Hunter, C.J.
This action was brought by appellant against appellee for a writ of habeas corpus arising out of the alleged wrongful restraint and detention of appellant pursuant to extradition proceedings between this state and the State of Tennessee. Trial was had before the Vigo County Superior Court which ordered that appellant be delivered up to Sheriff Bilyeu, the agent of Tennessee, to be transported to that state.
Appellant sets out various assignments of error in his motion for new trial some of which he fails to argue on this appeal. The law is clear that grounds urged in a motion for new trial, not discussed in the argument section of the brief, are deemed waived. Brown v. State (1969), 252 Ind. 161, 247 N. E. 2d 76; Short v. State (1968), 250 Ind. 459, 237 N. E. 2d 258.
The two principal contentions advanced by argument in appellant’s brief relate to errors occurring at trial. It is further argued that the decision of the trial court is contrary to law in that the extradition papers were allegedly deficient under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (Ind. Ann. Stat. §§9-419-448 [1956 Repl.]).
Looking first to the errors alleged to have occurred at trial, appellant argues that highly prejudicial hearsay evidence was allowed to be entered over his objection. More specifically it is contended that appellant was denied the right to confront and cross-examine an identifying witness whose affidavit was admitted in the record. The affidavit complained of was that of one Jewell Allison who swore that appellant was in Tennessee and had defrauded her of $6,000. Additionally she swore that she had identified a picture of defendant as being the same man who defrauded her and that such picture was attached to her statement.
[678]*678Appellant cites as authority for the exclusion of the affidavit cases and other reference works which merely reaffirm the general rule that an accused has the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him. This rule is so well established and basic to this country’s concepts of ordered liberty and due process that we need not be reminded of its significance to an accused. Inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding pursuant to extradition is limited, however, to identifying the alleged fugitive as being one and the same individual as charged in the indictment or affidavit accompanying the requisition:
“The guilt or innocence of the accused as to the crime of which he is charged may not be inquired into by the governor or in any proceeding after the demand for extradition accompanied by a charge of crime in legal form as above provided shall have been presented to the governor, except that as it may be involved in identifying the person held as the person charged with the crime.” (emphasis added) Ind. Ann. Stat. §9-438 (1956 Repl.).
See also, Johnson v. Burke, Deputy Sheriff, etc. (1958), 238 Ind. 1, 148 N. E. 2d 413; Taylor v. Smith (1938), 213 Ind.. 640, 13 N. E. 2d 954. Thus, evidence relating to the various aspects of petitioner’s probable guilt or innocence has been properly excluded by this .court on previous occasions. Gluff v. Rouls, Superintendent, Indianapolis Police Dept. (1950), 228 Ind. 186, 91 N. E. 2d 176; Cook v. Rodger, Sheriff (1939), 215 Ind. 500, 20 N. E. 2d 933.
In the instant case therefore, the issue is not whether petitioner could have been in the state so as to commit the crime, but rather is whether the man sought to be extradited is indeed the same man arrested under the warrant. To consider if petitioner could have been in the state or otherwise available to commit the alleged crime goes to the merits of the case on the issue of alibi. Consequently, to entertain evidence at a habeas corpus proceeding which tends to establish petitioner’s presence elsewhere at the time of the offense is to give him a de facto trial on the merits prior to extradition.
[679]*679Keeping in mind the nature and scope of a habeas corpus proceeding relative to an arrest pursuant to extradition, it must also be noted that the usual rules of evidence are not applicable. Notter v. Beasley, Sheriff of Vigo County (1960), 240 Ind. 631, 166 N. E. 2d 643, and numerous cases there cited. See also 93 A. L. R. 2d 912. This being the law, the affidavit of Jewell Allison with the accompanying photograph identified to be that of appellant was competent evidence to establish appellant’s identity. Notter v. Beasley, supra. In fact it appears that appellant admitted at the hearing that the photograph was in fact one of him.
Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in overruling his objections to the purported telephone conversation had between Raymond Tryon, witness for appellee and a person presumed to have been Sheriff Bilyeu of Putnam County, Cookeville, Tennessee. It is argued that such evidence is inadmissible unless a foundation first be laid as to the identity of the person with whom the witness was speaking. However, we need not determine whether such evidence was improperly admitted. Appellant fails to show in what manner such evidence prejudiced his case. Further, his identity had already been established by his own admission that it was indeed his picture that the affiant, Jewell Allison, had identified. Consequently, the admission of the testimony relating to the telephone conversation, if improper would be harmless error.
