Stucky v. City of San Antonio

Fifth Circuit

Stucky v. City of San Antonio

307 F.3d 315, 2002 WL 31084441

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

DecidedSeptember 17, 2002

Docket00-50462

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 307 F.3d 315 (Stucky v. City of San Antonio) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Stucky v. City of San Antonio, 307 F.3d 315, 2002 WL 31084441 (5th Cir. 2002).

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Opinion

ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Before KING, Chief Judge, and REAVLEY and JONES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

In this case, Plaintiffs-Counter Defendants Brenda L. Stucky and Richard Villa-neva, owners of towing companies in San Antonio, Texas, appealed to this court from the district court’s award of summary judgment on the basis that 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c) does not preempt certain ordinances prohibiting tow trucks from removing disabled vehicles from public streets without being directed to do so by the city and creating an option to extend the city’s exclusive contract with a rival towing company. On review of this ruling, we reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. See Stucky v. City of San Antonio, 260 F.3d 424, 446 (5th Cir.2001).

Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court granted the applications for writ of certiorari filed by Defendant-Counter Plaintiff the City of San Antonio and In-tervenor DefendanF-Counter Plaintiff Texas Towing Corporation, vacated our prior judgment, and ordered the “case remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of City of Columbus v. Ours Garage and Wrecker Service, Inc., — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 2226, 153 L.Ed.2d 430 (2002).” City of San Antonio v. Stucky, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 2617, 153 L.Ed.2d 801 (2002).

Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s remand, we now remand the case to the district court for further consideration in light of Ours Garage, with specific instructions at least to address whether San Antonio Wrecker Code section 19-391 and City Ordinance 77716 are appropriately characterized as exercises of the “safety regulatory authority of a state with respect to motor vehicles,” the statutory exception to 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c) preemption addressed in Ours Garage, and for disposition.

REMANDED.

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ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Before KING, Chief Judge, and REAVLEY and JONES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

In this case, Plaintiffs-Counter Defendants Brenda L. Stucky and Richard Villa-neva, owners of towing companies in San Antonio, Texas, appealed to this court from the district court’s award of summary judgment on the basis that 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c) does not preempt certain ordinances prohibiting tow trucks from removing disabled vehicles from public streets without being directed to do so by the city and creating an option to extend the city’s exclusive contract with a rival towing company. On review of this ruling, we reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. See Stucky v. City of San Antonio, 260 F.3d 424, 446 (5th Cir.2001).

Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court granted the applications for writ of certiorari filed by Defendant-Counter Plaintiff the City of San Antonio and In-tervenor DefendanF-Counter Plaintiff Texas Towing Corporation, vacated our prior judgment, and ordered the “case remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of City of Columbus v. Ours Garage and Wrecker Service, Inc., — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 2226, 153 L.Ed.2d 430 (2002).” City of San Antonio v. Stucky, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 2617, 153 L.Ed.2d 801 (2002).

Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s remand, we now remand the case to the district court for further consideration in light of Ours Garage, with specific instructions at least to address whether San Antonio Wrecker Code section 19-391 and City Ordinance 77716 are appropriately characterized as exercises of the “safety regulatory authority of a state with respect to motor vehicles,” the statutory exception to 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c) preemption addressed in Ours Garage, and for disposition.

REMANDED.

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307 F.3d 315, 2002 WL 31084441, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stucky-v-city-of-san-antonio-ca5-2002.

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