Sullivan v. Milliken

113 F. 93, 51 C.C.A. 79, 1902 U.S. App. LEXIS 3935

Opinion

SHELBY, Circuit Judge,

after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court.

Did the circuit court err in overruling the demurrer to the declaration? This is an action by a broker against his principal for commissions for selling real estate. The declaration should contain a statement of facts which entitles the plaintiff to recover. No fact material to recovery should be left to inference. By considering what it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove in such case, we ascertain what must be alleged in the declaration. The issues to be tried involve the questions; (i) What did the broker undertake to do ? (2) Has he completed the undertaking within the time and upon the terms stipulated? (3) If not, is his failure attributable to the fault dr interference of the principal? If on investigation it be determined that the broker has performed his contract within the time and upon the terms agreed on, he is entitled to his commissions. If he has not, he has earned no commissions, unless performance by the agent was prevented by the fault or wrong of the principal. To entitle him to recover, he must prove, and therefore he must allege, (i) that he was employed as an agent or broker to sell the property; (2) that he sold it at the price and on the terms fixed by his principal, or on other terms agreed to by him, or that he found a purchaser ready, willing, and able to buy the property at. the price and on the terms fixed or agreed to by the principal; and, if the sale was not made, that the failure to conclude the same was caused by some fault of the principal. The undertaking of the plaintiff was to sell the property. This is specifically averred, and the written authority to sell is made Exhibit A to the declaration. Addressing the plaintiff, the defendant wrote:

“I hereby authorize and empower you to sell my pine timber lands,” etc. (briefly describing the property and stating the price). “This authority to remain good for sixty days. 1 will make a deed, with general warranty, to the purchaser.”

The plaintiff acted under this authority. His undertaking, therefore, was, clearly, to sell. The plaintiff, having been employed to sell the property, prepared, at the request of the defendant, an elaborate description of it. In this prospectus he estimates the number of acres; describes the booms, sawmills, and railways; states the value of the timber on the land, the amount of lumber that could be put on the market from the lands, and states the several sources of revenue from the lands. This estimate and description is made a part of the declaration, as Exhibit 13. It tends to show the property to be worth much more than the price asked for it. It is not alleged that the defendant was in any way responsible for its contents. He did not sign it. He did not sign any agreement alleging that the statements of this memorandum arc true. It is only referred to in the contract between the defendant and Mann as “a written memorandum given to the said Mann.” There is no averment that Sullivan gave Mann the memorandum, or that Sullivan knew of its contents. This memorandum was made by the plaintiff, and no fact is alleged that would make the defendant responsible to the plaintiff for the truth of its statements. If the declaration can be construed to make Sullivan responsible to Mann for the truth of the prospectus, it certainly cannot be held, on its averments, that he ever represented to Milliken that the prospectus was true. Milliken, it is averred, and not Sullivan, is its author. It is the plaintiff’s handiwork. There is no claim asserted in the declaration that a sale was prevented by the wrong or interference of the defendant. The case, therefore, depends on the allegation as to performance on the part of the broker. It is not alleged that the plaintiff sold the property. It is not alleged that he found a purchaser ready, willing, and able to buy the property. As a substitute for these averments, usual in suits by brokers to recover commissions, the plaintiff alleges that:

“In pursuance of the said employment the plaintiff procured that the defendant and one W. D. Mann should and did on Xoyember 16, 1890, enter into a written contract by which the defendant agreed to convey the property mentioned in the written authority and memorandum hereinbefore set forth as Exhibits A and B [which memorandum is the memorandum referred-to in the said written contract] to a corporation to be organized by the said Mann as set forth in the said agreement, and the said Mann agreed to cause the said corporation to be organized, and to pay to the defendant for the said property five hundred thousand dollars in cash, one million dollars in the first mortgage bonds, and one hundred thousand dollars in the stock, of the said company, all of which is set forth in the said agreement, which is hereby referred to, and, as Exhibit C, hereto attached and made a part hereof for greater particularity and exactness.”

