Sunnyvale Maritime Co., Inc. v. Gomez

546 So. 2d 6, 1989 WL 6193
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedJanuary 31, 1989
Docket87-866
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 546 So. 2d 6 (Sunnyvale Maritime Co., Inc. v. Gomez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sunnyvale Maritime Co., Inc. v. Gomez, 546 So. 2d 6, 1989 WL 6193 (Fla. Ct. App. 1989).

Opinion

546 So.2d 6 (1989)

SUNNYVALE MARITIME CO., INC., Appellant,
v.
Elsa Delfina Montoya GOMEZ, As Widow and Personal Representative of Jose Luis Gomez-Duarte, Deceased, Appellee.

No. 87-866.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

January 31, 1989.
Rehearing Denied August 4, 1989.

*7 Schreiber, Rodon Alvarez and Gerhart Schreiber, Coral Gables, for appellant.

Brett Rivkind, William Huggett, Miami, for appellee.

Before BARKDULL, DANIEL S. PEARSON and FERGUSON, JJ.

DANIEL S. PEARSON, Judge.

This is an appeal from a final judgment for the plaintiff in a negligence action brought under the Jones Act. Although the defendant challenges the propriety of the judgment on several grounds, in our view only one merits discussion. We affirm.

The defendant contends that the records of the Prince Lara Hospital, Puerto Cabello, Venezuela (at which the plaintiff's decedent was first cared for and later, after his release and return, died) were not properly authenticated and were therefore erroneously admitted. This lack of proper authentication, says the defendant, arose from the plaintiff's non-compliance with the procedure for self-authentication of foreign documents set out in Section 90.902, Florida Statutes (1987), that is, the failure to show that final certification of the hospital records was made by one of the members of the diplomatic service enumerated in the statute.[1]

In our view, the flaw in the defendant's argument lies in treating self-authentication as the exclusive method of authentication. Self-authentication is, instead, merely a streamlined alternative to the more tedious authentication procedure; while documents must be authenticated to be admitted, they need not be self-authenticated.

Section 90.901, Florida Statutes (1987), provides that the authentication requirement is satisfied by evidence "sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." Since traditional methods of authentication (e.g., testimony or other extrinsic evidence) "may prove troublesome, time consuming, and expensive," McCormick on Evidence § 228, at 699 (3d ed. 1984), Section 90.902 permits evidence to be "self-authenticated" when "the document itself discloses sufficient information to be admitted without further proof of its genuineness." C. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 902.1, at 585 *8 (2d ed. 1984). Accordingly, self-authentication is said to be an "exception" to the general requirement of authentication. 11 J. Moore & H. Bendix, Moore's Federal Practice § 902.02 (2d ed. 1988); C. Ehrhardt, supra § 902.1, at 585. See McCormick on Evidence § 228, at 699-700 (self-authentication is an "escape from authentication requirements").

Federal decisions interpreting Federal Rules of Evidence 901 and 902 (upon which the Florida rules are based) quite clearly hold that self-authentication is only one of several ways to authenticate documents. "The FRE offers generous opportunity to authenticate by presentation of sufficient evidence to support the authenticity of a document. Alternatively, if 902(3) is met the document is self-authenticating." United States v. Perlmuter, 693 F.2d 1290, 1293 (9th Cir.1982) (emphasis added). "Documentary evidence introduced in federal courts must be authenticated under the provisions of Rules 901 or 902 of the Federal Rules of Evidence." Amoco Production Co. v. United States, 619 F.2d 1383, 1391 (10th Cir.1980) (emphasis added). See also First National Bank v. M/V Lightning Power, 851 F.2d 1543, 1548 (5th Cir.1988) (document was "neither self-authenticating nor authenticated by the testimony"); United States v. Rue, 819 F.2d 1488, 1494 (8th Cir.1987) (although document is not self-authenticating, it is admissible under other procedures for authentication); In re Bobby Boggs, Inc., 819 F.2d 574, 580 (5th Cir.1987); Ogden Environmental Services v. City of San Diego, 687 F. Supp. 1436, 1437 n. 1 (S.D.Cal. 1988).

In the present case, the trial court ruled that the medical records were adequately authenticated by (a) the affidavit of the director (custodian) of the medical records of the hospital who testified that the 54 pages of hospital medical records were exact duplicates of the originals of the records which could not be released from the hospital; (b) the testimony of the medical director of the hospital who certified that the records were true and correct copies of the originals; and (c) the testimony of the marine investigator who had travelled to the hospital and obtained true and accurate copies of the original records that were at the hospital. This ruling should stand as there is competent evidence in the record to support it. Bury v. Marietta Dodge, 692 F.2d 1335, 1338 (11th Cir.1982). See United States v. Perlmuter, 693 F.2d 1290, 1292 (9th Cir.1982).

Lastly, we note that the trial judge's admission of the medical records did not conclusively establish their authenticity. The Law Revision Council Note to Section 90.901 points out that the "admission into evidence of a matter merely indicates initial sufficiency for presentation to the trier of fact. Once the matter is in evidence the opposing party is free to challenge its genuineness. The court or the jury may find it to be not genuine." See also M. Graham, Handbook of Florida Evidence § 901.0, at 761 (1987) ("The ultimate decision as to whether a person, document, or item of real or demonstrative evidence is as purported is for the trier of fact."). Thus, the trial court's ruling that authenticity had been shown was necessarily reinforced by the jury's factual finding — implicit in its verdict for the plaintiff — that the documents were authentic. In our view, neither the jury's finding nor the trial court's ruling should be disturbed.

Affirmed.

FERGUSON, J., concurs.

BARKDULL, Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion authored by Judge Pearson.

In May of 1982, Jose Luis Gomez-Duarte, deceased, was a crew member aboard the cargo vessel "Anadria" when it called at the Port of Puerto Cabello, Venezuela. On Saturday, May 15, 1982, the deceased went on shore leave where he became drunk and engaged in acts with homosexuals that may have been unlawful. This conduct resulted in a foreign object being inserted into his rectum which remained therein when he returned to the ship. The deceased returned to the ship and on Sunday, May 16, 1982, he was not feeling well so he went to the Dr. Adolfo Prince Lara Hospital in Puerto Cabello *9 where he was operated upon. The record does not reveal whether the deceased went to the hospital on his own or whether he was sent there by the ship's captain or another ship's officer.[1] The captain was informed the deceased had a hemorrhage due to an ulcer in the digestive system.

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546 So. 2d 6, 1989 WL 6193, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sunnyvale-maritime-co-inc-v-gomez-fladistctapp-1989.