Studley v. Ballard

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Studley v. Ballard

47 N.E. 1000, 169 Mass. 295, 1897 Mass. LEXIS 66

CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

DecidedOctober 20, 1897

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 47 N.E. 1000 (Studley v. Ballard) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Studley v. Ballard, 47 N.E. 1000, 169 Mass. 295, 1897 Mass. LEXIS 66 (Mass. 1897).

Pincite

Opinion

Holmes, J.

The place of seizure was the town of Hampden. The plaintiffs lived in Palmer. There were otljer deputies nearer, but the defendant especially desired and requested the plaintiffs to do the work, and promised to pay them. The case is here, after a finding for the plaintiffs by a judge without a jury, upon an exception to a refusal to rule that the contracts were without consideration and illegal. That broad question is the only one before us. It appears that the plaintiffs, at the defendant’s request, went to Springfield to get evidence upon which to found complaints, and advice as to the best manner in which to proceed in serving the warrants, and subsequently made complaints, obtained warrants, and served them. We must assume that the judge found that the defendant’s promises referred to the pre[296]*296liminary or outside work and expenditures, and that the trips to Springfield recovered for fall within the promises as thus construed. No question is raised by the exceptions on these points.

It follows that the exceptions must be overruled. The rule of law is simple. A contract to pay an officer for doing his official duty, or to pay him a sum in addition to his statutory fees, cannot be enforced. Pool v. Boston, 5 Cush. 219. Brophy v. Marble, 118 Mass. 548. Hatch v. Mann, 15 Wend. 44. But a contract is good to pay him for services outside the line of his duty for which the law allows him no fee. Davis v. Munson, 43 Vt. 676. Trundle v. Riley, 17 B. Mon. (Ky.) 396. England v. Davidson, 11 Ad. & El. 856. In Shattuck v. Woods, 1 Pick. 171, 175, it is said that, if an officer returns an execution unsatisfied by consent of the creditor and has incurred any expense, he must look to the creditor for his recompense.

We cannot say that the plaintiffs have been allowed to recover for anything except their time, travel, and outlay in order to get information before filing the complaints. In Davis v. Munson, ubi supra, a deputy sheriff who went in pursuit of escaped prisoners and recaptured them was held entitled to a reward which had been offered. In these cases, as in that, the plaintiffs were under no “ specific official obligation ” to look up information, and apart from the defendant’s promises would have been entitled to no pay for their trouble or expense. It does not appear that what they did fell within Pub. Sts. c. 100, § 43, and it is unnecessary to consider what the effect of that section would be.

Exceptions overruled.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Holmes, J.

The place of seizure was the town of Hampden. The plaintiffs lived in Palmer. There were otljer deputies nearer, but the defendant especially desired and requested the plaintiffs to do the work, and promised to pay them. The case is here, after a finding for the plaintiffs by a judge without a jury, upon an exception to a refusal to rule that the contracts were without consideration and illegal. That broad question is the only one before us. It appears that the plaintiffs, at the defendant’s request, went to Springfield to get evidence upon which to found complaints, and advice as to the best manner in which to proceed in serving the warrants, and subsequently made complaints, obtained warrants, and served them. We must assume that the judge found that the defendant’s promises referred to the pre[296]*296liminary or outside work and expenditures, and that the trips to Springfield recovered for fall within the promises as thus construed. No question is raised by the exceptions on these points.

It follows that the exceptions must be overruled. The rule of law is simple. A contract to pay an officer for doing his official duty, or to pay him a sum in addition to his statutory fees, cannot be enforced. Pool v. Boston, 5 Cush. 219. Brophy v. Marble, 118 Mass. 548. Hatch v. Mann, 15 Wend. 44. But a contract is good to pay him for services outside the line of his duty for which the law allows him no fee. Davis v. Munson, 43 Vt. 676. Trundle v. Riley, 17 B. Mon. (Ky.) 396. England v. Davidson, 11 Ad. & El. 856. In Shattuck v. Woods, 1 Pick. 171, 175, it is said that, if an officer returns an execution unsatisfied by consent of the creditor and has incurred any expense, he must look to the creditor for his recompense.

We cannot say that the plaintiffs have been allowed to recover for anything except their time, travel, and outlay in order to get information before filing the complaints. In Davis v. Munson, ubi supra, a deputy sheriff who went in pursuit of escaped prisoners and recaptured them was held entitled to a reward which had been offered. In these cases, as in that, the plaintiffs were under no “ specific official obligation ” to look up information, and apart from the defendant’s promises would have been entitled to no pay for their trouble or expense. It does not appear that what they did fell within Pub. Sts. c. 100, § 43, and it is unnecessary to consider what the effect of that section would be.

Exceptions overruled.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

47 N.E. 1000, 169 Mass. 295, 1897 Mass. LEXIS 66, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/studley-v-ballard-mass-1897.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack