Succession of Kemp v. Robertson

316 So. 2d 919
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedOctober 22, 1975
Docket10265
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 316 So. 2d 919 (Succession of Kemp v. Robertson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Succession of Kemp v. Robertson, 316 So. 2d 919 (La. Ct. App. 1975).

Opinion

316 So.2d 919 (1975)

SUCCESSION of Bolivar E. KEMP, Jr. (Batson Lumber Co., Inc., and Reimers-Schneider Co., Inc., Substituted Plaintiffs and Appellees),
v.
Helen Edwards ROBERTSON (Guy Wells, Executor of Succession of Helen Edwards Robertson, Substituted Defendant and Appellant).

No. 10265.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

June 30, 1975.
Rehearing Denied August 26, 1975.
Writ Refused October 22, 1975.

*921 J. Harrison Henderson, III, New Orleans, and Wm. McM. King, Covington, for defendant and appellant.

Henry A. Mentz, Jr., Hammond, Allen B. Pierson, Jr., Ponchatoula, for plaintiffs and appellees.

Before LANDRY, BLANCHE and YELVERTON, JJ.

LANDRY, Judge.

Defendant Guy Wells (Wells), Executor of the Estate of his aunt, Helen Edwards Robertson (Mae Edwards) appeals from judgment recognizing plaintiffs Batson Lumber Co., Inc., (Batson) and Reimers-Schneider Co., Inc. (R-S) as owners of a disputed 298.70 acre tract of land known as the Bedico Tract, situated in Headright 45, T-7-S, R-9-E, Tangipahoa Parish. The trial court held that Appellant failed to establish title to subject property by 30 years adverse possession upon finding that the possession relied upon was not exclusive possession but was precarious or mixed possession. We affirm.

This litigation originated as a possessory action brought by Menette Wilson Kemp, Widow of Bolivar E. Kemp, Jr., deceased, against Mae Edwards, on January 4, 1967. Mrs. Kemp alleged that her deceased husband acquired possession of subject lands through an unbroken chain of title originating from a Succession Sale to Bolivar E. Kemp, Sr., on November 18, 1905. Plaintiff also alleged that on October 8, and October 17, 1966, Mae Edwards disturbed plaintiff's possession by claiming ownership of the land and demanding that Bolivar E. Kemp, Jr., quit claim the land to defendant Mae Edwards.

Defendant answered denying plaintiff's possession, and filed a reconventional demand in which defendant asserted ownership of the property by virtue of thirty years adverse possession commencing in 1934. Defendant alternatively asserted a claim for caretaker's services for 33 years at $200.00 per month, or the sum of $79,200.00. Mae Edwards died before trial. Wells, nephew and sole legatee under the will of Mae Edwards, was substituted as defendant herein in said decedent's stead.

Subsequent to the filing of defendant's answer and reconventional demand, Batson and R-S joined in these proceedings as plaintiffs. As parties, Batson and R-S claim ownership of the land by virtue of conveyances dated June 16, 1972, from Olivette Garrison and Eloise Heidelberg who, in turn, acquired through the Kemps.

On the date of trial Wells moved to amend the original answer to allege adverse possession of Mae Edwards commencing in 1920 instead of 1934, as initially asserted. Upon plaintiffs objecting to said proposed amendment, the trial court offered to grant plaintiffs a continuance to meet this important new allegation. Plaintiffs elected to decline the continuance and proceed to trial.

The record discloses that Bolivar E. Kemp, Jr., and Mae Edwards were related. However the precise nature of the relationship is not made clear by the evidence. Bolivar E. Kemp, Jr., acquired a ¼ interest in subject lands from the Succession of his father, Bolivar E. Kemp, Sr., on June 25, 1934; a ¼ interest from the Estate of his mother Lallie Conner Kemp, on April 28, 1944, and the remaining ½ interest from his sister, Eleanor Kemp Ellis, on December 22, 1962. It is acknowledged that Kemp's title and also that of Batson and R-S is by unbroken chain emanating from the Successions of Robert T. Edwards and Emily N. Edwards, under date of September 2, 1905. In said Succession proceeding subject tract was sold at Sheriff's Sale pursuant to a duly issued court order to effect a partition of the land. Mae Edwards, as heir of said decedents, was cited in said Succession proceedings with process relating to said partition sale. No attack is herein made on the validity of said partition sale or upon any subsequent *922 link in the chain of title of Batson and R-S.

It is likewise acknowledged that Mae Edwards has no recorded title whatsoever and that all claims asserted through her are predicated upon alleged adverse possession of thirty years. Also conceded is the fact that since acquisition in 1905, the Kemps and their assignees have paid the taxes due each year on the property in question.

The lower court held that Mae Edwards' reconventional demand asserting ownership of the land converted plaintiff's possessory action into a petitory action. The trial court also held that since defendant converted the suit into a petitory action, defendant bore the burden of establishing title. After considering and reviewing the numerous witnesses called by the contending parties, the lower court concluded that defendant failed to establish the type of possession required by LSA-R.C.C. arts. 3499 and 3500 to support a claim of thirty years acquisitive prescription of immovables.

Wells contends the trial court erred in: (1) failing to hold that the claim of ownership by Batson and R-S converted the suit into a petitory action thereby imposing upon said plaintiffs the burden of establishing title good against the world, namely, perfect title from sovereignty, and (2) failing to find that defendant established adverse possession as required by law. In this latter regard, it is urged that the trial court erred in holding that the possession exercised by Mae Edwards was "precarious and mixed" rather than exclusive and adverse.

Relying upon Pure Oil Company v. Skinner, La., 294 So.2d 797, Wells contends that plaintiffs, having converted the suit into a petitory action, bear the burden of establishing perfect title against the world, not just a better title than defendant as possessor. The doctrine of Pure Oil Company, above, can be of no consolation to Appellant since it is Appellant who bears the primary burden of proof under the circumstances of this case.

LSA-C.C.P. Article 3657 pertinently provides as follows:

"When, except as provided in Article 3661(1)-(3), the defendant in a possessory action asserts title in himself, in the alternative or otherwise, he thereby converts the suit into a petitory action, and judicially confesses the possession of the plaintiff in the possessory action."

The foregoing codal authority plainly provides that by claiming ownership of subject property, Mae Edwards, the initial defendant in the possessory action, converted the suit into a petitory action in which defendant became plaintiff. Said claim of ownership also amounted to judicial confession of plaintiff's possession and defendant's lack of possession. Having become plaintiff in the petitory action, the burden shifted to defendant Mae Edwards, and those claiming through her, to make out title against the defendant whose possession is conceded. LSA-C.C.P. Article 3653.

The acquisitive prescription of thirty years relied upon is provided for by LSA-R.C.C. Articles 3499 and 3500 which state:

"Article 3499. The ownership of immovables is prescribed for thirty years without any need of title or possession in good faith."
"Article 3500. The possession on which this prescription is founded must be continuous and uninterrupted during all the time; it must be public and unequivocal, and under the title of owner."

The possession required by LSA-R.C.C.

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Bluebook (online)
316 So. 2d 919, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/succession-of-kemp-v-robertson-lactapp-1975.