Summayyab Ann MNC Wylder v. U.S. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

2018 DNH 135

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: July 2, 2018
• Docket: 17-cv-153-JL
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Summayyab Ann MNC Wylder

v. Civil No. 17-cv-153-JL Opinion No. 2018 DNH 135 U.S. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

ORDER ON APPEAL

Summayyan Ann MNC Wylder has appealed the Social Security

Administration’s (“SSA”) denial of her application for a period

of disability and disability insurance benefits. An

administrative law judge (“ALJ”) at the SSA ruled that, despite

several severe impairments, Wylder retains the residual

functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform jobs that exist in

significant numbers in the national economy, and thus is not

disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a). The

Appeals Council granted Wylder’s request for review, see id.

§ 404.967, requiring the ALJ to reconsider that decision, taking

certain evidence into consideration. Having done so, the ALJ

again concluded that Wylder is not disabled. The Appeals

Council denied Wylder’s second request for review, with the

result that the ALJ’s second decision became the final decision

on her application, see id. § 404.981. Wylder then appealed the

decision to this court, which has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g) (Social Security). Wylder has moved to reverse the decision. See LR 9.1(b).

The Acting Commissioner of the SSA has cross-moved for an order

affirming the ALJ’s decision. See LR 9.1(e). After careful

consideration, the court denies Wylder’s motion and grants the

Acting Commissioner’s motion.

Applicable legal standard

The court limits its review of a final decision of the SSA

“to determining whether the ALJ used the proper legal standards

and found facts upon the proper quantum of evidence.” Ward v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 211 F.3d 652, 655 (1st Cir. 2000). It

“review[s] questions of law de novo, but defer[s] to the

Commissioner’s findings of fact, so long as they are supported

by substantial evidence,” id., that is, “such evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion,” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)

(quotations omitted). Though the evidence in the record may

support multiple conclusions, the court will still uphold the

ALJ’s findings “if a reasonable mind, reviewing the evidence in

the record as a whole, could accept it as adequate to support

his conclusion.” Irlanda Ortiz v. Sec’y of Health & Human

Servs., 955 F.2d 765, 769 (1st Cir. 1991). The court therefore

“must uphold a denial of social security . . . benefits unless

‘the [Acting Commissioner] has committed a legal or factual

2 error in evaluating a particular claim.’” Manso-Pizarro v.

Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 76 F.3d 15, 16 (1st Cir. 1996)

(per curiam) (quoting Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 885

(1989)).

Background1

The ALJ invoked the requisite five-step sequential

evaluation process in assessing Wylder’s request for disability

and disability insurance benefits. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520,

416.920. After determining that Wylder had not engaged in

substantial gainful activity after the alleged onset of her

disability on June 3, 2009, the ALJ analyzed the severity of her

impairments. At this second step, the ALJ concluded that Wylder

had several impairments: posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD),

unspecified depressive disorder, hoarding disorder, obesity,

degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, and

osteoarthritis of the right knee.2

At the third step, the ALJ found that Wylder’s severe

impairments did not meet or “medically equal” the severity of

one of the impairments listed in the Social Security

1 The court recounts here only those facts relevant to the instant appeal. The parties’ more complete recitation in their Joint Statement of Material Facts (doc. no. 11) is incorporated by reference. See LR 9.1(d). 2 Admin. R. at 21.

3 regulations.3 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526,

416.920(d), 416.925, and 416.926. After reviewing the medical

evidence of record, medical opinions, and Wylder’s own

statements, the ALJ concluded that Wylder retained the RFC to

perform light work, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b),

except that she:

can occasionally climb ramps and stairs; . . . must avoid exposure to extremes of temperature and pulmonary irritants such as fumes, dusts, and gasses; . . . is able to perform simple, routine tasks for two-hour blocks of time, and cannot understand, remember, or carry out detailed instructions; . . . can tolerate up to occasional interaction with co- workers, but cannot engage in tandem tasks; . . . can tolerate up to occasional interaction with the public; and . . . requires a low-stress job, defined as one involving up to occasional decision-making.4

Finding that, even limited in this manner, Wylder was able to

perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national

economy, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566 and 416.966, the ALJ

concluded his analysis and found that Wylder was not disabled

within the meaning of the Social Security Act.