The plaintiff, therefore, bases his right to recover on the fact that he procured Mann to make a contract with the defendant on November 16, 1899. The claim is that the plaintiff is entitled to the commissions sued for, because he procured Mann to make this contract. If his contention is well founded, his right to the commissions accrued as soon as the contract was made. There is noaverment as to what followed the making of the contract. The case made by the declaration ends with the signing of the contract. It is not alleged otherwise that Mann became the purchaser of the property. The agreement is made a part of the declaration. Reading it, we find that it is clearly binding on Sullivan to sell if Mann finally agrees to buy. But it clearly does not bind Mann unconditionally to purchase. Mann agrees “forthwith to select some one or more persons to go upon said lands and wharf and examine the same, and to make a report as to the amount of timber upon said lands, and the value thereof. * * * Upon examination of said report, if it shall appear that the statements set forth in a written memorandum given to the said Mann as to said property are substantially correct,” then, and in that event only, Mann agrees to organize a corporation to buy the property on terms stated in the contract. The contract as to Mann is tentative, his acceptance being dependent on the result of an investigation to be made in 60 days. Can it be true that, as soon as this contract was signed, the plaintiff, who was employed to sell the property, was entitled to commissions, whatever the person or persons selected to examine the property might report? If the prospectus was untrue, was he entitled to commissions? Has he earned the commissions, under an employment to sell, by preparing a prospectus showing the great value of the property, and finding a customer who agrees to take the property if the description and estimated values are substantially correct? Did Sullivan, when he signed the contract with Mann, — a contract not binding on Mann unless Mann’s investigations confirmed Milliken’s prospectus, — become indebted to Mil-liken for commissions on the agreed price? Consider the question in this way: The authority which Sullivan gave Milliken to sell the property, of course, authorized him, as Sullivan’s agent, to make a written offer to sell it. Except for the changes as to the terms of sale, he might well have signed as agent for Sullivan the contract with Mann. Now, if he had signed an agreement binding his principal to convey the land to Mann on the terms and at the price named in his authority, and Mann had agreed to buy the land, if, on the report of experts to be appointed to examine it, it was found that the prospectus prepared by Milliken was substantially correct* would Milliken be entitled to commissions, as on a sale, whether Mann completed the purchase or not? Whether the land was ex-amiued by the experts or not? Whether the descriptions and estimates prepared by Milliken were true or not? We cannot think he would have earned his commissions by making such contract. To so bold would give the agent great advantage of his principal, and would encourage him to exaggerate the value of the propert]/' in his dealings with customers. If he was reckless in his descriptions and extravagant in his valuations, he might easily find a customer to contract to buy the property if it was found to be, as valuable as the agent said it was. Such performance, surely, would not entitle him to commissions.

To show that the contract is binding on Mann, it is said that Sullivan could recover damages for the failure by Mann to complete the purchase. This proposition need not be examined further than to say it is clear that such damages could not be recovered without: alleging and proving that the prospectus prepared by Milliken was substantially correct, or at least that the persons appointed to examine the property reported it so. An action for damages might He on the averment that it was Mann’s duty to appoint persons to examine the property, and that he failed to do so, and that the prospectus was substantially correct. But the declaration in question contains no averment of fact, which shows that a recovery could be had in damages by Sullivan in a suit against Mann for a breach oí the contract.

It is also said that the contract in this case was one of sale, because it could be specifically enforced. The question on this suggestion here is, could it be specifically enforced against Mann, admitting the averments of the declaration to be true? That it is a contract to sell that could be enforced by Mann against Sullivan, if Mann performed his part of the contract, may be admitted. Sullivan bound himself to convey. But Mann has not bound himself unconditionally to purchase. He stipulates for time to have the property examined, and agrees to purchase only in the event that it is found to conform to the prospectus. When it appears by the contract, in its express terms, that it was intended to be binding upon one of the parties alone, it may be specifically enforced against that party, although the remedy cannot be granted to him against the other party. Pom. Cont. § 169. The declaration in this case does not describe a contract for which Sullivan would have a remedy in equity for specific performance. Mann agreed to buy on condition that the prospectus was shown to be substantially correct, and there is no averment that it is correct. Unless the property met this requirement, there was no “true contract” of sale. Id. § 334. The prospectus not being substantially correct, the contract would not bind Mann, or at least he could revoke it. A court of equity will not enforce specific performance against a party who has the power of revocation. Southern Exp. Co. v. Western North Carolina R. Co., 99 U. S. 191-200, 25 L. Ed. 319. The contract pleaded is not a completed sale, and, on the facts averred in the declaration, it is not a contract that Sullivan could specifically enforce against Mann. Mayer v. McCreery, 119 N. Y. 434, 23 N. E. 1045. The declaration shows nothing done by Milliken to earn a commission, except to procure the making of the contract with Mann. To show a legal claim to commissions, it must allege a completed sale, or an enforceable agreement for sale. Hammond v. Crawford, 14 C. C. A. 109, 66 Fed. 425; Jacobs v. Shenon, 2 Idaho, 1002, 29 Pac. 44. Securing a preliminary or tentative agreement not shown to have resulted in a complete sale, and not binding on the proposed purchaser, is not sufficient. Hale v. Kumler, 29 C. C. A. 67, 85 Fed. 161. In such cases nothing should be left to conjecture or speculation. “There should have been as much certainty on the one side of the contract as upon the other. * * * The broker must complete the sale (that is, he must find a purchaser in a situation, and ready and willing, to complete the purchase on the terms agreed on) before he is entitled to his commissions.” McGavock v. Woodlief, 20 How. 221, 227, 15 L. Ed. 884. The declaration states that the plaintiff, at the request of the defendant, “prepared a written memorandum describing the property.” The action, however, is not for such service. The declaration, we think, is properly construed in that respect by the learned attorneys for the defendant in error, in their printed argument, when they say this is an action “to recover $100,000 commissions alleged to have been earned by Milliken by selling,” etc. We have so considered it. The services were performed under a special employment to sell, and no right to recover on the quantum meruit is asserted.

