Sullivan Equity Partners, LLC v. City of Los Angeles

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 10, 2025
• Docket: 24-2893
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 10 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SULLIVAN EQUITY PARTNERS, LLC, a No. 24-2893 Delaware limited liability company, D.C. No. 2:16-cv-07148-CAS-AGR Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM*

CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a Charter City,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 3, 2025 Pasadena, California

Before: CLIFTON, IKUTA, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff Sullivan Equity Partners, LLC, appeals a district court order

dismissing its complaint with prejudice. The district court held that this federal

action was precluded by an earlier state court proceeding. We have jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and, under de novo review, we affirm. See Garity v.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. APWU Nat’l Lab. Org., 828 F.3d 848, 854 (9th Cir. 2016).

1. The district court correctly applied issue preclusion. Federal courts

afford “the same preclusive effect to state court judgments that those judgments

would be given in that state’s own courts.” Clements v. Airport Auth. of Washoe

Cnty., 69 F.3d 321, 326 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738). We thus turn to

California law, which applies issue preclusion “(1) after final adjudication (2) of an

identical issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit and (4)

asserted against one who was a party in the first suit or one in privity with that

party.” DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber, 352 P.3d 378, 387–88 (Cal. 2015).

These requirements are satisfied here. Sullivan Equity initiated a mandamus

proceeding in California state court that resulted in a final judgment. The central

issue in both the state mandamus proceeding and the federal action was the alleged

unfairness of the administrative hearings. Sullivan Equity actually litigated that

issue in state court, and it did so with reliance on the administrative record, newly

introduced documentary evidence, and excerpts from two depositions.

Sullivan Equity suggests that the state mandamus proceeding limited its

ability to introduce certain relevant evidence, thereby depriving it of the

opportunity to fully and fairly litigate. But Sullivan Equity had such an

opportunity before the state court. Twice, it moved to introduce documentary

evidence. Although the state court denied the admission of most of that evidence,

2 24-2893 it did so because Sullivan Equity “provide[d] no legal argument” for its

introduction. The court considered—and for the most part admitted—every piece

of evidence for which Sullivan Equity advanced specific arguments. “The fact that

[Sullivan Equity] failed to avail [it]self of the full procedures provided by state law

does not constitute a sign of their inadequacy.” Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp.,

456 U.S. 461, 485 (1982).

Moreover, Sullivan Equity has not shown that the additional evidence it

sought to admit “could readily cause a different result.” Collins v. D.R. Horton,

Inc., 505 F.3d 874, 881 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,

439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979)). Because Sullivan Equity has “fail[ed] to point to facts

that it was unable to present or how these facts would have affected the outcome,”

we conclude that it “had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue[]” of

fairness before the state court. Ross v. Alaska, 189 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir.

1999).

2. Sullivan Equity’s other arguments lack merit. It contends that its

reservation under England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375

U.S. 411 (1964), prohibits the application of issue preclusion, but England

reservations do not insulate parties from the preclusion of issues “necessarily

decided in state court,” even if the parties were required to “litigate in state court

pursuant to Pullman.” San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. San Francisco City & County, 364

3 24-2893 F.3d 1088, 1096 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’d, 545 U.S. 323 (2005). It argues that state

decisions should not preclude the litigation of constitutional rights in federal

§ 1983 suits, but “[s]tate court decisions” are “entitled to the same preclusive effect

in a § 1983 action as in any other action.” White v. City of Pasadena, 671 F.3d

918, 927 (9th Cir. 2012).

Sullivan Equity further asserts that two cases—Jamgotchian v. Ferraro, 93

F.4th 1150 (9th Cir. 2024), and United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co.,

384 U.S. 394 (1966)—prevent issue preclusion from attaching to the state court

decision. Neither case governs here, however, because both cases involve the

preclusive effects of administrative decisions, not state court decisions, on

subsequent federal actions. See Jamgotchian, 93 F.4th at 1152 (considering

“whether a state agency decision precludes [a] § 1983 lawsuit”); Utah Constr., 384

U.S. at 422 (explaining when preclusive effects can attach to an agency’s

decision). Moreover, Sullivan Equity suggests that the district court prematurely

dismissed its Takings Clause argument without adequate consideration, but the

court had already considered and rejected that very argument in an earlier order.1

Finally, Sullivan Equity tries to reargue the merits, claiming that the

1 Because Sullivan Equity did not “specifically and distinctly” raise an argument regarding its other requests for declaratory relief in its opening brief, that issue has been forfeited. Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 2001).

4 24-2893 administrative proceeding was unfair and that the agency fabricated evidence. The

sole question before us is not whether the state court reached the right decision, but

whether issue preclusion applies. See Chen ex rel. Chen v. Albany Unified Sch.

Dist., 56 F.4th 708, 726 (9th Cir. 2022); Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Ct.,

954 P.2d 511, 516 (Cal. 1998) (“[U]nder the doctrines of res judicata and collateral

estoppel a judgment may not be collaterally attacked on the ground that evidence

was falsified or destroyed.”). For the reasons discussed, we conclude that it does.

AFFIRMED.

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