Sugey Yajaira Hernandez Rojas v. General Motors LLC, et al.

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: February 12, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-06844
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 JS-6 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SUGEY YAJAIRA HERNANDEZ Case No. 2:25-cv-06844-FLA (JCx) ROJAS, 12 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S Plaintiff, 13 MOTION TO REMAND AND v. DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST 14 FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND

COSTS [DKT. 14] 15 GENERAL MOTORS LLC, et al., 16 Defendants.

19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 RULING 2 Before the court is Plaintiff Sugey Yajaira Hernandez Rojas’ (“Plaintiff”) 3 Motion to Remand (“Motion”) this action to the Los Angeles County Superior Court. 4 Dkt. 14 (“Mot.”). Plaintiff also requests attorney’s fees and costs of $2,866.50, 5 incurred because of Defendant General Motors LLC’s (“Defendant”) allegedly 6 untimely removal. Id. at 12–13.1 On September 16, 2025, the court found this matter 7 appropriate for resolution without oral argument and vacated the September 19, 2025 8 hearing on the Motion. Dkt. 23; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Local Rule 7-15. 9 For the reasons set forth herein, the court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion and 10 REMANDS this action to the Los Angeles County Superior Court. The court 11 DENIES Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees and costs. 12 BACKGROUND 13 Plaintiff filed her Complaint in this action on March 13, 2025, in the Los 14 Angeles County Superior Court, Case No. 25STCV07235, alleging violations of the 15 Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2) and the Magnuson- 16 Moss Warranty Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312), as well as breach of the implied 17 warranty of merchantability (Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1791.1, 1794), relating to her purchase 18 of a 2021 Chevrolet Silverado (the “Vehicle”) from Defendant. Dkt. 1-1 (“Compl.”)2 19 ¶¶ 6–44. 20 Defendant answered Plaintiff’s Complaint on April 17, 2025. Dkt. 1-2 at 2–9; 21 Dkt. 1 at 2. Defendant removed the action to this court over three months later, on 22 July 25, 2025, alleging it had now “conducted a preliminary investigation and 23 determined that Plaintiff’s citizenship and the reasonable, non-speculative estimation 24 of the amount in controversy placed at issue through Plaintiff’s allegations plausibly 25

26 1 The court cites documents by the page numbers added by the court’s CM/ECF 27 System, rather than any page numbers included natively. 28 2 Citations to the Complaint refer to pages 10 through 17 of Dkt. 1-1. 1 give rise to subject matter jurisdiction.” Dkt. 1 at 2. 2 Plaintiff filed the subject Motion on August 8, 2025, arguing, inter alia, that 3 Defendant failed to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 1446(1)(b)(3)’s (“Section 1446”) thirty- 4 day window to remove an action to state court. Mot. at 7–12. Plaintiff also seeks 5 attorney’s fees and costs associated with its Motion. Id. at 12–13. Defendant filed an 6 opposition (“Opposition”) on August 29, 2025. Dkt. 17 (“Opp’n”). 7 DISCUSSION 8 I. Legal Standard 9 Federal courts are courts of “limited jurisdiction,” possessing only “power 10 authorized by the Constitution and statute[.]” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 11 Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Federal courts are 12 presumed to lack jurisdiction unless the contrary appears affirmatively from the 13 record. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n. 3 (2006). “Article III 14 generally requires a federal court to satisfy itself of its jurisdiction over the subject 15 matter before it considers the merits of a case.” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 16 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). 17 Most commonly, federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction where: (1) an 18 action arises under federal law (federal question jurisdiction), 28 U.S.C. § 1331; or 19 (2) the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and the 20 citizenship of each plaintiff is diverse from that of each defendant (diversity 21 jurisdiction), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Except as otherwise provided by an act of 22 Congress expressly, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district 23 courts of the United States have original jurisdiction[] may be removed by the 24 defendant or the defendants” to the district court for the district and division where the 25 action is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. 26 However, pursuant to Section 1446(b)(1), a notice of removal must be filed 27 within thirty days after a defendant receives the initial pleading or summons. Section 28 1446 is strictly construed against removal. If removability is not apparent from the 1 initial pleading, the thirty-day removal period accrues “thirty days after receipt by the 2 defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, 3 order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which 4 is or has become removable.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). “If a notice of removal is filed 5 after this thirty-day window, it is untimely and remand to state court is therefore 6 appropriate.” Babasa v. LensCrafters, Inc., 498 F.3d 972, 974 (9th Cir. 2007). 7 A defendant’s notice of removal must include “a plausible allegation that the 8 amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Dart Cherokee Basin 9 Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014). “[W]hen the plaintiff contests, or 10 the court questions, the defendant’s allegation,” “both sides [must] submit proof,” at 11 which point “the court decides, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the 12 amount-in-controversy requirement has been satisfied.” Id. at 88–89. Courts “strictly 13 construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction,” and “[f]ederal jurisdiction 14 must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” 15 Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). “The ‘strong presumption’ 16 against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of 17 establishing that removal is proper.” Id. 18 II. Analysis 19 Plaintiff argues remand is appropriate because Defendant failed to remove the 20 action timely. Mot. at 7–12. The court agrees. Plaintiff filed the action in state court 21 on March 13, 2025, and Defendant did not file its Notice of Removal until more than 22 four months later—on July 25, 2025—well outside Section 1446’s thirty-day window 23 for removal. Compare Dkt. 1, with Dkts. 1-1, 1-2. Defendant argues removal was 24 timely because the Complaint did not establish the $50,000 amount in controversy3 25 unequivocally and clearly. Opp’n at 18–19. 26 27 3 See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3)(B), creating a private cause of action for consumers under the Magnusson-Moss Act, but permitting claims to be filed in federal courts 28 1 Although the Complaint does not contain a clearly stated amount in 2 controversy, see generally, Compl., Plaintiff served Defendant with the retail 3 installment sales contract (“RISC”) for the Vehicle, identifying a total sales price of 4 $70,188.56, on June 23, 2025, thirty-two-days before Defendant’s removal. Mot. at 5; 5 Dkts. 14-1 ¶ 7, 14-3 at 1. Defendant responds it did not receive the RISC until July 6 16, 2025, which was within the thirty-day window. Opp’n at 23. The evidence before 7 the court consists of a single declaration by Plaintiff attesting the RISC was served on 8 June 23, 2025, Dkts. 14-1 ¶ 7, 14-3, and a single declaration by Defendant stating 9 disclosure occurred on July 16, 2025, Dkts. 17-1 ¶ 2, 17-2 at 2–4. Nothing more. 10 A court must reject “[f]ederal jurisdiction … if there is any doubt as to the right 11 of removal in the first instance.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. Such doubt exists here.4 12 Defendant, who bears the burden of proof on removal, has failed to submit sufficient 13 evidence it did not learn the amount in controversy exceeded $50,000 within thirty 14 days before its removal of the action.5 15 Defendant also argues Plaintiff’s citizenship could not be determined from the 16 Complaint and RISC, thereby extending the period of removability. Opp’n at 20–21. 17

