Supreme Auto Transport, LLC v. Arcelor Mittal USA, Inc.

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedSeptember 6, 2018
Docket17-2910
StatusPublished

This text of Supreme Auto Transport, LLC v. Arcelor Mittal USA, Inc. (Supreme Auto Transport, LLC v. Arcelor Mittal USA, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Supreme Auto Transport, LLC v. Arcelor Mittal USA, Inc., (7th Cir. 2018).

Opinion

In the

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 17-2910 SUPREME AUTO TRANSPORT, LLC, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.

ARCELOR MITTAL USA, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 08 C 5468—Manish S. Shah, Judge. ____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 16, 2018 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 6, 2018 ____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and KANNE and ROVNER, Circuit Judges. WOOD, Chief Judge. This putative class action rests on alle- gations of a massive antitrust conspiracy within the domestic steel industry. Plaintiffs, indirect purchasers of steel, assert that eight U.S. steel producers colluded to slash output in an effort to drive up the price of steel nationwide. Years after their initial complaint, however, the plaintiffs transformed their theory of liability. The original complaint, filed in 2008, 2 No. 17-2910

charged that plaintiffs overpaid for steel sheets, rods, and tub- ing manufactured by the defendants at their steel mills. Eight years later, the plaintiffs amended their complaint, asserting instead that they overpaid for end-use consumer goods, such as vehicles, washing machines, and refrigerators, that were manufactured by third parties using steel. This new product definition greatly expanded the potential scope of the class. The district court dismissed the suit for two reasons. First, it determined that plaintiffs’ amended complaint is time- barred because it redefines “steel products” in a way that gives rise to an entirely different, and exponentially larger, universe of plaintiffs. Second, in the alternative, the court held that the amended complaint does not plausibly plead a causal connection between the alleged antitrust conspiracy and plaintiffs’ own injuries. Plaintiffs now appeal both rulings. We affirm. I According to the allegations in plaintiffs’ amended com- plaint, which we accept as true for the purposes of this appeal, defendant Arcelor Mittal is the largest integrated producer of steel in the United States, controlling 20–25 percent of total domestic raw steel capacity. Defendant U.S. Steel is the sec- ond largest integrated producer, controlling about 16 percent of total domestic raw steel capacity. Defendant Nuncor is the nation’s largest mini-mill producer, controlling 21 percent of total domestic raw steel capacity. Other major domestic steel producers include defendants Gerdau Ameristeel (10 per- cent), AK Steel (5 percent), Steel Dynamics (4 percent), IPSCO (2.5 percent), and Commercial Metals (2 percent). The remain- ing 15–20 percent of the steel market is controlled by firms No. 17-2910 3

that are not named defendants and are not alleged to have en- gaged in any anticompetitive behavior. It can be difficult to organize and maintain a price-fixing cartel in a market with many competitors—including firms that are not party to the conspiracy—but that is what plain- tiffs allege happened here. They theorize that sometime in early 2005, Arcelor Mittal organized a scheme to “improve in- dustry discipline” by cutting raw steel output in order to drive up prices and reap supracompetitive profits. They point to a statement by a Mittal executive at an industry meeting in March 2005 criticizing the industry’s traditional business model on the grounds that it “ensured that most producers would cut price before reducing volume.” The executive then called on his competitors to coordinate supply cuts: he asked them directly to “respond to market fluctuations” by cutting production at “marginal facilities” to avoid a “race to the bot- tom” in steel prices. A series of industry meetings followed in early-to-mid 2005; at those meetings, multiple defendants al- legedly cautioned the industry against oversupplying the market and urged everyone to “adjust … operating levels” to preserve high prices. According to plaintiffs, the result of all this “urging” and “cautioning” was a series of major production cuts in mid- 2005. Arcelor Mittal closed five of its twelve U.S. integrated blast furnaces and reduced production at U.S. mills to 55 per- cent of total capacity. U.S. Steel reduced output from 90 per- cent capacity in the first quarter of 2005 to 75 percent capacity in the second quarter, and closed at least two of its twelve do- mestic blast furnaces. Nuncor similarly reduced its output from 96 percent of capacity in 2004 to 79 percent capacity in 4 No. 17-2910

the second quarter of 2005. The smaller defendants took com- parable measures. After these cuts took effect, the price of a steel sheet increased by about 25 percent. The supply cuts al- legedly remained in effect until mid-to-late 2007. Plaintiffs insist that there is no procompetitive explanation for this huge reduction in output. They allege that from early 2005 to late 2007, “annual domestic demand for steel far ex- ceeded the United States production capacity of Defendants and other domestic producers,” and that as a result, “there was a shortage of steel in the United States market” through- out the relevant period. (We can assume that there was such a shortage. We observe, however, that neither the original nor amended complaint discusses input or energy costs, or what effect these costs might have had on steel prices. This is a trou- bling omission, especially given the fact that a separate sec- tion of plaintiffs’ complaint admits that the cost of energy, in- puts, and many other commodities—including “aluminum, copper, precious metals, resins, … plastic, … zinc and nickel”—increased substantially during the class period. The rising cost of inputs would provide an obvious innocent ex- planation for the increase in steel prices. Cf. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). We will not address this pos- sibility because the defendants did not raise it on appeal. Nor will we address the impact of steel imports on the market— an issue that also has not been discussed by the parties and that would take us down a deep rabbit-hole.) In the end, the 2005 production cuts and subsequent in- creases in steel price led to two major antitrust class actions. The first suit, which we call the “direct-purchaser” suit, was filed in early September 2008, with Standard Iron Works as the lead plaintiff. Standard Iron filed that suit on behalf of a No. 17-2910 5

putative class. See Complaint at 1, 6, Standard Iron Works v. Arcelor Mittal, No. 08-cv-5214 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2008), ECF No. 1. The complaint defined class members as those who purchased “steel products” directly from the defendants. In turn, it defined “steel products” as: [A]ll products derived from raw steel … including, but not limited to, steel sheet and coil products; galvanized sheet and other galvanized and/or coated steel prod- ucts; tin mill products; steel slabs and plates; steel beams, blooms, rails, and other structural shapes; steel billets, bars, and rods; steel pipe and other tubular products; and all other products derived from raw steel. Id. at 6. The second suit, which we call the “indirect-purchaser” suit, is the one that gave rise to this appeal. It was brought by Supreme Auto in late September 2008, just weeks after the di- rect-purchaser action. The original complaint did not include a formal class definition. It simply alleged that Supreme Auto was injured when it “purchased several items of steel tubing [at an inflated price] indirectly from one or more of the de- fendants … for end use” and indicated that Supreme Auto was bringing suit on behalf of “all others similarly situated.” Supreme Auto’s original complaint included a definition of the types of steel products at issue.

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