exclude, Defendant seeks to limit testimony of Drs. Shoham and Margolis. First, Defendant moves to exclude Dr. Shoham from offering general causation opinions. Second, Defendant moves to exclude Dr. Shoham from testifying as to whether Plaintiff has suffered from a MRSA infection or will need treatment for a MRSA infection in the future. Third, Defendant seeks to prevent Dr. Shoham from testifying about the likelihood that Plaintiff will develop a systemic infection. Fourth, Defendant seeks to exclude Dr. Shoham’s testimony about Plaintiff’s previous diagnoses of Bartholin cysts. Fifth, and finally, Defendant seeks to exclude any testimony by Dr. Margolis related to MRSA. file a sur-surreply, [ECF No. 303], after already being permitted to file a surreply, [ECF No. 295]. I. Legal Standard Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, expert testimony is admissible if it will “help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue” and

(1) is “based upon sufficient facts or data” and (2) is “the product of reliable principles and methods” which (3) has been reliably applied “to the facts of the case.” Fed.R.Evid. 702. A two-part test governs the admissibility of expert testimony. The evidence is admitted if it “rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant.” 509 U.S. 579, 597, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). The proponent of expert testimony does not have the burden to “prove” anything. He must, however, “come forward with evidence from which the court can determine that the

proffered testimony is properly admissible.” 137 F.3d 780, 783 (4th Cir. 1998). The district court is the gatekeeper.1 It is an important role: “[E]xpert witnesses have the potential to be both powerful and quite misleading[;]” the court must “ensure that any and all scientific testimony ... is not only relevant, but reliable.” 259 F.3d 194, 199 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing

178 F.3d 257, 261 (4th Cir. 1999) and 509 U.S. at 588, 595, 113 S. Ct. 2786). I “need not determine that the proffered expert testimony is irrefutable or certainly correct”—“[a]s with all other admissible evidence, expert testimony is subject to testing by ‘vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof.’” U.S. at 596, 113 S. Ct. 2786); 137 F.3d at 783 (noting that “[a]ll demands is that the trial judge make a ‘preliminary assessment’ of whether the proffered testimony is both reliable ... and helpful”). mentions specific factors to guide the overall relevance and reliability determinations that apply to all expert evidence. They include (1) whether the

particular scientific theory “can be (and has been) tested”; (2) whether the theory “has been subjected to peer review and publication”; (3) the “known or potential rate of error”; (4) the “existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation”; and (5) whether the technique has achieved “general acceptance” in the relevant scientific or expert community. 324 F.3d 261, 266 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting 509 U.S. at 593–94, 113 S. Ct. 2786). Despite these factors, “[t]he inquiry to be undertaken by the district court is ‘a

flexible one’ focusing on the ‘principles and methodology’ employed by the expert, not on the conclusions reached.” 178 F.3d at 261 (quoting 509 U.S. at 594–95, 113 S. Ct. 2786); 526 U.S. 137, 150, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) (“We agree with the Solicitor General that ‘[t]he factors identified in may or may not be pertinent in assessing reliability, depending on the nature of the issue, the expert's particular expertise, and

the subject of his testimony.’ ”) (citation omitted); 324 F.3d at 266 (noting “that testing of reliability should be flexible and that five factors neither necessarily nor exclusively apply to every expert”). With respect to relevancy, also explains: described by Judge Becker as one of fit. Fit is not always obvious, and scientific validity for one purpose is not necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes.... Rule 702's helpfulness standard requires a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility.

509 U.S. at 591–92, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). II. Dr. Shoham’s General Causation Opinions Defendant moves to exclude any general causation opinions from Dr. Shoham because Plaintiff never disclosed Dr. Shoham as a general causation expert witness, but rather disclosed him only as a case-specific expert witness. [ECF No. 284, at 4– 5]. However, “Plaintiff does not intend to offer Dr. Shoham as a general expert” and his testimony will be confined to “case-specific opinions including, but not limited to Plaintiff’s medical history and conditions.” [ECF No. 290, at 5]. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion is DENIED as moot insofar as it seeks to exclude general causation testimony from Dr. Shoham [ECF No. 283]. III. Dr. Shoham’s MRSA Opinions Defendant hopes to prevent Dr. Shoham from offering testimony that Plaintiff suffered from a MRSA infection on March 5, 2020; that it is possible she suffered from a MRSA infection prior to March 5, 2020; and from offering his opinions about complications that Plaintiff might suffer from future treatments for possible infections. [ECF No. 284, at 5–8]. With regard to Dr. Shoham’s testimony that Plaintiff “more likely than not . . . had an [sic] MRSA infection” on March 5, 2020, Defendant contends that Dr. Shoham did not follow proper methodology to arrive at this conclusion. However, the record demonstrates that Dr. Shoham relied on “the [ECF No. 289-9, at 20]. According to Dr. Shoham’s report this conclusion was based on “the presence of MRSA on a surface culture in the context of the clinical findings of a vulvar abscess.” [ECF No. 289-2, at 9]. Forming this opinion in reliance on his education, experience, and the medical literature he lists is an acceptable method of reaching this conclusion. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion is DENIED to the extent

that it seeks an order preventing Dr. Shoham from offering these MRSA-related opinions and testimony. [ECF No. 283]. IV. Dr. Shoham’s Systemic Infection Opinions Defendant moves to exclude Dr. Shoham’s testimony that it is “quite possible” that “a locally invasive infection could turn into a systemic infection.” [ECF No. 284, at 8]. Defendant first argues that this opinion should be excluded because it was not disclosed in Dr. Shoham’s expert report. Plaintiff correctly points out that Dr.

Shoham did discuss the potentially invasive nature of an infection like MRSA in his report. Defendant further argues that Dr. Shoham’s testimony that it is “quite possible” that Plaintiff will develop a systemic infection should be excluded because it fails to prove that the systemic infection will develop with “reasonable certainty.” , No.

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