Sunoco Pipeline LP v. Daniel La Hart

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 25-2551

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SUNOCO PIPELINE LP,

Appellant

v.

DANIEL LA HART, individually and on behalf of a class of others similarly situated; KATHERINE LA HART, individually and on behalf of a class of others similarly situated; ROBERTA GELTCH, individually and on behalf of a class of others similarly situated; JAMES GELTCH, individually and on behalf of a class of others similarly situated; ANDREW MELA, individually and on behalf of a class of others similarly situated; HEATHER MELA, individually and on behalf of a class of others similarly situated; W. SCOTT MILLER, individually and on behalf of a class of others similarly situated;

MARYIDA MILLER, individually and on behalf of a class of others similarly situated; JOHN VANNI, individually and on behalf of a class of others similarly situated; ANGELA VANNI, individually and on behalf of a class of others similarly situated; KEVIN WOJNOVICH, individually and on behalf of a class of others similarly situated; KRISTINE WOJNOVICH, individually and on behalf of a class of others similarly situated; BASIL TSOLAKIS, individually and on behalf of a class of others similarly situated; FOTEINI TSOLAKIS, individually and on behalf of a class of others similarly situated; GERALD TSOLAKIS, individually and on behalf of a class of others similarly situated; MANTHA NIKOLOUDAKI, individually and on behalf of a class of others similarly situated

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On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (District Court No. 2:25-cv-03694) District Judge: Honorable Mia R. Perez

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Argued: April 30, 2026

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Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, ROTH, Circuit Judge, and DOW, * District Judge

(Filed: August 18, 2026)

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Cassidy Duckett Britt Morgan Lewis & Bockius 1201 N Market Street Suite 2201 Wilmington, DE 19801

Robert D. Fox Manko Gold Katcher & Fox Three Bala Plaza East Suite 700 Bala Cynwyd, PA 19004

Randall M. Levine Morgan Lewis & Bockius 1111 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Suite 800 North Washington, DC 20004

Duke K. McCall, III Morgan Lewis & Bockius 1111 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Suite 800 North Washington, DC 20004

Laura H. McNally [ARGUED] Morgan Lewis & Bockius 2222 Market Street 12th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103

*

Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr., District Judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

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Diana A. Silva Manko Gold Katcher & Fox Three Bala Plaza East Suite 700 Bala Cynwyd, PA 19004

Counsel for Appellant

Shanon J. Carson Berger Montague 1818 Market Street Suite 3600 Philadelphia, PA 19103

Jordan C. Hughes [ARGUED] Berger Montague 1229 Tyler Street NE Suite 205 Minneapolis, MN 55413

Joseph E. Samuel, Jr. Berger Montague 1818 Market Street Suite 3600 Philadelphia, PA 19103

Yechiel M. Twersky Berger Montague 1818 Market Street Suite 3600 Philadelphia, PA 19103

Counsel for Appellees

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OPINION †

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† This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to 3d Cir. I.O.P. 5.7, does not constitute binding precedent.

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CHAGARES, Chief Judge.

After a leak opened in a nearby fuel pipeline operated by Sunoco Pipeline LP

(“Sunoco”), several residents filed a lawsuit against the company in state court. The

residents sought injunctions compelling Sunoco to take specific remedial measures.

Sunoco moved for emergency relief in federal court, contending that these actions

violated the Pipeline Safety Act’s (“PSA”) prohibition of state regulation over interstate

pipelines. Sunoco appeals the District Court’s denial of that motion. But Sunoco did not

comply with the Act’s pre-suit notice and delay requirement before commencing this

lawsuit. For the following reasons, we will thus vacate the District Court’s order and

remand with instructions to dismiss.

I. 1

On January 31, 2025, Sunoco identified a leak in its Twin Oaks Pipeline in Upper

Makefield Township, located in Bucks County, Pennsylvania. The leak contaminated the

groundwater, soil, and air of the surrounding communities.

