[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _____________________________
No. 10-12521 FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS _____________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT D. C. Docket No. 1:09-cv-00899-TWT JAN 27, 2012 JOHN LEY CLERK
SUSAN PORTER, DAMINGA PORTER,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
RICKY L. JEWELL, in his individual and official capacity as City of McDonough police officer, PRESTON DORSEY, in his individual and official capacity as City of McDonough police chief,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia _________________________________________
(January 27, 2012) Before EDMONDSON, WILSON, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Susan Porter,1 proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of Officer Ricky Jewell, Chief Preston Dorsey, and the
City of McDonough, Georgia (“City”)2 in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit. No
reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
Porter’s complaint arose from the following series of events. Porter’s
brother told Officer Jewell, an officer in the City’s police force, that he was
concerned about his niece’s well being because he suspected that Porter was living
with a convicted child molester. Upon the brother’s request, Officer Jewell visited
Porter’s apartment to do a “welfare check,” but the Officer left when no one
answered the door.
Later that day, after Porter called the police department, Officer Jewell and
another officer returned to the apartment. Porter opened the door and denied that
1 Daminga Porter, Susan Porter’s minor daughter, was also a plaintiff in this case and appeals the district court’s order. Because Daminga’s appellate arguments are the same as her mother’s, we will not address them separately and our analysis of Porter’s claims applies with equal force to Daminga.
2 Although Porter did not name the City in her complaint, when an officer of the government is sued in his official capacity -- as in this case -- and “the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3105 (1985). Because the district court treated the City as a party and granted summary judgment in the City’s favor, Porter is entitled to challenge that decision on appeal.
2 she was living with a man. Although she invited the officers to inspect the
apartment, the officers did not enter. The parties dispute what happened next.
According to Porter, she closed the door; and Officer Jewell began banging on and
kicking the door and continued for several minutes. Porter was then unable to
open the door after the officers left because the door’s deadbolt and doorframe
were cracked. Porter and her daughter were confined in the apartment for one
hour before the apartment complex’s maintenance worker arrived to repair the
door. Porter reported the incident to the police department; but, after a brief
investigation, Chief Dorsey concluded that the matter did not warrant an internal
affairs investigation.
Porter filed a civil rights complaint against Officer Jewell and Chief Dorsey,
in their individual and official capacities, pursuant to section 1983. She alleged
that when Officer Jewell damaged her door, he interfered with her possessory
interest in her apartment and restrained her movement, in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.3 She also contended that Chief Dorsey, who was Officer Jewell’s
supervisor, was liable for Officer Jewell’s conduct because he failed to provide
proper training and discipline. Because Porter sued both officers in their official
3 Porter also alleged a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation. Because she does not raise that claim on appeal, she has abandoned it. See Irwin v. Hawk, 40 F.3d 347, 347 n.1 (11th Cir. 1994).
3 capacities, the district court construed the complaint as asserting a municipal
liability claim against the City. The officers and the City filed a motion for
summary judgment which the district court granted.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, and we
view the evidence and all reasonable factual inferences in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1136 (11th Cir.
2007). “Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence establishes ‘no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.’” McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243
(11th Cir. 2003). We construe liberally pro se pleadings. Tannenbaum v. United
States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
Qualified immunity shields a government official sued in his individual
capacity from liability for section 1983 claims if the official’s conduct did not
“violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.” Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d 1559, 1565 (11th Cir. 1994).
Once an officer establishes that “he was acting within the scope of his
discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred,” the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to show that (1) the facts, as alleged and viewed in the light
4 most favorable to the plaintiff, establish a constitutional violation and (2) the
constitutional right violated clearly was already established. Id.
The Fourth Amendment protects people “against unreasonable searches and
seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. A “seizure” of property under the Fourth
Amendment “occurs when ‘there is some meaningful interference with an
individual’s possessory interests in that property.’” Soldal v. Cook Cnty., Ill., 113
S.Ct. 538, 543 (1992).
The Constitution, however, “is not concerned” with de minimis violations.
Ingraham v. Wright, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 1414 (1977); see also United States v.
Hernandez, 418 F.3d 1206, 1212 n.7 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating that “[o]f trifles the
law does not concern itself: De minimis non curat lex”); United States v. Purcell,
236 F.3d 1274, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001) (concluding that a de minimis delay during a
traffic stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253,
1257 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating that “the application of de minimis force, without
more, will not support a claim for excessive force in violation of the Fourth
Amendment”). Although we have not addressed the amount of property damage
required to constitute a “seizure” of that property under the Fourth Amendment,
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _____________________________
No. 10-12521 FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS _____________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT D. C. Docket No. 1:09-cv-00899-TWT JAN 27, 2012 JOHN LEY CLERK
SUSAN PORTER, DAMINGA PORTER,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
RICKY L. JEWELL, in his individual and official capacity as City of McDonough police officer, PRESTON DORSEY, in his individual and official capacity as City of McDonough police chief,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia _________________________________________
(January 27, 2012) Before EDMONDSON, WILSON, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Susan Porter,1 proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of Officer Ricky Jewell, Chief Preston Dorsey, and the
City of McDonough, Georgia (“City”)2 in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit. No
reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
Porter’s complaint arose from the following series of events. Porter’s
brother told Officer Jewell, an officer in the City’s police force, that he was
concerned about his niece’s well being because he suspected that Porter was living
with a convicted child molester. Upon the brother’s request, Officer Jewell visited
Porter’s apartment to do a “welfare check,” but the Officer left when no one
answered the door.
Later that day, after Porter called the police department, Officer Jewell and
another officer returned to the apartment. Porter opened the door and denied that
1 Daminga Porter, Susan Porter’s minor daughter, was also a plaintiff in this case and appeals the district court’s order. Because Daminga’s appellate arguments are the same as her mother’s, we will not address them separately and our analysis of Porter’s claims applies with equal force to Daminga.
