Sun v. Notice

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: May 22, 2026
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-1402
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

YI SUN,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 25-1402 (TJK)

JAMES U. NOTICE et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

Yi Sun, proceeding pro se, sued several parties over a landlord-tenant dispute relating to

her New York City apartment. ECF No. 1. Only some of the sued Defendants made an appear-

ance, and the Court dismissed those that appeared for lack of personal jurisdiction. ECF No. 61.

The Court then expressed doubts that the remaining Defendants were properly served and ordered

Sun—to the extent she sought to maintain this action—to show cause why they should not be

dismissed for insufficient service of process. See Minute Order of May 1, 2026.

Sun has since filed two items on the docket. First, she has provided additional points and

authorities in opposition to the Court’s dismissal of two Defendants, La Casa Nuestra Housing

Development Corporation and James U. Notice. ECF No. 64. Second, she has moved for a pre-

liminary injunction and temporary restraining order. ECF No. 65. In addition to requesting relief,

the latter filing also includes representations about Sun’s service on the remaining Defendants.

Accordingly, the Court construes it as a response to the Court’s show-cause order. For the reasons

given below, the Court will decline to revise its prior Memorandum Order dismissing the Defend-

ants that appeared, deny Sun’s motion for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining or-

der, and dismiss this case for failure to timely serve. I. The Court Will Not Revise Its Prior Memorandum Order

Previously, Defendants La Casa Nuestra Housing Development Corporation and James U.

Notice moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. ECF No. 56. The Court granted their

motion, explaining that “none of the alleged actions” taken by either Defendant “take place outside

of New York,” and thus “Sun alleges no connection between La Casa Nuestra or Notice and the

District of Columbia.” ECF No. 61 at 3. However, Sun contended that she was not given her full

time to file an opposition to the Defendants’ motion to dismiss before the Court issued its Memo-

randum Order, see ECF No. 62 at 2, so the Court granted her additional time to file further points

and authorities, offering to “modify its Memorandum Order if necessary.” Minute Order of May

4, 2026. Sun has done so. See ECF No. 64.

Nothing in Sun’s filing persuades the Court to modify its prior order. Her additional argu-

ments fail to address the basis on which the Court granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss: lack

of personal jurisdiction. Instead, in her “rebuttal to Defendants’ Attorneys’ main point,” Sun ar-

gues that the Court “has jurisdiction of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 1343(4),” as

well as the “‘Fair Housing Amendments Act’ and ‘42 U.S. Code § 3631 . . . and ‘Privacy Act’ and

‘Amendment IV.’” ECF No. 64 at 5–6. But all these cited authorities go to the Court’s subject

matter jurisdiction, not its personal jurisdiction. Whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction

in a suit depends on whether “[t]he character of the controvers[y]” falls within “those subjects

encompassed within a statutory grant of jurisdiction.” Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie

des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701 (1982). The Court agrees that it possesses subject

matter jurisdiction over Sun’s complaint due to this being a “civil action[] arising under the Con-

stitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. That Sun has sued under

various federal laws, however, does not mean that the Court has personal jurisdiction over La Casa

2 Nuestra and Notice. The fact remains that all the allegations Sun makes against them concern their

activity in New York. In the end, nothing about Sun’s submission changes the Court’s conclusion

that it lacks personal jurisdiction over them.

II. The Court Will Deny Sun’s Request for Preliminary Injunctive Relief

Separately, Sun has filed a motion styled as an “Order to Show Cause for ‘Preliminary

Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order’ and Request a Retrial.” ECF No. 65 at 2. The title

does not match the body of the motion, with the body requesting “a rehearing by an [sic] neutral

Judge,” which appears to be yet another recusal request. Id. Regardless of which relief Sun re-

quests, her motion fails.

To the extent Sun is requesting a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order,

she has not showed that she meets any of their requirements, which are the same. See Est. of Coll-

Monge v. Inner Peace Movement, 524 F.3d 1341, 1349–50 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (four-part test for such

relief). Indeed, the body of her motion does not attempt at all to show a “likelihood of success on

the merits” of her underlying suit or the “irreparable harm” she will suffer without the requested

relief. Id. (quotation omitted). Thus, the Court will deny the motion to issue a preliminary injunc-

tion or temporary restraining order.

