Sullivan v. Carmany

121 A.2d 174, 384 Pa. 486, 1956 Pa. LEXIS 577

• Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: March 15, 1956
• Docket: Appeals, 56 and 57
• Status: Published

Opinions

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Arnold,

Plaintiffs appeal from the refusal of their motion for new trial in this action of trespass for personal injuries to plaintiff-wife, arising out of an automobile collision. The case was tried before a jury and resulted in a verdict for defendant.

The sole basis for new trial urged on this appeal is that the court below erred in its affirmance of defendant’s seventh point for charge, which read: “Mrs. Sullivan, in making a turn into a private driveway from a through highway where the speed limit was 50 miles per hour, is to be held strictly accountable for the manner in which she drove.” Prior to so charging, the court had fully and properly charged the jury on negligence and contributory negligence in all respects.

On the day in question, plaintiff-wife was driving westerly, and defendant was operating his automobile in an easterly direction, on route 322 in the village of Fontana. The highway is 22 feet in width and has a black top surface. As plaintiff reached a point opposite a private driveway to her left, she stopped on the berm on her right side to permit a truck, travelling in the same direction, to pass her. She then looked to the west and, observing no approaching traffic, turned left to proceed towards the private driveway. When she was approximately one-half of the distance across the highway she saw defendant approaching from the west at a fast rate of speed, and at a distance of about 400 feet. From the point of impact there is a clear view to the west for as much as 662 feet. Plaintiff estimated defendant’s speed at 50 to 70 miles per hour. The evidence also established that there were “two unbroken parallel skid marks 60 feet long on the eastbound lane from the debris west.” Defendant and his witness testified to a speed of approximately 40 miles per hour; that plaintiff “darted across the street”; and that he could not avoid striking her. The speed limit was 50 miles per hour.

A careful examination of the charge is convincing that the jury was fully informed and could have been under no misapprehension as to the law or the facts. As the court below well said:

“Under these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the plaintiff-operator was under the same duty of care as if she were entering a through highway . . .

“. . . it is clear that this plaintiff, after stopping on the north berm of said through highway, upon entering the through highway, observed the defendant’s car approaching from her right, but continued to cross said highway in front of it although she had ample opportunity to stop and avoid the collision. While she complied with the duty of stopping her car before entering the through highway and complied with the requirements that she should look in both directions before entering the intersection, her duty did not end there. She was required to yield the right of way to vehicles approaching from either direction on the through highway. When she moved forward and entered the intersection it was also her duty to continue to look as she advanced in the intersection and to keep her car under control so she could stop at any moment to avoid a collision. . . .

“As to defendant’s seventh Point for Charge, the plaintiffs argue that said Point was tantamount to said court charging the jury that if plaintiff made a turn into a private driveway into [from] a through highway and an accident resulted she was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law and that it placed an unfair burden upon the plaintiff. With this argument we cannot agree. 'The phrase in said point, ‘to be held strictly accountable for the manner in which she drove’, merely means that she would be answerable and liable for any negligence which the jury would find that she was guilty of. The construction of the words, ‘strictly accountable,’ is said to mean, in the New World Dictionary based on Webster, ‘answerable, responsible, and liable to be called to account’. In ‘Words and Phrases,’ Volume 1, ‘accountable’ is defined to be ‘liable for’. Wherefore, under the law, and the proper construction of the term used, we are of the opinion that the plaintiffs were not prejudiced by the averment (s) of the said Point(s) for Charge . ..”

Judgment affirmed.