Appellant’s final argument is that the trial court’s decision is contrary to law in that the extradition papers were deficient. The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act provides in part:
“No demand for the extradition of a person charged with crime in another state shall be recognized by the governor unless in writing and accompanied by a copy of an indictment found or by an information supported by affidavit in the state having jurisdiction of the crime, or by a copy of an affidavit made before a magistrate there, together with a .copy of any warrant which was issued [680]*680thereon. The indictment, information, or affidavit made before the magistrate must substantially charge the person demanded with having .committed a crime under the law of that state; and the copy must be authenticated by the executive authority making the demand, which shall be prima facie evidence of its truth.” Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-421 (1956 Repl.)
Also:
“A warrant of extradition shall not be issued unless the documents presented by the executive authority making the demand show that:
1. Except in cases arising under section six [§ 9-424], the accused was present in the demanding state at the time of the .commission of the alleged crime, and thereafter fled from the state;
2. The accused is now in this state, and
3. He is lawfully charged by indictment found or by information filed by a prosecuting officer and supported by affidavit to the facts, or by affidavit made before a magistrate in that state, with having committed a crime under the laws of that state, or that he has been convicted of a crime in that state and has escaped from confinement or broken his parole.” Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-423 (1956 Repl.)
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Hunter, C.J.
This action was brought by appellant against appellee for a writ of habeas corpus arising out of the alleged wrongful restraint and detention of appellant pursuant to extradition proceedings between this state and the State of Tennessee. Trial was had before the Vigo County Superior Court which ordered that appellant be delivered up to Sheriff Bilyeu, the agent of Tennessee, to be transported to that state.
Appellant sets out various assignments of error in his motion for new trial some of which he fails to argue on this appeal. The law is clear that grounds urged in a motion for new trial, not discussed in the argument section of the brief, are deemed waived. Brown v. State (1969), 252 Ind. 161, 247 N. E. 2d 76; Short v. State (1968), 250 Ind. 459, 237 N. E. 2d 258.
The two principal contentions advanced by argument in appellant’s brief relate to errors occurring at trial. It is further argued that the decision of the trial court is contrary to law in that the extradition papers were allegedly deficient under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (Ind. Ann. Stat. §§9-419-448 [1956 Repl.]).
Looking first to the errors alleged to have occurred at trial, appellant argues that highly prejudicial hearsay evidence was allowed to be entered over his objection. More specifically it is contended that appellant was denied the right to confront and cross-examine an identifying witness whose affidavit was admitted in the record. The affidavit complained of was that of one Jewell Allison who swore that appellant was in Tennessee and had defrauded her of $6,000. Additionally she swore that she had identified a picture of defendant as being the same man who defrauded her and that such picture was attached to her statement.
[678]*678Appellant cites as authority for the exclusion of the affidavit cases and other reference works which merely reaffirm the general rule that an accused has the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him. This rule is so well established and basic to this country’s concepts of ordered liberty and due process that we need not be reminded of its significance to an accused. Inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding pursuant to extradition is limited, however, to identifying the alleged fugitive as being one and the same individual as charged in the indictment or affidavit accompanying the requisition:
“The guilt or innocence of the accused as to the crime of which he is charged may not be inquired into by the governor or in any proceeding after the demand for extradition accompanied by a charge of crime in legal form as above provided shall have been presented to the governor, except that as it may be involved in identifying the person held as the person charged with the crime.” (emphasis added) Ind. Ann. Stat. §9-438 (1956 Repl.).
See also, Johnson v. Burke, Deputy Sheriff, etc. (1958), 238 Ind. 1, 148 N. E. 2d 413; Taylor v. Smith (1938), 213 Ind.. 640, 13 N. E. 2d 954. Thus, evidence relating to the various aspects of petitioner’s probable guilt or innocence has been properly excluded by this .court on previous occasions. Gluff v. Rouls, Superintendent, Indianapolis Police Dept. (1950), 228 Ind. 186, 91 N. E. 2d 176; Cook v. Rodger, Sheriff (1939), 215 Ind. 500, 20 N. E. 2d 933.
In the instant case therefore, the issue is not whether petitioner could have been in the state so as to commit the crime, but rather is whether the man sought to be extradited is indeed the same man arrested under the warrant. To consider if petitioner could have been in the state or otherwise available to commit the alleged crime goes to the merits of the case on the issue of alibi. Consequently, to entertain evidence at a habeas corpus proceeding which tends to establish petitioner’s presence elsewhere at the time of the offense is to give him a de facto trial on the merits prior to extradition.
[679]*679Keeping in mind the nature and scope of a habeas corpus proceeding relative to an arrest pursuant to extradition, it must also be noted that the usual rules of evidence are not applicable. Notter v. Beasley, Sheriff of Vigo County (1960), 240 Ind. 631, 166 N. E. 2d 643, and numerous cases there cited. See also 93 A. L. R. 2d 912. This being the law, the affidavit of Jewell Allison with the accompanying photograph identified to be that of appellant was competent evidence to establish appellant’s identity. Notter v. Beasley, supra. In fact it appears that appellant admitted at the hearing that the photograph was in fact one of him.
Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in overruling his objections to the purported telephone conversation had between Raymond Tryon, witness for appellee and a person presumed to have been Sheriff Bilyeu of Putnam County, Cookeville, Tennessee. It is argued that such evidence is inadmissible unless a foundation first be laid as to the identity of the person with whom the witness was speaking. However, we need not determine whether such evidence was improperly admitted. Appellant fails to show in what manner such evidence prejudiced his case. Further, his identity had already been established by his own admission that it was indeed his picture that the affiant, Jewell Allison, had identified. Consequently, the admission of the testimony relating to the telephone conversation, if improper would be harmless error.
Appellant’s final argument is that the trial court’s decision is contrary to law in that the extradition papers were deficient. The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act provides in part:
“No demand for the extradition of a person charged with crime in another state shall be recognized by the governor unless in writing and accompanied by a copy of an indictment found or by an information supported by affidavit in the state having jurisdiction of the crime, or by a copy of an affidavit made before a magistrate there, together with a .copy of any warrant which was issued [680]*680thereon. The indictment, information, or affidavit made before the magistrate must substantially charge the person demanded with having .committed a crime under the law of that state; and the copy must be authenticated by the executive authority making the demand, which shall be prima facie evidence of its truth.” Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-421 (1956 Repl.)
Also:
“A warrant of extradition shall not be issued unless the documents presented by the executive authority making the demand show that:
1. Except in cases arising under section six [§ 9-424], the accused was present in the demanding state at the time of the .commission of the alleged crime, and thereafter fled from the state;
2. The accused is now in this state, and
3. He is lawfully charged by indictment found or by information filed by a prosecuting officer and supported by affidavit to the facts, or by affidavit made before a magistrate in that state, with having committed a crime under the laws of that state, or that he has been convicted of a crime in that state and has escaped from confinement or broken his parole.” Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-423 (1956 Repl.)
The warrant of extradition is alleged, by appellant, to be insufficient in the present case since: (1) there is nothing contained therein stating or showing that the accused was in the demanding state of Tennessee at the time of the alleged offense by way of sworn document; (2) that the document entitled “State Warrant” fails to allege that the acts complained of constitute an unlawful act; (3) the person signing the “State Warrant” is in no manner identified as being a prosecuting officer; (4) that the requisition documents do not contain any affidavit, information or indictment on which to base a warrant of extradition; (5) that nowhere in the documents contained in the Governor’s Warrant of Extradition is there any allegation that a felony, or even a misdemeanor had been committed in Tennessee; and (6) that the “State Warrant” is so vague that it does not properly allege a crime.
[681]*681Upon a careful examination of the extradition papers properly made a part of the record in this case, it is our conclusion that appellant’s contentions as to their sufficiency are completely without merit. All of appellant’s points relating to the deficiency of the extradition papers will be dealt with in the order presented above:
(1) the statute [§9-423] requires that the documents presented by the executive authority of the demanding state show that the accused was present in that state at the time the alleged offense was committed and thereafter fled. It is clear from the affidavit of the prosecuting attorney, sworn to before a notary public and attached to the governor’s demand that appellant was present at the time the offense was committed.
(2) it is not a statutory requirement that the “State Warrant” allege that the act complained of constitute an unlawful act. Section 4-923(3) requires only that the documents filed show that the person sought has been lawfully charged with having committed a crime under the laws of that state. The “State Warrant” in addition to all supporting documents clearly satisfies this requirement.
(3) the statute does not require that the prosecuting attorney sign the “State Warrant.” The supporting papers accompanying the governor’s demand include an affidavit by Jewell Allison made before the Judge of Putnam County, Tennessee. Clearly this satisfies § 9-423(3).
(4) the statutory requirement that the demand be accompanied by a copy of an indictment found or by an information supported by affidavit in the state having jurisdiction or by a copy of an affidavit made before a magistrate [§ 9-421] is satisfied by the affidavit of Jewell Allison.
(5) the contention that nowhere in the documents contained in the Governor’s Warrant of Extradition is there an allegation that a felony, or even a misdemeanor has been committed in Tennessee is wholly frivolous.
(6) appellant fails to show in what manner the “State Warrant” is vague. It is manifestly evident to this court that the offense and its nature have been properly alleged.
There being no merit to those errors assigned and argued by appellant, the decision of the trial court is hereby affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
[682]*682Arterburn, Givan, DeBruler, JJ., concur; Jackson, J., dissents with opinion.