Tested by these principles and authorities, the declaration does not show a right of action against the plaintiff in error, and the demurrer to it should have been sustained.

The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause remanded, with instructions to set aside the verdict of the jury, sustain the demurrer to the declaration, and to grant a new trial, proceeding according to law and the views herein expressed. Reversed.

McCORMICK, Circuit Judge.

I agree with my Brethren that the judgment of the circuit court in this case should be reversed, and the cause remanded to that court, with direction to award the defendant a new trial; but I am unable to agree with them in the ground on which they base the decision of the court. I do not construe the thirteenth count in the declaration as an action to recover compensation stipulated for in a written contract. Exhibit A, attached to that count, makes no. mention of compensation. It simply authorizes and empowers the plaintiff to sell certain property of the defendant at a price named. Exhibit B shows only some of the services rendered by the plaintiff to the defendant; and Exhibit C helps to show further the services rendered by the plaintiff, and accepted and acted on to the extent therein shown by the defendant. And the count claims that, in pursuance of his employment, the plaintiff procured that the defendant and one W. D. Mann should and did on November 16, 1899, enter into a written contract by which, the defendant agreed to convey the property mentioned in the writ ten authority and memorandum set forth as Exhibits A and B, which contract oí November 16, 1899, is the Exhibit C attached to the count; and the plaintiff avers that by reason of the premises he became entitled to demand and receive from the defendant, and the defendant became obliged to pay to the plaintiff, for his services aforesaid, a large sum of money, to wit, the sum of $100,000. How this can be construed as other than demanding the reasonable compensation for the services shown to have been rendered, I confess my inability to understand.

The twenty-fourth error assigned is, in my judgment, well taken. It is thus stated in the record:

“Twenty-Fourth Assignment of Error. After the jury had rendered their verdict, to wit, ‘We, the jury, find for the plaintiff in the sum ol' thirty-one thousand nine hundred and fifty dollars, less six thousand nine hundred and fifty credit, with New York interest,’ and after the jury had been polled, and each had said that it was his verdict, and after the said verdict had been read and ordered to be received, and after the other proceedings shown in the bill of exceptions, the court said 1o the jury: ‘Gentlemen of the Jury: In this case you have found, for the plaintiff, and you have found against the pleas of the defendant. You have found that the plaintiff has a right to recover. The court charged you that the only testimony — charged you heretofore, and now I repeat, that the only testimony before you bearing, as I recollect it, upon the question of amount, was the testimony of Mr. Milliken, to the effect that in New York Oily, where the transaction took place, the customary and usual percentage was from five to ten per cent, on the full face value of the one million six hundred thousand dollars, and that he had agreed to take that amount as his compensation, — the amount of five per cent. You will take the case, gentlemen.’ The defendant then and there, before the jury retired, excepted to the said action of the court. This assignment is on the ground that after the jury had rendered their verdict, and said verdict had been received by the court and ordered recorded, the court had no authority to again submit the matter to the said jury, or to charge them concerning their verdict.”

And on this ground I concur in the judgment of reversal. Taken in connection with the other proceedings shown by the bill of exceptions to have been had at the time, the instruction was equivalent to the general charge to find for the plaintiff on the merits, and to render their verdict for 5 per cent, commissions on $x ,600,000, viz., for $80,000, less the admitted credit. The jury so understood it, and returned their verdict accordingly:

“We, the jury, find for the plaintiff in the sum of §80,000, with interest from the commencement of this suit, less the sum of §6,950, with interest from January 8, 1900.”

This shows clearly the taking of the case entirely from the jury, and substituting for their verdict the finding of the court.