Sundberg v. Shelton School District No 309

District Court, W.D. Washington·Decided March 7, 2025·No. 3:23-cv-05717·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5

6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 10 JAYDEN SUNDBERG, CASE NO. 3:23-cv-05717-DGE 11 Plaintiff, ORDER ON MOTION TO ACCESS 12 v. EDUCATION RECORDS (DKT. NO. 58) 13 SHELTON SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 309, 14 Defendant. 15

16 I INTRODUCTION 17 This matter comes before the Court on the Parties’ joint motion to access education 18 records. (Dkt. No. 58.) The motion requests that the Court authorize Shelton School District, 19 the Defendant, to disclose certain student education records to Plaintiff Jayden Sundberg, subject 20 to the protective order that has already been entered by the Court. (Id. at 1.) (See Dkt. No. 61, 21 Stipulated Protective Order.) Specifically, the Parties request that the Court authorize Defendant 22 to disclose information and education records responsive to Plaintiff’s discovery requests in this 23 24 1 matter on all non-parties who were served with notice of the joint motion to access education 2 records. (Dkt. No. 58-1 at 1). For the foregoing reasons, the motion is GRANTED IN PART. 3 II BACKGROUND 4 Plaintiff brings suit against his former school district for negligence and violations of 5 Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”) and the Americans with Disabilities Act

6 (“ADA”). (Dkt. No. 52 at 10–17.) Plaintiff is diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder, 7 Intermittent Explosive Disorder, and Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder and studied 8 according to an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) while enrolled at Shelton High 9 School. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff openly identified as queer and gender fluid while at Shelton High 10 School. (Id.) 11 In relevant part, the Complaint alleges that Defendant violated the WLAD and the ADA 12 by “treating Sundberg—and his complaints of harassment—differently based on his disabilities 13 and sexual orientation.” (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff claims that the District “did not enforce its rules and 14 policies against harassment, intimidation, and bullying when other [students],” including a

15 student who assaulted Sundberg with a knife, bullied Sundberg “based on his sexual orientation 16 and physical attributes.” (Id. at 10.) Defendant denies Plaintiff’s allegations and asserts that 17 “Mr. Sundberg cannot establish that he was treated in a manner different than the treatment 18 provided to students outside his protected classes.” (Dkt. No. 58 at 4) (quoting Dkt. No. 32 at 19 10). 20 On November 18, 2024, the Parties jointly moved for “an Order authorizing the District 21 to disclose certain student education records to Sundberg in discovery, subject to a protective 22 order.” (Dkt. No. 58 at 1.) The Parties state that “a central issue in this case is whether the 23 District handled Sundberg’s reports of harassment and bullying differently than reports by other 24 1 students who did not share his protected characteristics.” (Dkt. No. 58 at 8.) Indeed, it is 2 common for plaintiffs to rely on so-called “comparator evidence” when bringing 3 antidiscrimination lawsuits, both under the WLAD and federal antidiscrimination law. Under the 4 WLAD, “[p]roof of different treatment by way of comparator evidence is relevant and 5 admissible[.]” Johnson v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 244 P.3d 438, 446 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).

6 Likewise, a plaintiff may “point to comparators as circumstantial evidence of unlawful 7 discriminatory intent,” when bringing federal discrimination claims. Ballou v. McElvain, 29 8 F.4th 413, 424–25 (9th Cir. 2022). Here, the Parties confirm that “[t]he comparator evidence 9 sought through Sundberg’s discovery requests is not just a mechanism that may be used to prove 10 discriminatory disparate treatment; it is also relied upon by the District in support of its defense.” 11 (Dkt. No. 58 at 8.) 12 Defendant subsequently served notice of the motion, the proposed order, and the 13 protective order entered by the Court (Dkt. No. 61) on the parents of the students identified in 14 Plaintiff’s initial disclosures and the parents of students whose names appeared in records

15 requested by Plaintiff in written discovery. (Dkt. No. 63 at 1–2.) The notice informed parents 16 that if they wished to object to the production of the educational records and information, they 17 could send written objection to Defendant by January 17, 2025. (Id. at 36.) Twelve parents 18 and/or guardians objected to the production of the educational records and information. (See id. 19 at 3, 38–51; Dkt. No. 67 at 1.) The Court then requested supplemental briefing, which asked the 20 Parties to explain why the twelve educational records at issue met the relevant legal standard for 21 disclosure. (Dkt. No. 69 at 4–5.) Plaintiff and Defendant submitted supplemental briefing and 22 the matter is now ripe for disposition. (See Dkt. Nos. 71, 71.) 23 24 1 III DISCUSSION 2 A. Legal Standard 3 The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(2)(B), 4 provides that: 5 No funds shall be made available . . . to any educational agency or institution which has a policy or practice of releasing, or providing access to, any personally identifiable 6 information in education records . . . unless . . . such information is furnished in compliance with judicial order, or pursuant to any lawfully issued subpoena, upon 7 condition that parents and the students are notified of all such orders or subpoenas in advance of the compliance therewith by the educational institution or agency. 8 Thus, “FERPA does not prohibit the disclosure of educational records: FERPA instead penalizes 9 the inappropriate disclosure of such information.” Jones v. Espanola Mun. Sch. Dist., No. CV 10 13-741 RB-WPL, 2016 WL 10257481, *2 (D.N.M. May 13, 2016). Nevertheless, federal courts 11 have consistently required parties seeking disclosure of education records to meet a 12 “significantly heavier burden” than exists with respect to discovery of other kinds of information 13 because of the strong privacy interests of the students involved. See Jun Yu v. Idaho State Univ., 14 No. 4:15-CV-00430-REB, 2017 WL 1158813, *2 (D. Idaho Mar. 27, 2017) (collecting cases); 15 Jones, 2016 WL 10257481, at *2–*3 (collecting cases).1 16 Specifically, courts have coalesced around the requirement that the party seeking the 17 disclosure must “demonstrate a genuine need for the information that outweighs the privacy 18 interest of the students.” Jones, 2016 WL 10257481, *3 (citing Rios v. Read, 73 F.R.D. 589, 598 19 20

1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) establishes: “Parties may obtain discovery regarding 21 any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in 22 controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the 23 proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” 24 1 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)); see also Doe v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., No. C 20-08842 WHA, 2021 WL 2 1866197, *1 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2021). “Courts usually find that a party has met the burden 3 when it would be ‘impossible to prove’ the claim without such records.” Jones, 2016 WL 4 10257481, at *3 (quoting Rios, 73 F.R.D. at 599). For example, in Davids v.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Sundberg v. Shelton School District No 309, (W.D. Wash. 2025).

Sundberg v. Shelton School District No 309 (Sundberg v. Shelton School District No 309) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Johnson v. Chevron USA, Inc.
244 P.3d 438 (Court of Appeals of Washington, 2010)
United States v. Torres
8 F.4th 413 (Fifth Circuit, 2021)
Rios v. Read
73 F.R.D. 589 (E.D. New York, 1977)