GIBSON, Circuit Judge.
Stuyvesant Insurance Company, a surety for one, Sharon Kathleen Davis, seeks remission of a $10,000 bond forfeiture entered by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The principal of the bond, Davis, failed to appear for a scheduled court trial and neither the surety nor the federal government has been able to locate her or offer any explanation for her nonappearance except willful default. The District Court denied any relief to the surety. We affirm.
The only ground urged on appeal by the surety is that its risks were increased and the terms of the bail bond were enlarged by the District Court without the surety’s knowledge or consent.1 The bail bond followed the illustrative Form 17 in the Appendix of Forms, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and commanded the principal’s appearance before the arraigning court at a time certain,
“ * * * and at such other places as the defendant may be required to ap[525]*525pear, in accordance with any and all orders and directions relating to the defendant’s appearance in the above-entitled matter as may be given or issued [by the Court, and] the defendant is not to depart the Eastern District of Missouri * * *, except in accordance with such orders or warrants as may be issued by [the Court].”2
The surety relies on decisional law that exonerates a surety where the sovereign makes it impossible for the surety to perform, on general contract principles of not holding an obligor to unilateral change in the terms or conditions of a bond and on the equitable principle of justice embraced in Rule 46(f), Fed.R. Crim.P.
Relief on or remission of a bail bond forfeiture in federal courts is now governed by Rule 46,3 which liberalized and supplanted the old statute 18 U.S.C. § 601. The cases prior to the enactment of Rule 46 only allowed relief where the default was not willful, a subsequent trial of the cause could be had, and public justice did not otherwise require the penalty be enforced. Smaldone v. United States, 211 F.2d 161, 163 (10 Cir. 1954).
The early case of Reese v. United States, 76 U.S. 13, 19 L.Ed. 541 (1870) recognized that sureties on bail recognizances are in many respects different from sureties on ordinary bonds or commercial contracts. The sureties can discharge themselves at any time by surrendering the principal and are discharged at the principal’s death. Sureties may also arrest the principal without warrant to effect his appearance in court, but any change in the bail contract, no matter how trivial, made without their consent releases them.4 Another ground for the decision in Reese was that the government had made it impossible for the surety to perform by allowing the principal to leave the United States, recognizing that the surety’s powers of arrest can only be exercised within the United States, and holding: “It would be against all principle and all justice to allow the government to recover against the sureties for not producing their principal, when it had itself consented to his placing himself beyond their reach and control.” 22 of 76 U.S.
We do not think that this case falls within the holding of Reese, supra, in that the government did not make it impossible for the surety to perform; nor [526]*526within the principles enunciated in Hansen v. Edwards, 210 Mo.App. 35, 240 S.W. 489 (1922), where the state sovereign released the principal on extradition to another state sovereign, thus rendering the surety’s performance impossible; or United States v. Craft, 162 F.Supp. 578 (S.D.W.Va.1958), where one federal court prohibited the principal from appearing in another federal district; or United States v. Vendetti, 33 F.Supp. 34 (D.C.Mass.1940), where the principal escaped from the custody of the United States after pleading guilty on another charge — the United States as obligee in the bond took the principal out of the implied custody of the surety without the surety’s consent and then through the carelessness or negligence of the obligee’s agents allowed the principal to escape. Nor do we think that the more liberalized equitable principle of justice as exemplified in Rule 46 commands relief as in Smaldone v. United States, supra, where the Court held it an abuse of the trial judge’s discretion not to afford relief in a case where the principal showed up for trial but defaulted in appearance during the trial in order to have an operation for acute appendicitis, and then several days after the operation the trial was resumed and resulted in a hung jury.
