Sue Dale v. FCA US, LLC; and Does 1 through 10, inclusive

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: October 14, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00868
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 SUE DALE, No. 2:25-cv-00868 WBS JDP 13 Plaintiff, 14 v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 15 DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR FCA US, LLC; and DOES 1 through JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 16 10, inclusive, 17 Defendants. 18 19 20 ----oo0oo---- 21 Plaintiff Sue Dale brought this action alleging various 22 violations of California’s Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act 23 (the “Song-Beverly Act”) and fraudulent concealment against 24 defendant FCA US, LLC (“FCA”). (Docket No. 1-1 at 2-14.) 25 Plaintiff’s claims arise out of her purchase of an allegedly 26 defective vehicle manufactured by FCA, which she purchased from 27 co-defendant Autonation Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram Roseville 28 (“Autonation”). (See id.) 1 Defendant FCA now moves for judgment on the pleadings 2 on plaintiff’s claims against it on the grounds that plaintiff’s 3 claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, and 4 plaintiff has failed to adequately plead the merits of her 5 claims. (See Docket No. 10.) 1 6 I. Factual Background 7 On or about September 5, 2016, plaintiff entered into a 8 warranty contract with FCA regarding her vehicle, a 2017 Chrysler 9 Pacifica equipped with a nine-speed transmission. (See Docket 10 No. 1-1 at 3, 5.) Plaintiff claims that 2017 Chrysler Pacifica 11 vehicles equipped with nine-speed transmissions have a defective 12 transmission that may cause symptoms such as loss of power, 13 jerking, difficulty merging, and difficulty upon acceleration. 14 (See id. at 5.) Notably, plaintiff does not describe the nature 15 or symptoms of the transmission defect she claims is present in 16 her vehicle. (See id.) 17 Plaintiff alleges four violations of the Song-Beverly 18 Act against FCA: (1) FCA failed to timely replace her vehicle or 19 make restitution to her; (2) FCA failed to commence repairs of 20 her vehicle within a reasonable time and failed to repair her 21 vehicle to conform with the applicable warranties within thirty 22 days; (3) FCA failed to make available to its repair facilities 23 sufficient service literature and replacement parts to effect 24 repairs during the express warranty period; and (4) FCA breached 25 the implied warranty of merchantability. (See id. at 8-12.) 26

27 1 The motion is decided on the papers without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 230. The scheduled October 27, 2025 28 hearing on the motion is hereby VACATED. 1 Plaintiff also alleges that FCA committed fraudulent concealment 2 by concealing the existence of the alleged transmission defect. 3 (See id. at 12-13.) 4 II. Legal Standard 5 “After the pleadings are closed – but early enough not 6 to delay trial – a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” 7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). “Judgment on the pleadings is proper when 8 the moving party clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings 9 that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that it 10 is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Hal Roach Studios, 11 Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 12 1989). “A motion brought under Rule 12(c) is functionally 13 identical to one brought pursuant to Rule 12(b), and the same 14 standard of review applicable to a Rule 12(b) motion applies to 15 its Rule 12(c) analog.” Stoutt v. Travis Credit Union, 512 16 F.Supp.3d 1048, 1050 (E.D. Cal. 2021) (citation modified). 17 “Therefore, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the 18 factual allegations of the non-moving party are taken as true.” 19 Gutierrez v. RWD Techs., Inc., 279 F.Supp.2d 1223, 1224 (E.D. 20 Cal. 2003). 21 III. Discussion 22 A. Statutes of Limitations 23 “The Song–Beverly Act does not include its own statute 24 of limitations.” Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc., 174 Cal. App. 25 4th 1297, 1305–06, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 285 (2009). Accordingly, 26 “California courts have held that the statute of limitations for 27 an action for breach of warranty under the Song-Beverly Act is 28 1 governed by . . . section 2725 of the Uniform Commercial Code.” 2 Id. Under Section 2725, Song-Beverly Act claims are “subject to 3 a four-year statute of limitations period that commences when the 4 action accrues.” Schick v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 801 F.App'x 519, 5 520 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Cal. Com. Code § 2725(1)). Under 6 California’s “discovery rule,” the “four-year statute of 7 limitations begins to run only ‘when the breach is or should have 8 been discovered.’” Id. (quoting Cal. Com. Code § 2725(2)); see 9 also Tanner v. Ford Motor Co., 424 F.Supp.3d 666, 671 (N.D. Cal. 10 2019) (same). 11 Plaintiff’s fraudulent concealment claim is subject to 12 a three-year statute of limitations. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 13 338(d); see Yetter v. Ford Motor Co., 428 F.Supp.3d 210, 221 14 (N.D. Cal. 2019). “Under California law, a fraud claim does not 15 accrue until the plaintiff's discovery of facts constituting the 16 fraud.” Sharaf v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., 719 F.App'x 618, 621 17 (9th Cir. 2018). 18 Plaintiff does not specify exactly when she discovered 19 the alleged transmission defect or facts allegedly constituting 20 fraud. She states that she did not discover FCA’s alleged 21 “wrongful conduct . . . until shortly before the filing of the 22 complaint” because her vehicle “continued to exhibit symptoms of 23 defects following Defendant FCA’s unsuccessful attempts to repair 24 them.” (Docket No. 1-1 at 8, 12-14.) Based on these assertions, 25 the court cannot say that there is “no set of set of facts that 26 would establish the timeliness of [plaintiff’s] claim[s].” 27 Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. U.S., 68 F.3d 1204, 1206 (9th Cir. 28 1 1995). Accordingly, plaintiff’s Song-Beverly Act and fraudulent 2 concealment claims are not barred by the statute of limitations. 3 B. Song-Beverly Act Claims 4 Plaintiff claims that FCA violated Sections 1793.2(d), 5 1793.2(b), and 1793.2(a)(3) of the Song-Beverly Act. (See Docket 6 No. 1-1.) Plaintiff also claims that FCA breached the implied 7 warranty of merchantability under the Song-Beverly Act. (See 8 id.) 9 i. Section 1793.2(d) 10 For plaintiff to establish a violation of Section 11 1793.2(d), she must show: “(1) the vehicle had a nonconformity 12 covered by the express warranty that substantially impaired the 13 use, value or safety of the vehicle (the nonconformity element); 14 (2) the vehicle was presented to an authorized representative of 15 the manufacturer of the vehicle for repair (the presentation 16 element); and (3) the manufacturer or his representative did not 17 repair the nonconformity after a reasonable number of repair 18 attempts (the failure to repair element).” Donlen v. Ford Motor 19 Co., 217 Cal.App.4th 138, 152, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 180 (2013). 20 Plaintiff states that “Defendant FCA and its 21 representatives in this state have been unable to service or 22 repair the Vehicle to conform to the applicable express 23 warranties after a reasonable number of opportunities” and that 24 “Defendant FCA failed to promptly replace the Vehicle or make 25 restitution to Plaintiff as required by Civil Code section 26 1793.2, subdivision (d) and Civil Code section 1793.1, 27 subdivision (a)(2).” (Docket No. 1-1 at 8.) 28 1 Considered under the liberal pleading requirements of 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), these allegations are 3 sufficient to state a claim under Section 1793.2(d) of the Song- 4 Beverly Act. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Ford Motor Co., 680 5 F.Supp.3d 1177, 1188-89 (C.D. Cal. 2023) (finding plaintiff 6 adequately pled claim when plaintiff stated he presented the 7 alleged defect for repair multiple times). 8 ii. Section 1793.2(b) 9 Section 1793.2(b) requires manufacturers to “service[] 10 or repair[]” an alleged defect “so as to conform to the 11 applicable warranties within 30 days.” Cal. Civ. Code § 12 1793.2(b). 13 Plaintiff alleges that FCA failed to commence the 14 service or repair of her vehicle within a reasonable time and 15 failed to service or repair her vehicle to conform to the 16 applicable warranties within thirty days (See Docket No. 1-1 at 17 9.) This is sufficient to state a violation of Section 1793.2(b) 18 of the Song-Beverly Act. Cf. Guzzetta v. Ford Motor Co., No. 19 2:21-cv-09151 MEMF PVC, 2023 WL 5207429, at *6-7 (finding 20 plaintiff had adequately stated a claim despite not indicating 21 when the alleged defects were serviced or repaired because, 22 “drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, the 23 [complaint] suggest[ed] that” the manufacturer “failed to service 24 or repair the [v]ehicle so as to conform with” FCA’s warranty 25 within thirty days). 