Surinder Singh v. Todd Blanche

Opinion

FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 15 2026 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SURINDER SINGH, No. 16-70710

Petitioner, Agency No. A099-912-112

v.

TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General, MEMORANDUM*

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 11, 2026** San Francisco, California

Before: S.R. THOMAS and MILLER, Circuit Judges, and BLUMENFELD, District Judge.*** Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Miller.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Stanley Blumenfeld, Jr., United States District Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation. Petitioner Surinder Singh petitions this Court for review of a decision by the

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”)

denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention

Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252.

Because the parties are familiar with the history of the case, we need not recount it

here.

“In reviewing the BIA’s decisions, we consider only the grounds relied upon

by that agency.” Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2021).

Where as here “the BIA adopted and affirmed the [IJ]’s decision,” “[w]e. . . look

through the BIA’s decision and treat the IJ’s decision as the final agency decision

for purposes of this appeal.” Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir.

2010) (citation modified).

We review factual determinations by the BIA, including those establishing

“eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under CAT,” for

substantial evidence. Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 641–42 (9th Cir. 2021).

I

“To be eligible for asylum, a petitioner has the burden to demonstrate a

likelihood of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,

2 religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”

Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation modified). “To be

eligible for withholding of removal, the petitioner must discharge this burden by a

‘clear probability.’” Id. at 1059–60. If, as is true here, the immigrant has

successfully demonstrated that they have suffered past persecution, the burden then

falls upon the government to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the

immigrant does not have a well-founded fear of future persecution. Deloso v.

Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 858, 863–64 (9th Cir. 2005) (as amended). This can be done by

showing the immigrant could relocate within their country of origin. See Kaiser v.

Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 653, 659 (9th Cir. 2004). “For purposes of asylum and

withholding of removal, assessing Petitioner’s ability to relocate consists of two

steps: (1) whether [he] could relocate safely, and (2) whether it would be

reasonable to require [him] to do so.” Rodriguez Tornes v. Garland, 993 F.3d 743,

755 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation modified).

“To determine the reasonableness of relocation, factors to consider include

potential harm in the suggested relocation area, ongoing civil strife in the country,

and social and cultural constraints, among others.” Narinder Singh v. Whitaker,

914 F.3d 654, 659 (9th Cir. 2019). Furthermore, “where the applicant has

established a well-founded fear of future persecution at the hands of the

3 government, a rebuttable presumption arises that the threat exists nationwide and

therefore that internal relocation is unreasonable.” Melkonian v. Ashcroft, 320

F.3d 1061, 1070 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added).

The IJ found that Singh had previously suffered persecution at the hands of

the Punjab police on account of his actual or perceived political affiliation with the

Shiromani Akali Dal Simranjit Mann (“ADM”) party. However, the IJ determined

that the government rebutted the presumption of a well-founded fear of future

persecution by showing Singh could safely relocate and it would be reasonable for

him to do so.

The agency erred in its relocation analysis by failing to thoroughly analyze

the persecution faced by ADM party members and affiliates, instead primarily

discussing and reviewing evidence regarding the persecution of the Sikh

population. The IJ held that Singh’s previous persecution was “on account of his

actual or imputed political opinion” and “[e]ach time he was mistreated by the

Punjab police, the officers either made references to his affiliation with the ADM

party or the timing of the arrest suggests that his involvement with the ADM party

was the motive for his arrest.” Singh was not persecuted specifically for his

religion but for his political opinions and affiliation. While ADM is a Sikh-group,

4 Petitioner, on multiple occasions, indicated that individuals who were Sikh were

not necessarily members of the ADM.

The agency’s relocation analysis relied almost exclusively on evidence

related to the treatment of Sikhs. For example, the portions of the 2012 Law

Library of Congress Report which the IJ relies upon to show that Singh could

move freely without checks or registration in India are specifically about Sikh

people, not ADM members or affiliates. This is also true regarding the portion of

the report which indicates that “Sikhs have ‘indiscriminate’ access to housing,

employment, health care, and education outside of Punjab.”