2 Although Porter did not name the City in her complaint, when an officer of the government is sued in his official capacity -- as in this case -- and “the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3105 (1985). Because the district court treated the City as a party and granted summary judgment in the City’s favor, Porter is entitled to challenge that decision on appeal.
2 she was living with a man. Although she invited the officers to inspect the
apartment, the officers did not enter. The parties dispute what happened next.
According to Porter, she closed the door; and Officer Jewell began banging on and
kicking the door and continued for several minutes. Porter was then unable to
open the door after the officers left because the door’s deadbolt and doorframe
were cracked. Porter and her daughter were confined in the apartment for one
hour before the apartment complex’s maintenance worker arrived to repair the
door. Porter reported the incident to the police department; but, after a brief
investigation, Chief Dorsey concluded that the matter did not warrant an internal
affairs investigation.
Porter filed a civil rights complaint against Officer Jewell and Chief Dorsey,
in their individual and official capacities, pursuant to section 1983. She alleged
that when Officer Jewell damaged her door, he interfered with her possessory
interest in her apartment and restrained her movement, in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.3 She also contended that Chief Dorsey, who was Officer Jewell’s
supervisor, was liable for Officer Jewell’s conduct because he failed to provide
proper training and discipline. Because Porter sued both officers in their official
3 Porter also alleged a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation. Because she does not raise that claim on appeal, she has abandoned it. See Irwin v. Hawk, 40 F.3d 347, 347 n.1 (11th Cir. 1994).
3 capacities, the district court construed the complaint as asserting a municipal
liability claim against the City. The officers and the City filed a motion for
summary judgment which the district court granted.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, and we
view the evidence and all reasonable factual inferences in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1136 (11th Cir.
2007). “Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence establishes ‘no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.’” McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243
(11th Cir. 2003). We construe liberally pro se pleadings. Tannenbaum v. United
States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
Qualified immunity shields a government official sued in his individual
capacity from liability for section 1983 claims if the official’s conduct did not
“violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.” Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d 1559, 1565 (11th Cir. 1994).
Once an officer establishes that “he was acting within the scope of his
discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred,” the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to show that (1) the facts, as alleged and viewed in the light
4 most favorable to the plaintiff, establish a constitutional violation and (2) the
constitutional right violated clearly was already established. Id.
The Fourth Amendment protects people “against unreasonable searches and
seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. A “seizure” of property under the Fourth
Amendment “occurs when ‘there is some meaningful interference with an
individual’s possessory interests in that property.’” Soldal v. Cook Cnty., Ill., 113
S.Ct. 538, 543 (1992).
The Constitution, however, “is not concerned” with de minimis violations.
Ingraham v. Wright, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 1414 (1977); see also United States v.
Hernandez, 418 F.3d 1206, 1212 n.7 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating that “[o]f trifles the
law does not concern itself: De minimis non curat lex”); United States v. Purcell,
236 F.3d 1274, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001) (concluding that a de minimis delay during a
traffic stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253,
1257 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating that “the application of de minimis force, without
more, will not support a claim for excessive force in violation of the Fourth
Amendment”). Although we have not addressed the amount of property damage
required to constitute a “seizure” of that property under the Fourth Amendment,
we are convinced -- based on our decisions in these other contexts -- that a de
5 minimis amount of damage does not rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment
violation.
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Porter, Officer Jewell
banged on and kicked her apartment door several times unprovoked, cracking the
doorframe and damaging the deadbolt. Officer Jewell did not, however, kick the
door down or permanently destroy the door. Thus, at most, the damage was only a
temporary deprivation of Porter’s possessory interests. Cf. United States v.
Jacobsen, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1662 (1984) (concluding that a field test of suspected
drugs “did affect respondents’ possessory interests protected by the [Fourth]
Amendment, since by destroying a quantity of the powder it converted what had
been only a temporary deprivation of possessory interests into a permanent one.”).
Moreover, because this damage was relatively minor and was able to be repaired
within an hour, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that the damage was
de minimis. Thus, there was no “meaningful interference” with Porter’s
possessory interests and no “seizure” of property within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. See Soldal, 113 S.Ct. at 543.
6 Officer Jewell’s conduct also did not result in a “seizure” of Porter and her
daughter under the Fourth Amendment.4 An officer “seizes” a person for purposes
of the Fourth Amendment when he “restrains the freedom of a person to walk
away.” Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 1380 (1989). “Violation of the
Fourth Amendment requires an intentional acquisition of physical control.” Id. at
1381. Thus, a Fourth Amendment seizure occurs “only when there is a
governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally
applied.” Id. (emphasis in original).
The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Porter, indicates that
Officer Jewell damaged Porter’s door in such a way that Porter and her daughter
were unable to exit. Nothing in the record evidences that Officer Jewell intended
to trap Porter inside. In fact, one would expect that banging and kicking a door
would result in the door being forced open, not forced closed. Because Officer
Jewell did not restrain Porter or her daughter “through means intentionally
applied,” there was no “seizure” of persons under the Fourth Amendment.
Because Porter failed to establish that Officer Jewell’s conduct resulted in a
constitutional violation, Officer Jewell was entitled to qualified immunity. See
4 Although it is not clear whether this claim was addressed below, we may affirm a grant of summary judgment for any reason supported by the record. See Bircoll v. Miami-Dade County, 480 F.3d 1072, 1088 n.21 (11th Cir. 2007).
7 Jordan, 38 F.3d at 1565. And Porter’s claims against Chief Dorsey and the City --
based on their liability for Officer Jewell’s alleged constitutional violation -- also
must fail.
AFFIRMED.