To the extent Sun is requesting a “rehearing” before another judge, she seeks this Court’s

recusal—for the fifth time. See Minute Order of July 10, 2025 (denying a motion for a temporary

restraining order on the grounds the Court is “prejudiced”); Minute Order of July 31, 2025 (same);

Minute Order of April 15, 2026 (same); Minute Order of May 4, 2026 (same). In support of her

fifth attempt, she argues that the Court has treated her “unfairly.” ECF No. 65 at 3. Like her prior

motions, many of her objections are just disagreements with the Court’s prior rulings. See id.

(“The Chamber failed to properly evaluate the facts and evidence . . .”). As stated before, such

3 disagreements are not “legitimate reason[s] for recusal or reassignment outside of the Court's ‘ju-

dicial rulings.’” Minute Order of May 4, 2026 (quoting SEC v. Loving Spirit Found. Inc., 392

F.3d 486, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). The remaining arguments assert without factual support that the

Court is “influenced by personal prejudices or conflicts of interest” in favor of Defendants. ECF

No. 65 at 3. Again, as stated before, this bald assertion does not “provide[] ‘facts that would fairly

convince a sane and reasonable mind to question this Court’s impartiality.’” Minute Order of May

4, 2026 (quoting Walsh v. Comey, 110 F. Supp. 3d 73, 77 (D.D.C. 2015)). Thus, Sun’s motion

fails no matter how it is construed.

III. The Court Will Dismiss the Remaining Defendants and the Case

Finally, after the Court dismissed those Defendants that had appeared in the suit, it noted

that “the remaining Defendants that have not appeared may not have been served, or served

properly, for various reasons.” Minute Order of May 1, 2026. The Federal Rules of Civil Proce-

dure mandate that “[i]f a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the

court—on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action without prej-

udice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 4(m) (emphasis added). And by “the plain text of Rule 4, the plaintiff has the burden to ‘demon-

strate that the procedure employed to deliver the papers satisfies the requirements of the relevant

portions of Rule 4.’” Mann v. Castiel, 681 F.3d 368, 372 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (internal citation omit-

ted).

At that point, it had been almost a year—361 days—since the complaint was filed. And

during that time, Sun had made several missteps in properly serving all Defendants and had re-

ceived, on several occasions, guidance from the Court and additional time to serve. See Minute

Order of May 15, 2025 (denying an attempt to serve by email or other alternate means); Minute

4 Order of June 18, 2025 (walking through the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

4(c)(2)); Minute Order of July 10, 2025 (providing a reminder of the 90-day service deadline);

Minute Order of July 31, 2025 (granting a 20-day extension of time to effect service). Against

that backdrop, the Court gave notice to Sun of its inclination to dismiss the remaining Defendants

and ordered her, to the extent she wished to maintain this action—after all, it appears that the Court

lacks personal jurisdiction over these Defendants, like the others—to “show cause by May 15,

2026, why each remaining Defendant should not be dismissed for insufficient service of process.”

Minute Order of May 1, 2026.

That date passed a week ago, and it is not altogether clear that Sun has complied with the

Court’s show-cause order. Certainly, no separate filing appears on the docket attempting to justify

the validity of her service. And Sun has not moved for an extension of the time to serve by trying

to show “good cause” for her failure to do so. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). That said, appended at the

bottom of Sun’s motion seeking preliminary relief and/or recusal, she appears to address the va-

lidity of her service on the remaining six Defendants. ECF No. 65 at 4–6. Under the circum-

stances, the Court understands this to be Sun’s response.