3 Id. at 21-23. 4 Admin. R. at 23.

4 Analysis

Wylder argues that the ALJ’s RFC determination with respect

to her mental limitations5 is not supported by substantial

evidence. Specifically, Wylder contends that the ALJ failed to

account for, and his RFC determination runs contrary to, three

specific statements in Dr. Robert Prescott’s March 2016 opinion,

which the ALJ afforded “great weight.”6 In that opinion,

Dr. Prescott concluded, among other things, that Wylder:

 “does not appear typically able to be around

unfamiliar or too many others without considerable

distress”;

 “would not be expected to effectively maintain

concentration for extended periods as well as most

others”; and

 “does not appear at this time able to effectively

manage typical levels of stress and change found in

settings outside the home on a consistent, sustained

basis.”7

5 She does not challenge the ALJ’s RFC determination with respect to her physical limitations. 6 See Mot. to Remand (doc. no. 8-1) at 3; Admin. R. at 25. 7 Admin. R. at 1347.

5 Importantly, Wylder does not contest the weight that the ALJ

afforded to Dr. Prescott’s opinion. Her sole complaint is that

the ALJ crafted an RFC that did not account for these three

observations.8 If he had done so, she contends, then the ALJ

would have found that she had a “moderately severe limitation in

the ability to maintain appropriate attention and concentration

through an eight-hour workday” resulting in “unsatisfactory

performance,” and thus would be unable to engage in substantial

activity.9

The ALJ did not err. He clearly considered Dr. Prescott’s

March 2016 opinion.10 He afforded it “great weight,” finding its

conclusions “generally consistent with the contemporaneous

treatment notes from David Corriss, Ph.D., who treated the

claimant on a weekly basis from July 2014 through February

2016,” and “with the medical evidence of record as a whole.”11

Wylder identifies no evidence, opinion or otherwise, with which

Dr. Prescott’s opinion conflicts.

And, contrary to Wylder’s assertion, the RFC crafted by the

ALJ appears to reflect all three of Dr. Prescott’s conclusions.

8 See Mot. to Remand (doc. no. 8-1) at 3-5. 9 Id. at 4. 10 See Admin. R. at 25. 11 Id.

6 First, Dr. Prescott opined that Wylder “does not appear

typically able to be around unfamiliar or too many others

without considerable distress.”12 The ALJ limited her to only

occasional interaction with both co-workers and the public.13

Next, Dr. Prescott opined that Wylder “would not be expected to

effectively maintain concentration for extended periods as well

as most others.”14 The ALJ concluded that she could “perform

simple, routine tasks for two-hour blocks of time.”15 Finally,

Dr. Prescott opined that Wylder “does not appear at this time

able to effectively manage typical levels of stress and change

found in settings outside the home on a consistent, sustained

basis.”16 The ALJ concluded that she “requires a low-stress

job.”17

This is a straightforward case wherein the evidence in the

record could, theoretically, support conclusions different from

those drawn by the ALJ. Wylder has not shown, however, that the

ALJ failed to account for the evidence or that, even if he had,

12 Id. at 1347. 13 Id. at 25. 14 Id. at 1347. 15 Id. at 25. 16 Id. at 1347. 17 Id. at 25.

7 those three statements would compel a different RFC. Even were

that the case, the court would still uphold the ALJ’s findings

“if a reasonable mind, reviewing the evidence in the record as a

whole, could accept it as adequate to support his conclusion.”

Irlanda Ortiz, 955 F.2d at 769 (1st Cir. 1991). Here, it could.

Conclusion

For these reasons, the Acting Commissioner’s motion to

affirm18 is GRANTED and Wylder’s motion to reverse and remand the

Acting Commissioner’s decision19 is DENIED. The Clerk of Court

shall enter judgment in accordance with this order and close the

case.

SO ORDERED.

Joseph N. Laplante United States District Judge

Dated: July 2, 2018

cc: Christopher G. Roundy, Esq. Robert J. Rabuck, AUSA

18 Document no. 11. 19 Document no. 8.