26 iii. Section 1793.2(a)(3) 27 Under Section 1793.2(a)(3), manufacturers must “[m]ake 28 1 available to authorized service and repair facilities sufficient 2 service literature and replacement parts to effect repairs during 3 the express warranty period.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(a)(3). 4 Plaintiff alleges FCA failed to make sufficient service 5 literature and replacement parts available to its authorized 6 service and repair facilities. (Docket No. 1-1 at 10.) It is 7 unclear what more plaintiff could allege to state a claim under 8 this section given that plaintiff is unlikely to be aware of the 9 specifics of the service literature and replacement parts at the 10 pleading stage. Accordingly, plaintiff has adequately pled a 11 claim for violation of Section 1793.2(a)(3) of the Song-Beverly 12 Act. 13 iv. Implied Warranty 14 “Pursuant to the Song–Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, 15 ‘every sale of consumer goods that are sold at retail in 16 [California] shall be accompanied by the manufacturer's and the 17 retail seller's implied warranty that the goods are 18 merchantable.’” Daniel v. Ford Motor Co., 806 F.3d 1217, 1222 19 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 1792). The implied 20 warranty of merchantability guarantees that goods: “(1) Pass 21 without objection in the trade under the contract description. 22 (2) Are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are 23 used. (3) Are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled. (4) 24 Conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the 25 container or label.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1791.1. “Thus, a 26 plaintiff claiming breach of an implied warranty of 27 merchantability must show that the product did not possess even 28 1 the most basic degree of fitness for ordinary use.” Keegan v. 2 Am. Honda Motor Co., 838 F.Supp.2d 929, 945 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 3 Plaintiff alleges that the implied warranty of 4 merchantability was breached because 2017 Chrysler Pacifica 5 vehicles with nine-speed transmissions possess a transmission 6 defect that may make them more difficult to operate. (See Docket 7 No. 1-1 at 5, 11.) She then alleges that the existence of this 8 defect “constitutes a breach of the implied warranty because 9 [her] [v]ehicle (1) does not pass without objection in the trade 10 under the contract description, (2) is not fit for the ordinary 11 purposes for which such goods are used, (3) is not adequately 12 contained, packaged, and labelled, and (4) does not conform to 13 the promises or affirmations made on the container or label.” 14 (Id. at 11.) 15 Plaintiff further states that defendant breached the 16 implied warranty of merchantability because her vehicle contained 17 a latent transmission defect that rendered it unfit for its 18 ordinary purpose. (Docket No. 1-1 at 5, 11.). Plaintiff alleges 19 that the transmission defect is a “safety concern because it 20 severely affects the driver’s ability to control the car’s speed, 21 acceleration, and deceleration.” (Id. at 5.) She claims that 22 “these conditions make it difficult to safely merge into traffic 23 or may cause a sudden loss of power while in motion” and that the 24 transmission defect “can [also] cause the vehicle to fail without 25 warning, while [it] is moving at highway speeds.” Id. 26 Defendant argues that plaintiff’s implied warranty 27 claim must fail because there is no privity of contract between 28 1 plaintiff and FCA. (See Docket No. 10 at 16.) However, the 2 privity requirement defendant invokes by citing Burr v. Sherwin 3 Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 695 (1954), applies to a provision 4 of California’s Civil Code not at issue here. (See Docket No. 10 5 at 16.) That other California statutes require vertical privity 6 to bring an implied warranty of merchantability claim does not 7 alter the fact that “[t]he privity requirement is not required 8 for an implied warranty of merchantability claim brought under 9 California’s Song-Beverly Act.” Allen, 96 F. Supp. 3d at 1075. 