Sun has failed to carry her burden to show that service was proper on the remaining De-

fendants. As the Court noted, it appears that Defendant Karima—apparently a corporate subsidi-

ary of “Verizon Telecommunications Company,” ECF No. 1 ¶ 7—was not served at all. Minute

Order of May 1, 2026. Sun counters that “Sun sent the Summons by Fax . . . to ‘Verizon Security

Assistance Team.’” ECF No. 65 at 5–6. But that is not an acceptable form of service. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 4(h) (describing acceptable forms of service on a “corporation”). Sun also asserts that

she mentioned this form of service before and yet “the Court never brought up this.” ECF No. 65

at 6. But the Court was not mistaken; the operative attempt at service does not mention Karima.

5 See ECF No. 16. Only a prior attempt at service mentioned Karima, see ECF No. 8 at 13–14, but

that attempt was not by fax, and in any case, the Court already explained why that attempt was

faulty, see Minute Order of June 18, 2025.

The Court also noted its concern that Defendant Tito could not be served through a “Mr.

Luis Vargas.” Minute Order of May 1, 2026. Sun counters that Tito is a “hired electrician by ‘La

Casa Nuestra Housing Development Fund Corporation/El Barrio’s Operation Fightback, Inc” and

that “Mr. Luis Vargas” is the “Head Officer” of La Casa Nuestra,” making Vargas able to accept

service of process on Tito’s behalf. ECF No. 65 at 4. But while Vargas can perhaps accept service

on behalf of La Casa Nuestra because he is that corporation’s officer, see Fed. R. Civ. P.

4(h)(1)(B), this does not mean that he can also accept service on behalf of Tito, who is an individ-

ual. Service of process via agent for an individual can only be done if the agent is “authorized by

appointment or by law to receive service of process” on the individual’s behalf. Fed. R. Civ. P.

4(e)(2)(C). Sun has provided no reason to think that Vargas fits the bill for Tito.

Service on the remaining Defendants suffers from similar problems, and Sun’s explana-

tions do not meet her burden to prove service for them, either. Defendant Marty Watson is a

“cleaner” hired by La Casa Nuestra, ECF No. 65 at 4, and, like Tito, was served via Vargas, see

ECF No. 16 at 4. The service on him is faulty for the same reasons it was faulty on Tito. Defend-

ants Evon Asforis is a “judge of the Housing Court for the Civil Court of the City of New York”

and was apparently served via “Martiza Rosa,” the administrative assistant of “James Cooney,”

who is in turn alleged to be Asforis’s attorney. ECF No. 65 at 4–5. Sun provides no reason to

think that Rosa, let alone Cooney, is authorized to accept service on Asforis’s behalf, making this

explanation insufficient. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2)(C). Defendant New York State Division of

Housing and Community Renewal was apparently also served via Martiza Rosa. ECF No. 65 at

6 5. But, as Rosa does not even work for the Division directly, Sun has provided no reason to think

Rosa could be “an officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent authorized by appoint-

ment or by law to receive service of process” for the Division. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(B). Finally,

Sun states that she served the remaining Defendant, the 25th Precinct of the New York Police

Department, through the Precinct’s “Commanding Officer,” who is “Captain Eric Carrasquillo.”

ECF No. 65 at 5. But “the NYPD is a non-suable agency of the City,” making this attempt at

service on one of its precincts improper, as all service would need to be directed at “the city of

New York” instead. Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting

N.Y.C. Charter § 396).

In sum, after providing her repeated guidance and additional time to serve in the past, the

Court provided “notice to the plaintiff” that her service appeared deficient for all remaining six

Defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). She has failed to meet her burden to show service was proper,

nor has she sought more time to serve. Thus, the Court will “dismiss the action” as to all six, as

well as the case. Id.

IV. Conclusion

For all these reasons, the Court will deny Sun’s motion for a preliminary injunctive relief

and dismiss the remaining six Defendants—Evon M. Asforis, Marty Watson, Karima, the 25th

Precinct of the New York Police Department, the New York State Division of Housing and Com-

munity Renewal, and Tito—for insufficient service of process. The Court will also dismiss the

case. A separate order will issue.

/s/ Timothy J. Kelly TIMOTHY J. KELLY United States District Judge

Date: May 22, 2026