Sunnyside Up Corp. v. City of Lancaster Zoning Hearing Board

739 A.2d 644, 1999 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 828
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedOctober 20, 1999
StatusPublished
Cited by25 cases

This text of 739 A.2d 644 (Sunnyside Up Corp. v. City of Lancaster Zoning Hearing Board) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sunnyside Up Corp. v. City of Lancaster Zoning Hearing Board, 739 A.2d 644, 1999 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 828 (Pa. Ct. App. 1999).

Opinion

PELLEGRINI, Judge.

Sunnyside Up Corporation and Kathryn Longer (Objectors) appeal from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County (trial court) affirming the Zoning Hearing Board of the City of Lancaster’s (Board) decision granting a special exception to the County of Lancaster (County) to construct a “juvenile” detention facility.

The County is the owner of approximately 60 acres of land in the City of Lancaster on the northern tip of what is known as the Sunnyside Peninsula (Peninsula) because it is bordered on three sides by the Conestoga River. The Peninsula is largely undeveloped containing farmland, an abandoned quarry and a small residential community located on its southern end. Under the City of Lancaster Zoning Ordinance (Ordinance), the property is located in a “Mixed Use” 1 zoning district. On January 8, 1998, the County filed an application with the Board for a special exception 2 to construct on 13.63 acres of its 60 acres of property a facility to house up to 144 juvenile delinquents awaiting final disposition in court. Such a facility would be permitted as a special exception 3 in a “Mixed Use” zoning district if it fell within the definition of a “government facility” but would not be permitted if the facility was characterized as a “criminal detention facility.” A “criminal detention facility” is defined as one that is “used for the detainment of individuals who had been arrested and are awaiting court action and/or for the incarceration of individuals assigned prison terms by the courts” 4 and is limited to the area zoned “Detention Facility.” 5

At the hearing on whether the special exception should be granted, County Engineer David McCudden (McCudden), among others, 6 testified as to the descrip *647 tion of the proposed facility and its compatibility with surrounding uses. He stated that the facility would consist of a 100,000 square-foot one-story brick building containing 144 secured beds, 25 shelter beds, meeting rooms, educational areas, indoor recreation facilities, a gymnasium, a chapel, a parking area and a walled courtyard. He also testified that the facility would be compatible with the adjacent properties because it would resemble a school, it would not be surrounded by fences or gates, would have a buffer of vegetation to hide it from view, and would maintain the large side yard areas required in the flood plain area which would preserve the wooded area near the river. McCudden also stated that since it would be located at the northern point of the Peninsula, the facility would not be near the residential area located at its southern end. As to the proposed governmental use of the facility, McCudden opined that it was not a “criminal detention facility” as defined under the Ordinance because under Pennsylvania law, juveniles can neither be charged with crimes nor be considered criminals, but rather are charged with “delinquent acts” and are considered “delinquent.”

Edward Stoudt (Stoudt), the Director of Juvenile Probation for the County of Lancaster, also testified that unlike a criminal detention facility, the proposed facility would be licensed by the Department of Public Welfare to detain juveniles who were alleged or adjudicated delinquent children under the Pennsylvania Juvenile Act pending their hearing in juvenile court and for juveniles who were awaiting placement after disposition in the courts. Also, unlike a criminal detention facility, the facility would be used to provide .additional governmental services such as educational programs, therapy and shelter for juveniles who had not committed delinquent acts but required safety from abusive homes.

Objectors opposed, contending that the proposed facility was not permitted because it was a “criminal detention facility” and not a “governmental facility” as it would be used to detain individuals who had committed violent crimes and who were arrested and awaiting court action. Because the use fell within the definition of a “criminal detention facility,” Objectors contend that the facility was limited to only “Detention Facility” districts and, as such, was not a permitted use in the “Mixed Use” district. Even if the proposed facility was a “governmental facility,” Objectors contend that the special exception should not be granted allowing its use because its presence would have an adverse impact on surrounding properties. In support of that position, Objectors presented the testimony of a civil engineer, a landscape architect and two real estate brokers who cumulatively testified that the detention center would adversely impact the health, safety and welfare of the community because property values might decline upon the construction of a facility to house violent juveniles on the Peninsula due to apprehension of escapes from the facility and an increase in crime in the neighborhood. They also stated that the neighborhood would be adversely impacted by the facility because its presence would be incompatible with the residential and ecological nature of the community, the facility would increase traffic to the community, and its lighting would cause a “glow” at night.

Rejecting Objectors’ interpretation of the Zoning Code that the proposed facility would be a “criminal detention facility” because juvenile delinquents could not be considered “criminals” under Pennsylvania law, the Board found that the juvenile detention center was a permitted use in the “Mixed Use” zoning district because it was a “government facility.” Because the County had met its burden to establish *648 that the use was permitted under the Ordinance, the Board granted the County’s request for a special exception finding that Objectors failed to provide probative evidence of the harm to the community because their evidence was speculative and did not establish effects greater than that which would be incident to any of the other permitted uses in the district. Objectors appealed to the trial court which affirmed the Board based on similar findings. This appeal by Objectors followed.

I.

As a preliminary matter, the County seeks to quash the appeal of Sunnyside Up Corporation for lack of standing because its option to purchase the quarry abutting the proposed site of the facility expired since the trial court issued its decision. It argues that because the option expired on February 19,1999, Sunnyside Up Corporation is no longer an “aggrieved party” to the action.

Generally, persons having no real interest in a dispute are not considered to have standing to become parties to a proceeding, and zoning cases are no exception to this general rule. Society Created to Reduce Urban Blight (SCRUB) v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of the City of Philadelphia, 729 A.2d 117 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999). To have standing, a party must be “aggrieved,” i.e., the party must have an adverse, substantial and immediate interest in the subject matter of the litigation. Id.

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Bluebook (online)
739 A.2d 644, 1999 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 828, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sunnyside-up-corp-v-city-of-lancaster-zoning-hearing-board-pacommwct-1999.