We think that the present factual situation falls within those classes of cases where the sovereign did not render performance by the surety impossible, such as Detroit Fidelity & Surety Co. v. United States, 36 F.2d 682 (6 Cir. 1930) where the Court held that permission of the trial court to leave the jurisdiction did not affect the right of a surety to arrest the principal without warrant, and that a Court rule of the District Court where the bond was executed provided for departure from the jurisdiction by leave of the Court; and United States v. Davis, 202 F.2d 621 (7 Cir. 1953), cert. denied Ferguson v. United States, 345 U.S. 998, 73 S.Ct. 1141, 97 L.Ed. 1404, holding the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in failing to remit any of the forfeited bond where the principal after default was apprehended by the FBI and then pleaded guilty at the suggestion of the surety. The Court in Davis indicated that although it believed the trial court might well have remitted a portion of the forfeited amount, and the trial court’s action was probably “severe or even harsh”, failure to order remittal was not an abuse of discretion.
Davis viewed the bond as a contract between the surety and the government that if the government releases the principal from custody, the surety will undertake that the principal will appear personally at any specified time and place to answer; upon the failure of the principal to so appear, the surety becomes the absolute debtor of the United States for the amount of the penalty. Also pertinent is United States v. Egan, 394 F.2d 262 (2 Cir. 1968), where the Court held that an order requiring the principal to report daily to the marshal which was modified to require a reporting at ten-day intervals was not an enlargement of the conditions of bail nor did it enhance the principal’s chances of absconding.
The surety here has not demonstrated any basis for relief, either legal or equitable.
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GIBSON, Circuit Judge.
Stuyvesant Insurance Company, a surety for one, Sharon Kathleen Davis, seeks remission of a $10,000 bond forfeiture entered by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The principal of the bond, Davis, failed to appear for a scheduled court trial and neither the surety nor the federal government has been able to locate her or offer any explanation for her nonappearance except willful default. The District Court denied any relief to the surety. We affirm.
The only ground urged on appeal by the surety is that its risks were increased and the terms of the bail bond were enlarged by the District Court without the surety’s knowledge or consent.1 The bail bond followed the illustrative Form 17 in the Appendix of Forms, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and commanded the principal’s appearance before the arraigning court at a time certain,
“ * * * and at such other places as the defendant may be required to ap[525]*525pear, in accordance with any and all orders and directions relating to the defendant’s appearance in the above-entitled matter as may be given or issued [by the Court, and] the defendant is not to depart the Eastern District of Missouri * * *, except in accordance with such orders or warrants as may be issued by [the Court].”2
The surety relies on decisional law that exonerates a surety where the sovereign makes it impossible for the surety to perform, on general contract principles of not holding an obligor to unilateral change in the terms or conditions of a bond and on the equitable principle of justice embraced in Rule 46(f), Fed.R. Crim.P.
Relief on or remission of a bail bond forfeiture in federal courts is now governed by Rule 46,3 which liberalized and supplanted the old statute 18 U.S.C. § 601. The cases prior to the enactment of Rule 46 only allowed relief where the default was not willful, a subsequent trial of the cause could be had, and public justice did not otherwise require the penalty be enforced. Smaldone v. United States, 211 F.2d 161, 163 (10 Cir. 1954).
The early case of Reese v. United States, 76 U.S. 13, 19 L.Ed. 541 (1870) recognized that sureties on bail recognizances are in many respects different from sureties on ordinary bonds or commercial contracts. The sureties can discharge themselves at any time by surrendering the principal and are discharged at the principal’s death. Sureties may also arrest the principal without warrant to effect his appearance in court, but any change in the bail contract, no matter how trivial, made without their consent releases them.4 Another ground for the decision in Reese was that the government had made it impossible for the surety to perform by allowing the principal to leave the United States, recognizing that the surety’s powers of arrest can only be exercised within the United States, and holding: “It would be against all principle and all justice to allow the government to recover against the sureties for not producing their principal, when it had itself consented to his placing himself beyond their reach and control.” 22 of 76 U.S.