18 only if the amount in controversy is at least “$50,000 (exclusive of interests and costs) 19 computed on the basis of all claims to be determined in this suit[.]”). 20 4 Defendant also argues the RISC “is not unequivocally clear and certain as to actual damages because it only provides the purchase price—not the value of other necessary 21 offsets.” Opp’n at 23–24. This argument is meritless as the RISC identified a sales 22 price well above the $50,000 threshold, and Defendant does not identify what pleading or paper—beside the RISC—it eventually relied upon to conclude that the 23 amount in controversy exceeded $50,000, that it did not possess or could not acquire 24 during the 30-day window. See generally, Dkt. 1; Opp’n. 25 5 Defendant argues the January 1, 2025 Song-Beverly Act amendments “expanded the formula for actual damages” to include “negative equity …, manufacturer’s rebate[s] 26 …, any third party sold optional equipment …, and unpaid financing.” Opp’n at 22. 27 Defendant, however, fails to identify how this new formula prevented its determination of removability within thirty days of service of the RISC. See 28 generally, Opp’n. 1 The Complaint, however, states Plaintiff “is, and at all times relevant herein was, a 2 resident of San Jose, California.” Compl. ¶ 2. Defendant’s reliance on Plaintiff’s use 3 of the term “resident,” rather than “citizen,” to claim indeterminate citizenship is 4 unavailing. Opp’n at 20–21. Defendant’s Notice of Removal also states Defendant’s 5 “preliminary investigation also concluded that Plaintiff resided in California when 6 [s]he purchased the subject vehicle, and on other occasions, establishing a plausible 7 basis for intent to remain in California thus providing a plausible basis for 8 citizenship.” Dkt. 1 at 3. Defendant does not explain the nature of its “investigation” 9 or why it could not have determined any earlier that Plaintiff was a citizen of 10 California given that “Plaintiff resided in California when [s]he purchased the subject 11 vehicle[.]” Id. 12 Accordingly, the court finds Defendant has failed to carry its burden of 13 plausibly establishing this court’s jurisdiction, which is strictly construed against 14 removal, as Defendant had ample information at its disposal to remove the action 15 before July 16, 2025, and within the permitted thirty-day period. See Gaus, 980 F.2d 16 at 566. The court, therefore, GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion and REMANDS the action 17 to the Los Angeles County Superior Court. 18 III. Attorney’s Fees 19 When remanding a case, a court may, in its discretion, “require payment of just 20 costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the 21 removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see also Jordan v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 781 F.3d 22 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2015). Typically, a court may only award fees and costs when 23 “the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.” 24 Jordan, 781 F.3d at 1184 (quoting Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 25 141 (2005)). Courts in the Ninth Circuit apply “an objectively reasonable standard by 26 looking to the clarity of the law at the time of removal.” Lussier v. Dollar Tree 27 Stores, Inc., 518 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Martin, 546 U.S. at 141). 28 The court finds the evidence insufficient to warrant an award of attorney’s fees 1 in this case. The court cannot say Defendant “lacked an objectively reasonable basis 2 | for seeking removal” here. Jordan, 781 F.3d at 1184. Accordingly, the court declines 3 || to exercise its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) to award Plaintiff attorney’s fees 4 | and costs. 5 CONCLUSION 6 The court, having considered Plaintiff's Motion and finding good cause 7 | therefor, hereby GRANTS the Motion and ORDERS as follows: 8 1. This action is REMANDED to the Los Angeles County Superior Court, 9 Case No. 25STCV07235. 10 2. All dates and deadlines in this action are VACATED. 1] 3. The clerk of the court shall close this action administratively. 12 4. Plaintiff's request for attorney’s fees and costs is DENIED. 13 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 16 | Dated: February 12, 2026

18 : FERNANDO L. AENLLE-ROCHA 19 United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28