Su v. Poros, Inc. d/b/a Bentley's Pancake House

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedMarch 27, 2023
Docket1:21-cv-01944
StatusUnknown

This text of Su v. Poros, Inc. d/b/a Bentley's Pancake House (Su v. Poros, Inc. d/b/a Bentley's Pancake House) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Su v. Poros, Inc. d/b/a Bentley's Pancake House, (N.D. Ill. 2023).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

Martin J. Walsh, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Plaintiff, Case No. 21-cv-1944 v. Judge Mary M. Rowland Poros Inc. d/b/a Bentley’s Pancake House, Pete Giafis, Stavroula Giafis,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Martin J. Walsh, Secretary of Labor, U.S. Department of Labor (“Secretary”) brings this action against Defendants, Poros Inc. d/b/a Bentley’s Pancake House, Pete Giafis and Stavroula Giafis for violating the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (FLSA). The Secretary now moves for summary judgment on his claims against Defendants. For the reasons explained below, the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment [49] is granted in part and denied in part. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD Summary judgment is proper where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The substantive law controls which facts are material. Id. After a “properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party ‘must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 250 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The Court “consider[s] all of the evidence in the record in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party, and [ ] draw[s] all reasonable inferences from that evidence in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.” Logan v. City of Chicago, 4 F.4th 529, 536 (7th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted). The Court “must refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing evidence.” Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., 951 F.3d 429, 467 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). In ruling on summary judgment, the Court gives the non-moving party “the benefit of reasonable

inferences from the evidence, but not speculative inferences in [its] favor.” White v. City of Chicago, 829 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted). “The controlling question is whether a reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of the non-moving party on the evidence submitted in support of and opposition to the motion for summary judgment.” Id. BACKGROUND1 I. Local Rule 56.1

The Court first addresses the Secretary’s argument that Defendants failed to comply with Local Rule 56.1. “Local Rule 56.1 statements serve to streamline the resolution of summary judgment motions by having the parties identify undisputed

1 The facts are taken from the parties’ Rule 56.1 statements and are undisputed unless otherwise noted. The Secretary’s Rule 56.1 statement is at Dkt. 50 (“PSOF”); Defendants’ Rule 56.1 statement is at Dkt. 53 (“DSOF”). Defendants’ response to the Secretary’s statement is at Dkt. 52 (“Def. Resp.”); the Secretary’s response to Defendant’s statement is at Dkt. 56. (“Pl. Resp.”). material facts and cite the supporting evidence.” Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Innovation Landscape, Inc., No. 15 CV 9580, 2019 WL 6699190, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2019). Specifically, under Local Rule 56.1(e), the nonmovant’s response to the

movant’s statement of facts must cite specific evidentiary material that controverts the fact and must concisely explain how the cited material controverts the asserted fact. LR 56.1(e)(3). The Court may deem asserted facts as admitted if not controverted with specific citations to evidentiary material. Id; see also Montano v. City of Chi., 535 F.3d 558, 569 (7th Cir. 2008) (where a party merely disagrees with the movant’s asserted facts, that “is inadequate [to defeat summary judgment] if made without

reference to specific supporting material.”) (quotation omitted). The Seventh Circuit has “consistently upheld district judges’ discretion to require strict compliance with Local Rule 56.1.” Kreg Therapeutics, Inc. v. VitalGo, Inc., 919 F.3d 405, 414 (7th Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted). “We have frequently said that it is within the district court’s discretion to strictly enforce local rules regarding summary judgment by accepting the movant’s version of facts as undisputed if the non-movant has failed to respond in the form required.” Zuppardi v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 770

F.3d 644, 648 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court agrees with the Secretary that a number of responses by Defendants are deficient. In some responses, Defendants appear to concede the fact, but then add new facts or argument, sometimes with no citation to any evidence. Accordingly, the Court will deem admitted certain facts that are not properly disputed. The following are deemed admitted because the Defendants’ responses “object to” or dispute portions of the asserted fact or add new facts and fail to cite to any evidence and/or contain only legal argument: Def. Resp. at ¶¶ 9, 17, 22, 23, 25, 28, 33, 34, and 39–41. Thus, the foregoing asserted facts by the Secretary are deemed admitted.

II. Investigations into Defendant’s Pay Practices Defendant Poros Inc., d/b/a Bentley’s Pancake House (“Poros”) is a full-service restaurant in Bloomingdale, Illinois. PSOF at ¶ 1. Since at least 2018, Defendants Pete Giafis and Stavroula Giafis, who are married, have served as the President and Secretary of Poros respectively. Id. at ¶ 4–5. Pete is responsible for hiring and supervising Poros’ employees while Stavroula is responsible for handling the

employees’ pay as well as supervising and hiring employees. Id. In 2014 the Department of Labor’s (DOL) Wage and Hour Division (WHD) previously investigated Defendants’ employment practices for the period of March 2012 to August 2013. PSOF at ¶ 35. The WHD found that Defendants violated FLSA’s overtime requirements by paying employees at their regular rate for hours worked over 40 per week, rather than paying them the appropriate overtime premium, and violated the recordkeeping requirements by failing to maintain accurate pay and time

records. Id. ¶ 36. At the culmination of the 2014 investigation, Defendants agreed to comply with the FLSA. Id. ¶ 37. The investigation underlying this litigation concerns the period of February 5, 2018 through February 2, 2020 (“Investigation Period”). Id. ¶ 38. During this period, Defendants had approximately 25 employees who were required to record their hours by punching a timecard. Id. at ¶¶ 6-7. Renato Reggiardo (“Reggiardo”) was the investigator assigned to investigate Defendants for that period. DSOF ¶ 1. As a result of the investigation, WHD allege that Defendants violated the FLSA by unlawfully keeping a portion of servers’ tips; paying cooks, dishwashers, and bussers at their

regular rate for hours worked over 40 per week; and failing to keep accurate pay records. PSOF ¶ 39.

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Su v. Poros, Inc. d/b/a Bentley's Pancake House, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/su-v-poros-inc-dba-bentleys-pancake-house-ilnd-2023.