The only part of the 2012 Law Library of Congress Report cited to which

specifically focuses on the ADM indicates that “hard-core militants” are at risk of

police attention but that those who “simply hold[] pro-Khalistani views” are not.

This, however, provides no insight into the danger or lack thereof to individuals

who were active members and participants of the ADM. Further, that same report

notes the limitations of data about persecution of ADM members, stating that

“[m]ost reports describe the situation of internal relocation for Sikhs, including

those who are wanted for suspected militancy, but do not specifically consider the

situation of members of the Shiromani Akali Dal (Mann) Party.” No other data

5 cited by the agency in its relocation analysis is specifically related to the

experiences of ADM members.

The BIA errs when it “fail[s] to conduct a reasoned analysis with respect to

Singh’s individualized situation to determine if he could safely relocate within

another area of India.” Ajay Singh v. Garland, 97 F.4th 597, 607 (9th Cir. 2024)

(citation modified). Here, the agency’s analysis lacks critical discussion of those

with the same identity as the one for which Singh is persecuted. Evidence

regarding “[v]iolence against Sikhs and those who quietly hold pro-Khalistan

views does not address Singh’s . . . claim, which is premised on his active

membership and participation in [ADM] activities.” Jaswinder Singh v. Garland,

118 F.4th 1150, 1167 (9th Cir. 2024). As such, the relocation analysis by the

agency is inadequate.

Second, the agency’s relocation analysis did not specifically address Singh’s

continued intention to advocate for the ADM party even upon relocation. We have

previously held that “[a]lthough Singh testified that he planned to continue

working for the [ADM] if he were to return to India, the government did not

sustain its burden of proof that Singh could safely engage in [ADM] politics

outside of Punjab.” Jaswinder Singh, 118 F.4th at 1166. We have also held that

“the BIA’s analysis regarding whether Singh could reasonably relocate was

6 inadequate” because “the BIA failed to specifically address Singh’s stated intent to

continue proselytizing for his party wherever he went.” Ajay Singh, 97 F.4th at

607–08 (remanding to the agency “to conduct a sufficiently individualized

relocation analysis”) (citation modified). Because Petitioner’s intent to continue

advocating for his party regardless of relocation went unaddressed, the agency’s

analysis was inadequate.

Finally, the agency erred because it failed to address how local authorities

outside of Punjab would treat Singh upon relocation. “[T]he BIA’s analysis

focused on whether the Punjabi police would follow Singh outside of Punjab,

based on his past political activity, ultimately concluding that he was not

sufficiently high-profile for them to do so. This analysis does not account for the

persecution he may face outside Punjab from local authorities, or other actors,

based on his future political activities.” Narinder Singh, 914 F.3d at 661. “[T]he

BIA erred by failing to address the potential harm . . . other local authorities[]

might inflict upon Singh in a new state.” Ajay Singh, 97 F.4th at 607.

For the forgoing reasons, substantial evidence does not support the agency’s

determination that Petitioner could safely and reasonably relocate within India.

We remand Petitioner’s asylum and withholding claims to the agency to determine

whether Singh could safely and reasonably relocate outside of Punjab.

7 II

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s decision to deny CAT relief.

When an immigrant applies for protection under CAT, they must show it is more

likely than not that they would be tortured if returned to the country of removal.

Kamalthas v. I.N.S., 251 F.3d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, although Singh

supplied evidence of mistreatment of members of the ADM party, the agency

properly concluded that the evidence does not show that there was over a fifty

percent chance that Singh would be tortured upon returning to India.

III

In conclusion, we GRANT the petition for review as to asylum and

withholding of removal, and REMAND to the agency. We DENY the petition for

review as to protection under CAT. Each party shall bear their or its own costs.

PETITION DENIED IN PART; GRANTED IN PART; REMANDED IN PART.

8 FILED Singh v. Blanche, No. 16-70710 MAY 15 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS MILLER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

Surinder Singh is a member of the Shiromani Akali Dal (Amritsar), a Sikh

nationalist political party in India’s Punjab state commonly known as the “Mann

Party.” An immigration judge denied his applications for asylum, withholding of

removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) based on a finding

that he could safely relocate within India, and the Board of Immigration Appeals

affirmed. “Under the substantial evidence standard, administrative findings of fact

are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude

to the contrary.” Ani v. Bondi, 155 F.4th 1118, 1126 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting Ruiz-

Colmenares v. Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2022)). Because substantial

evidence supports the agency’s finding, I would deny the petition for review in full.

Singh argues that the immigration judge erroneously focused on evidence

pertaining to the treatment of Sikhs in general, as opposed to members of the Mann

Party in particular. But in fact, the immigration judge analyzed Singh’s

“individualized situation,” considering the “persons or entities that caused the past

persecution” and the “nature and extent of the persecution,” and found that he

could safely relocate elsewhere in India. Narinder Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654,

661 (9th Cir. 2019). The immigration judge relied on Singh’s own testimony to

find that Singh engaged only “in low-level party activities, such as putting up

1 posters,” and that the Punjab police, who were responsible for every instance of

persecution, “do not truly consider him to be a high-level leader or threat.” The

immigration judge also noted the absence of any “system of registration of

citizens” or “checks on a newcomer” in other parts of India, as well as the fact that

Singh was never fingerprinted or photographed by the Punjab police. Because

Singh is not a “high-level leader” of the Mann Party or a “hard-core militant,” the

immigration judge found that he is of no interest to the central authorities, and the

Punjab police likely would not search for or be able to locate him “in another part

of the country.”

Those findings were supported by a 2012 report from the Law Library of

Congress, which the immigration judge cited. The report, titled “Feasibility of

Relocation for Sikhs and Mann Party Members,” explains that “only those [Mann

Party members] considered by police to be high-profile militants are at risk of

persecution even if they were to relocate.” The report goes on to explain that

“favoring an independent Sikh state” typically “would not make an individual a

high-profile suspect” or “hard-core militant[].” The report specifically addresses

the possibility of relocation for Mann Party members who, like Singh, express a

fear of the Punjab police, explaining that “relocation to a different area of the

country . . . is feasible where the applicant’s fear is of local police and the

individual is not of interest to the central authorities.” Although the immigration

2 judge did not quote those specific passages from the report, the substantial

evidence standard does not require an immigration judge to “individually identify

and discuss every piece of evidence in the record.” Hernandez v. Garland, 52 F.4th

757, 770 (9th Cir. 2022).

As the court points out, some of our decisions in similar cases have required

the government to prove that an applicant “could safely engage in Mann Party

politics outside of Punjab.” Jaswinder Singh v. Garland, 118 F.4th 1150, 1166 (9th

Cir. 2024). Those cases require the immigration judge to “specifically address

Singh’s stated intent to continue proselytizing for his party,” id. (quoting Ajay

Singh v. Garland, 97 F.4th 597, 607–08 (9th Cir. 2024)), and to discuss the

persecution he “may face outside Punjab from local authorities, or other actors,

based on his future political activities,” id. at 1167 (quoting Narinder Singh, 914

F.3d at 661)).

I agree that the immigration judge here—in a decision issued before any of

those cases were decided—did not engage in the specific analysis that they require.

In my view, however, Singh has forfeited that objection because he does not argue

that he fears persecution from the Indian government or the local authorities in any

other state. See United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 375 (2020);

Iraheta-Martinez v. Garland, 12 F.4th 942, 959 (9th Cir. 2021). Instead, he argues

that the Punjab police believe that he is a Sikh “leader” and “continue to maintain

3 an interest in him.” He fears that, if he moved somewhere else in India, the tenant-

registration system would reveal his location to the Punjab police, who “view him

as a criminal,” and they would then pursue him “throughout India.” As I have

explained, substantial evidence supports the immigration judge’s rejection of that

theory because it shows that Singh may avoid persecution by the Punjab police by

relocating. See Narinder Singh, 914 F.3d at 661 (requiring the immigration judge

to consider the “persons or entities that caused the past persecution” in assessing

whether relocation is possible). Considering only the arguments advanced by

Singh, I would deny the petition in full.