Summers v. City of Charlotte

District Court, W.D. North Carolina·Decided November 23, 2022·No. 3:18-cv-00612·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA CHARLOTTE DIVISION 3:18-cv-00612-RJC-DSC

LANCE PATTERSON, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) Order CITY OF CHARLOTTE, ) ) Defendant. ) ) )

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Defendant City of Charlotte’s Request for Clarification and Supplemental Motions in Limine (the “Motion”). (Doc. No. 315). This matter consists of four separate actions filed by five plaintiffs asserting, among other things, race discrimination in the Charlotte Fire Department. The Court consolidated the actions for purposes of discovery. Joint-Plaintiffs Smith-Phifer and Patterson’s jury trial was scheduled to begin on November 7, 2022. Before trial, the Court ruled on the Parties’ motions in limine. (Doc. No. 285). On the Friday before trial, both Plaintiffs filed a motion to continue the trial due to Plaintiff Patterson’s medical issue. The Court granted the motion to continue as to Patterson and denied the motion to continue as to Plaintiff Smith-Phifer. As scheduled, Plaintiff Smith-Phifer’s jury trial began on November 7, 2022, which was ultimately resolved after numerous days without further need from the Court or jury. After observing the testimony and evidence at Plaintiff Smith-Phifer’s trial, in the interest of providing the parties with the Court’s rulings ahead of trial, the Court amended some of its rulings in the original Order (Doc. No. 285) on the Parties’ motions in limine. (Doc. No. 311). Thereafter, Defendant filed the Motion requesting clarification as to the Court’s ruling and asking the Court to exclude additional witnesses. First, Defendant originally filed a motion in limine asking the Court to exclude evidence of events prior to 2015, and specifically the 2006 to 2014 promotional processes. The Court ruled, in its amended Order, that Plaintiff may present evidence related only to the Battalion Chief

promotional processes, including the handling of complaints and grievances related to the Battalion Chief promotional processes, beginning in 2007. (Doc. No. 311). Defendant now requests the Court exclude this evidence or testimony regarding processes prior to 2011, because Plaintiff Patterson did not participate in the Battalion Chief promotional processes prior to 2011. The Court will permit a limited inquiry into the Battalion Chief promotional processes prior to 2011, to establish the changes in the promotional processes and processes for handling grievances and complaints related to the Battalion Chief promotional processes, offered to prove a discriminatory basis for such changes to the extent the changes are relevant to the 2015 to 2019 promotional processes and/or handling of grievances related to the same. The Court will give a

limiting instruction that the evidence is being offered for that purpose, and that Defendant is not on trial for any alleged discrimination in the Battalion Chief promotional processes prior to 2015. As noted, the Court will only allow a limited inquiry to avoid evidence that is cumulative, confusing, and a waste of time. Fed. R. Evid. 401; Fed. R. Evid. 403; Fed. R. Evid. 611. Next, after the Court excluded Plaintiff’s expert witness Dr. Geisinger, Defendant requests the Court prevent Plaintiff from calling Defendant’s expert witness, Dr. Locklear, or introducing her reports. The Defendant does not intend to call Dr. Locklear. Courts take different approaches when considering whether to allow a party to call the opposing party’s witness during their case- in-chief. See House v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 168 F.R.D. 236 (N.D. Ia. 1996) (noting three different standards that courts have applied when considering whether a party to call an opposing party’s witness). Ultimately, the decision is within the discretion of the district court, “to control the mode and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence, and [the court] is instructed to exercise this discretion in order to (1) make those procedures effective for determining the truth; (2) avoid wasting time; and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.”

Labat v. Rayner, No. 20-447, 2022 WL 1442982, at *2 (E.D. La. May 4, 2022). Here, the Court, in its discretion, will not allow Plaintiff to call Defendant’s expert Dr. Locklear. Plaintiff will “receive a windfall of expert testimony if permitted to call Defendant[’s] expert[] in [his] case-in-chief.” Id. As one court recently explained: One of the hardest things in litigation is finding a good expert. It is a skill that must be learned and often takes a lot of time. Many plaintiffs’ lawyers expend their own time without immediate compensation for their efforts. Lawyers often develop close relationships with experts that can last well beyond that case and often surpass multiple cases and years. It violates the principle of protecting an attorney’s work if the opponent can call that witness as its own witness. The other side is getting something for free . . . the opponent should have to show exceptional circumstances to benefit from the other side’s work. Such free loading is inconsistent with the Anglo-American adversarial system and with the American rule, which leaves attorney fees with the parties. Rawers v. United States, 488 F. Supp. 1059, 1084 n.29 (D.N.M. 2020). Defendant would be prejudiced by allowing Plaintiff to call Dr. Locklear because Plaintiff would “piggyback on another party’s trial preparation,” it would confuse the jury, and due to the potential for the jury to learn Dr. Locklear is Defendant’s expert. Labat, 2022 WL 1442982, at *2. Dr. Locklear was retained by Defendant as an expert in this case. Dr. Locklear may be privy to Defendant’s privileged or work product information and materials, or Defendant’s trial preparation and strategy. Additionally, Dr. Locklear’s work is at least in part intertwined with the Dr. Geisinger’s opinions, which this Court already excluded. Finally, Defendant would be significantly prejudiced if the jury were to learn that Dr. Locklear was an expert retained by Defendant, but that Plaintiff was calling Dr. Locklear on his case-in-chief. For these reasons, the Court will not allow Plaintiff to call Dr. Locklear as an expert witness in his case-in-chief. Ferguson v. Michael Foods, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 408 (D. Minn. 1999) (concluding plaintiff was not permitted to call defendant’s expert during her case-in-chief due to the danger of prejudice).

Finally, Defendant asks the Court to exclude a number of witnesses from testifying at trial. As an initial matter, the Court expects and assumes the authenticity of documents that the Parties stipulated to in Plaintiff Smith-Phifer’s trial will be stipulated to again alleviating the need to call witnesses solely for the purpose of authentication. The Court provides its ruling to each witness below.

Witness Defendant Ruling Requests to Exclude GRANTED IN PART. The Court reviewed Plaintiff’s proffer of Michael Clumpner, and based on that proffer, Plaintiff may call Michael Clumpner to testify only about his personal knowledge and observations of the 2015 to 2019 Battalion Chief promotional processes. Fed. R. Evid. 401; Fed. R. Evid. 403; Fed. R. Evid. 611.

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Summers v. City of Charlotte, (W.D.N.C. 2022).

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488 F. Supp. 1057 (D. South Carolina, 1980)
Ferguson v. Michael Foods, Inc.
189 F.R.D. 408 (D. Minnesota, 1999)
House v. Combined Insurance Co. of America
168 F.R.D. 236 (N.D. Iowa, 1996)