In response, Daniel La Hart, his wife, and other local residents filed a putative

class action in Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas against Sunoco and several

related entities. Sunoco and its affiliates timely removed the action to federal court under

the Class Action Fairness Act. The residents then moved to remand, and the District

Court granted the motion. 2

1 We write primarily for the parties, so we recite only the facts essential to our decision. 2 Sunoco and its affiliates have appealed this ruling. See Dkt. Nos. 25-2152, 25-8027. That appeal is not at issue in this case.

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The La Harts filed a renewed motion for a preliminary injunction in state court,

seeking identical relief to what they had requested in federal court. Several other local

residents also filed their own lawsuits in state court seeking equitable and injunctive

relief that closely resembled the relief sought by the La Harts.

Counsel for Sunoco sent a letter to the relevant U.S. Department of Transportation

official on July 18, 2025, “provid[ing] notice pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60121, on behalf of

[Sunoco], of certain activities that violate the Pipeline Safety Act.” Joint Appendix

(“J.A.”) 119. Sunoco filed this lawsuit that same day, alleging that the residents’ state

court actions for injunctive relief amounted to an impermissible attempt at state

regulation over interstate pipelines. Sunoco quickly moved for a temporary restraining

order and preliminary injunction. The District Court denied the motion, and Sunoco

timely appealed.

II. 3

This lawsuit must be dismissed because Sunoco failed to comply with the PSA’s

60-day notice and delay requirement. The PSA’s notice and delay provision provides:

(1) A person may bring a civil action in an appropriate district court of the United States for an injunction against another person . . . for a violation of this chapter or a regulation prescribed or order issued under this chapter. However, the person—

(A) may bring the action only after 60 days after the person has given notice of the violation to the Secretary

3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). We review the denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. Smith v. City of Atlantic City, 138 F.4th 759, 770 (3d Cir. 2025).

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of Transportation or to the appropriate State authority . . . and to the person alleged to have committed the violation.

49 U.S.C. § 60121(a)(1)(A).

In Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989), the Supreme Court

addressed the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act’s (“RCRA”) similar 60-day

notice and delay requirement. The Court held that RCRA’s notice and 60-day delay

requirements are “mandatory conditions precedent to commencing suit” that district

courts “may not disregard . . . at [their] discretion.” Id. at 31.

Sunoco does not dispute that it failed to provide the required notice. Sunoco

instead suggests that Hallstrom permits a “flexible construction” of notice requirements.

Sunoco Reply Br. 27. Yet the Hallstrom Court rejected calls for a “flexible or pragmatic

construction” of RCRA’s notice requirement, 4 reasoning that such a construction “flatly

contradicts the language of the statute.” 493 U.S. at 26. Sunoco also contends that no

court “has ever held that the PSA’s pre-suit notice requirement operates as an inflexible

condition precedent to suit.” Sunoco Reply Br. 27. We are not convinced, however.

See, e.g., Laclede Gas. Co. v. St. Charles County, 713 F.3d 413, 417 (8th Cir. 2013)

(“[A] PSA action cannot be filed until 60 days after proper notice is given to the

Secretary of Transportation, or to the appropriate state agency, and to the person alleged

to have committed the violation.” (citing Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 23 & n.1)); SFPP, L.P. v.

4 As the Hallstrom Court observed, RCRA’s notice requirement and the notice requirement in many other statutes — including the PSA’s precursor statute — were all modeled upon the notice requirement in the Clean Air Act’s citizen suit provision. See Hallstrom, 493 U.S. 23 & n.1 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7604).

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Union Pac. R.R. Co., 274 F. App’x 549, 551 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In addition, SFPP’s claims

under the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act fail because SFPP did not provide the

requisite notice 60 days before filing its original complaint.” (citing Hallstrom, 493 U.S.

at 25–33)). And though Sunoco urges that we grant an equitable exception to the

statutory requirement, “we are not at liberty to create an exception where Congress has

declined to do so.” Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 27.

In sum, the language of the PSA’s citizen suit provision is clear, and Sunoco could

not commence this lawsuit until 60 days after it had given the requisite notice. Because

Sunoco did not comply with this requirement, this lawsuit must be dismissed. See

Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 31 (“As a general rule, if an action is barred by the terms of a

statute, it must be dismissed.”).

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the order of the District Court and

remand with instructions to dismiss this case without prejudice.