Summit Cty. Sher. v. Frat. Order, Pol., Unpublished Decision (3-12-2003)

CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedMarch 12, 2003
DocketC.A. No. 21303.
StatusUnpublished

This text of Summit Cty. Sher. v. Frat. Order, Pol., Unpublished Decision (3-12-2003) (Summit Cty. Sher. v. Frat. Order, Pol., Unpublished Decision (3-12-2003)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Summit Cty. Sher. v. Frat. Order, Pol., Unpublished Decision (3-12-2003), (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).

Opinion

This cause was heard upon the record in the trial court. Each error assigned has been reviewed and the following disposition is made: {¶ 1} Appellants, Jerome Angerstein ("Angerstein"), the Fraternal Order of Police #139, and Ohio Labor Council, Inc., appeal from the judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas which vacated the arbitrator's award reinstating Appellant Angerstein. We affirm.

{¶ 2} On September 14, 2001, Appellant Angerstein was terminated from Appellee's, Summit County Sheriff, employ. Appellant Angerstein then filed a grievance arguing that Appellee violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") by discharging him. An arbitrator was appointed and a hearing was held. On February 8, 2002, the arbitrator sustained the grievance in part and denied the grievance in part. The arbitrator determined that Appellee had grounds to impose discipline but that Appellant Angerstein's deficiencies did not rise to the level of just cause necessary to sustain a termination. Appellee was ordered to offer Appellant Angerstein reinstatement. Appellant Angerstein did not receive back pay and his time off was converted to disciplinary suspension.

{¶ 3} Thereafter, Appellee filed a petition for vacation or modification of the arbitrator's award in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. Appellants filed an answer and counterclaim and an application to confirm the arbitration award. On September 30, 2002, the trial court issued its decision vacating the arbitration award. Appellants timely appealed raising three assignments of error, which have been consolidated to facilitate review.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
{¶ 4} "The trial court erred in vacating the arbitrator's award pursuant to [R.C.] 2711.10(D) when the arbitrator did not make any findings contrary to or inconsistent with provisions of the [CBA]."

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
{¶ 5} "The trial court erred by engaging in a just cause analysis when that task is solely within the purview of the arbitrator, not with the court reviewing an arbitrator's award pursuant to [R.C.] 2711.10(D)."

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
{¶ 6} "The trial court erred by vacating the arbitrator's award on public policy grounds. There is no public policy prohibiting the reinstatement of a deputy sheriff found to have shown a report generated by one deputy to another deputy within the department."

{¶ 7} In their three assignments of error, Appellants maintain that the trial court improperly vacated the arbitrator's award. Specifically, Appellants allege that the trial court's analysis under R.C. 2711.10(D) was flawed. Additionally, Appellants argue that the court's additional determinations regarding public policy and the applicable standard of "just cause" were also flawed. Appellants' assignments of error lack merit.

{¶ 8} In Ohio, courts give deference to an arbitrator's award and presume they are valid. Findlay City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. FindlayEdn. Assn. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 129, paragraph one of the syllabus, superseded by statute on other grounds (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 658. See, also, Gingrich v. Wooster (Jan. 10, 2001), 9th Dist. No. 00CA0032, at 9. When parties agree to binding arbitration, they agree to accept the result, regardless of the legal or factual accuracy. Gingrich, supra, at 9, citing Huffman v. Valletto (1984), 15 Ohio App.3d 61, paragraph two of the syllabus.

{¶ 9} A trial court's ability to review an arbitration award, which is governed by R.C. Chapter 2711, is narrow and limited. WarrenEdn. Assn. v. Warren City Bd. of Edn. (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 170, 173. A trial court may vacate an award if the arbitrators exceed their powers or imperfectly execute them. R.C. 2711.10(D). This Court has previously explained that "[m]ere error in the interpretation or application of the law will not suffice [to vacate an arbitration award]. The arbitrators' decision must `fly in the face of clearly established legal precedent' to support a vacation of the award." Automated Tracking Systems, Inc. v.Great American Ins. Co. (Oct. 14, 1998), 9th Dist. No. 18906, at 7, quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner Smith, Inc. v. Jaros (C.A.6, 1995), 70 F.3d 418, 421. See, also, Communication Workers of Am., Local#4546 v. Summit Cty. Children Servs. Bd. (Mar. 31, 1999), 9th Dist. No. 19122, at 5. An arbitrator exceeds his power when an award fails to draw its essence from the CBA of the parties. Gingrich, supra, at 10, citingOhio Office of Collective Bargaining v. Ohio Civil. Service EmployeesAssn., Local 11, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 177, 179-80. This occurs when there is an absence of "a rational nexus between the agreement and the award," or when the award is "arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful." Gingrich, supra, at 10, citing Findlay City School Dist. Bd.of Edn., 49 Ohio St.3d at 132. "An arbitrator's award departs from the essence of a collective bargaining agreement when: (1) the award conflicts with the express terms of the agreement, and/or (2) the award is without rational support or cannot be rationally derived from the terms of the agreement." Ohio Office of Collective Bargaining,59 Ohio St.3d 177 at syllabus.

{¶ 10} An appeal may be taken from a trial court order that confirms, modifies, corrects, or vacates an arbitration award. WarrenEdn. Assn., 18 Ohio St.3d at 173-74, quoting Lockhart v. American Res.Ins. Co. (1981), 2 Ohio App.3d 99, 101. However, appellate review is limited to a review of the lower court's order, as the original arbitration proceedings are not reviewable, "absent evidence of material mistake or extensive impropriety." Gingrich, supra, at 10, citing Lynchv. Halcomb (1984), 16 Ohio App.3d 223, paragraph two of the syllabus, andLockhart, 2 Ohio App.3d at 101. Accordingly, an appellate court is to discern whether the trial court "erred as a matter of law." Union Twp.Bd. of Trustees v. Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Valley Lodge, No. 112 (2001), 146 Ohio App.3d 456, 459, citing McFaul v. UAW Region 2 (1998),130 Ohio App.3d 111, 115.

{¶ 11} In the instant case, the trial court recognized that R.C. 2711.10

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Related

Lynch v. Halcomb
475 N.E.2d 181 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1984)
Lockhart v. American Reserve Insurance
440 N.E.2d 1219 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1981)
Huffman v. Valletto
472 N.E.2d 740 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1984)
McFaul v. Uaw Region 2
719 N.E.2d 632 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1998)
Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp.
424 N.E.2d 568 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1981)
Warren Education Ass'n v. Warren City Board of Education
480 N.E.2d 456 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1985)
Board of Education v. Findlay Education Ass'n
551 N.E.2d 186 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1990)

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Summit Cty. Sher. v. Frat. Order, Pol., Unpublished Decision (3-12-2003), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/summit-cty-sher-v-frat-order-pol-unpublished-decision-3-12-2003-ohioctapp-2003.