We do not think that this case falls within the holding of Reese, supra, in that the government did not make it impossible for the surety to perform; nor [526]*526within the principles enunciated in Hansen v. Edwards, 210 Mo.App. 35, 240 S.W. 489 (1922), where the state sovereign released the principal on extradition to another state sovereign, thus rendering the surety’s performance impossible; or United States v. Craft, 162 F.Supp. 578 (S.D.W.Va.1958), where one federal court prohibited the principal from appearing in another federal district; or United States v. Vendetti, 33 F.Supp. 34 (D.C.Mass.1940), where the principal escaped from the custody of the United States after pleading guilty on another charge — the United States as obligee in the bond took the principal out of the implied custody of the surety without the surety’s consent and then through the carelessness or negligence of the obligee’s agents allowed the principal to escape. Nor do we think that the more liberalized equitable principle of justice as exemplified in Rule 46 commands relief as in Smaldone v. United States, supra, where the Court held it an abuse of the trial judge’s discretion not to afford relief in a case where the principal showed up for trial but defaulted in appearance during the trial in order to have an operation for acute appendicitis, and then several days after the operation the trial was resumed and resulted in a hung jury.
We think that the present factual situation falls within those classes of cases where the sovereign did not render performance by the surety impossible, such as Detroit Fidelity & Surety Co. v. United States, 36 F.2d 682 (6 Cir. 1930) where the Court held that permission of the trial court to leave the jurisdiction did not affect the right of a surety to arrest the principal without warrant, and that a Court rule of the District Court where the bond was executed provided for departure from the jurisdiction by leave of the Court; and United States v. Davis, 202 F.2d 621 (7 Cir. 1953), cert. denied Ferguson v. United States, 345 U.S. 998, 73 S.Ct. 1141, 97 L.Ed. 1404, holding the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in failing to remit any of the forfeited bond where the principal after default was apprehended by the FBI and then pleaded guilty at the suggestion of the surety. The Court in Davis indicated that although it believed the trial court might well have remitted a portion of the forfeited amount, and the trial court’s action was probably “severe or even harsh”, failure to order remittal was not an abuse of discretion.
Davis viewed the bond as a contract between the surety and the government that if the government releases the principal from custody, the surety will undertake that the principal will appear personally at any specified time and place to answer; upon the failure of the principal to so appear, the surety becomes the absolute debtor of the United States for the amount of the penalty. Also pertinent is United States v. Egan, 394 F.2d 262 (2 Cir. 1968), where the Court held that an order requiring the principal to report daily to the marshal which was modified to require a reporting at ten-day intervals was not an enlargement of the conditions of bail nor did it enhance the principal’s chances of absconding.
The surety here has not demonstrated any basis for relief, either legal or equitable. Its legal contention that a unilateral modification of the bond was brought about when the trial court granted the principal permission to leave the Court’s district and travel to her home in Peoria, Illinois, is not well taken because the bond expressly provides .“that the defendant is not to depart the Eastern District of Missouri * * * except in accordance with such orders * * * as may be issued by * * * the United States District Court.” (Emphasis supplied.) This clause expressly reserved to the Court power to enlarge the area in which the principal of the bond may travel. Stuyvesant, as a compensated surety, accepted the onerous conditions of assuring a criminal defendant’s appearance for trial and should anticipate the enlargement of travel restrictions in accordance with the terms of the bond. The surety does not have to be notified every time the principal is to appear in court but instead should keep itself post[527]*527ed on when the principal is to appear in order to keep itself informed of any changes made by the court in accordance with the terms and purpose of the bond.
Thus, where the enlargement of travel area does not place the principal beyond the bounds of the United States, the surety should be responsible for the appearance of the principal, and it has the power of arrest without warrant in carrying out its obligations to produce the principal.
The surety has failed to show any equitable ground for relief under Rule 46 on the broad principle that justice does not require enforcement of the forfeiture. United States v. Davis, 202 F.2d 621, 625 (7 Cir. 1953). The principal did not appear for trial and has not been located by either the government or the surety and no exonerating explanation warranting relief has been provided.
Judgment affirmed.