10 “Vehicles subject to . . . failure cannot be said to be 11 merchantable.” Cholakyan v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 796 F. Supp. 12 2d 1220, 1244 (C.D. Cal. 2011). Accordingly, the court concludes 13 that plaintiff has adequately pled a claim for breach of the 14 implied warranty of merchantability under the Song-Beverly Act. 15 C. Fraudulent Concealment 16 The elements of a claim for fraudulent concealment 17 under California law are: “(1) the defendant must have concealed 18 or suppressed a material fact; (2) the defendant must have been 19 under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff; (3) the 20 defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the 21 fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff; (4) the plaintiff 22 must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he 23 did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) 24 as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the 25 plaintiff must have sustained damage.” Shanmugam v. Mercedes- 26 Benz USA, LLC, No. 2:20-cv-01647 WBS KJN, 2021 WL 2227876, at *3 27 (E.D. Cal. June 2, 2021). 28 1 “It is well-settled that the Federal Rules of Civil 2 Procedure apply in federal court, irrespective of the source of 3 the subject matter jurisdiction, and irrespective of whether the 4 substantive law at issue is state or federal.” Kearns v. Ford 5 Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation 6 modified). The court therefore evaluates plaintiff’s fraud claim 7 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)’s requirement 8 that a party who alleges fraud state the circumstances of the 9 alleged fraud with “particularity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); Vess 10 v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2003). 11 Plaintiff’s fraud claim falls short of what Rule 9(b) 12 requires. Critically, plaintiff does not adequately plead that 13 her vehicle possessed a defect FCA failed to disclose. See, 14 e.g., Stewart v. Electrolux Home Prods., Inc., 304 F.Supp.3d 894, 15 907 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (O’Neill, C.J.); DeCoteau v. FCA US LLC, No. 16 2:15-cv-00020 MCE EFB, 2015 WL 6951296, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 17 2015) (To satisfy federal pleading requirements, “[p]laintiff[] 18 must go further than a conclusory allegation that the 19 [t]ransmission [d]efect exists and is responsible for the 20 injuries outlined in the [complaint] because automatic 21 transmissions . . . are complicated systems that demand more 22 detailed factual allegations in order to identify a plausible 23 defect.”). 24 Plaintiff alleges only that “Defendant FCA knowingly 25 and intentionally concealed material facts” regarding a purported 26 transmission defect present in 2017 Chrysler Pacifica vehicles 27 generally. (Docket No. 1-1 at 5-6, 13-14.). She does not state 28 eee I EIR EEE cm IOI IO RO III ISIN OS IEE III ED eee

1 . what material facts were concealed or suppressed, how she would 2 have acted differently if such facts had been disclosed to her, 3 or how she was damaged by such nondisclosure. See Stewart, 304 4 F.Supop.3d at 907; see also Eisen v. Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc., 5 No. cv-11-9405 CAS FEMX, 2012 WL 841019, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 6 22, 2012) (noting that plaintiff did not explain how defective 7 aspect of vehicle actually failed). 8 Accordingly, because plaintiff has failed to plead her 9 fraudulent concealment claim with particularity, defendant’s 10 motion for judgment on the pleadings must be granted on that 11 claim. 12 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant’s motion for 13 judgment on the pleadings be, and the same is, hereby DENIED on 14 plaintiff’s claims under the Song-Beverly Act, and GRANTED on 15 plaintiff’s claim for fraudulent concealment. Plaintiff is given 16 14 days from the date of this Order to file an amended complaint 17 if she can do so consistent with this Order.? 18 , . Dated: October 14, 2025 rb them. hd. bE—~ 19 WILLIAM B. SHUBB 50 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 21 22 23 24 25 26 2 See Special Dist. Risk Mgmt. Auth. v. Munich Reinsurance Am., Inc., 562 F.Supp.3d 989, 994 (E.D. Cal. 2021) (“Courts have 27 discretion in appropriate cases to grant a Rule 12(c) motion with leave to amend, or to simply grant dismissal of the action 28 | instead of entry of judgment .4,